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Note on transliterations
For Mongolian Cyrillic transliteration, I adopted the MNS 5217:2012 
standard approved by the National Council of Standardisation 
(Standartchillyn ündesnii zövlol 2012) of Mongolia. For Mongolian 
names of people, however, I had to follow the system General Authority 
for State Registration of Mongolia adopted to print names on Mongolian 
passports, which is the widely accepted system to write contemporary 
Mongolian names. The main difference between the MNS 5217:2012 
standard and the registration authority standard appear in Mongolian 
Cyrillic letters such as Ө, Ү and У. In the state registration authority 
standard, the transliteration of the Mongolian Cyrillic Ө is U which is 
not different from the transliteration of the Mongolian Cyrillic Ү and У. 
In the MNS 5217:2012 standard, the transliteration of the Mongolian 
Cyrillic Ө is Ö, while the transliteration of the Mongolian Cyrillic Ү is Ü 
and У is U. For example, the name ‘Мөнх’ is ‘Munkh’, not ‘Mönkh’, in the 
state registration authority standard which I adopt in this book. Also, in 
the case of some well-known Mongolian names and words, I followed 
the most widely accepted versions in English literature. For example, 
‘Буриад’, which should be ‘Buriad’ in the MNS 5217:2012 standard, 
often appears as ‘Buryat’ in English literature. For Mongolian classical 
script, known as Uyghur, Vertical or Old Mongolian script, I adopted B. I. 
Vladimirtsov’s (1971) system, except Q replaces KH, SH replaces Š, and 
GH replaces γ in some words that are already established. 
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Preface
Mongolia is known to the world for its post-Soviet democratic and 
neoliberal transformation, successfully achieved in complete peace, 
without any fighting or violence. However, more than 20 years after the 
collapse of the socialist regime, environmental and nationalist protestors 
interrupted the peace in an attempt to gain attention for the protection 
of the environment from mining and to preserve the mobile pastoral way 
of life. On 16 September 2013, there was a gunshot1 during a protest 
carried out by several environmentalist and nationalist movements in 
Chinggis Square2 in front of the state house (Töriin ordon), where the 
president, parliament and government of Mongolia operate. Mongolia’s 
most famous and most successful environmental activist, Goldman 
Environmental Prize winner (2007) and National Geographic Emerging 
Explorer (2008) Munkhbayar Tsetsegee, appeared in front of the state 
house entrance with his colleagues, armed with rifles and grenades. 
State special security (Töriin tusgai khamgaalaltyn gazar), intelligence 
(Tagnuulyn yerönkhii gazar) and police terminated the actions of the 
protestors and arrested them. No one was hurt. Munkhbayar was 
arrested, along with 11 men of the river movement. The court sentenced 
five members of the movement to one to ten years in prison for possessing 
arms, attempted terrorism and extortion (see Chapter 5). The incident 
shocked many Mongolians because it was probably the first ever public 
incident, in modern times, of Mongolians bringing arms against the tör 
(state),3 which is considered as superior, sacred, respected and unchal-
lengeable by many Mongolians (see also Bumochir 2004; Dulam 2009). 
The destructive consequences of the mining industry generated seemingly 
endless protests by environmentalist and nationalist movements, and 
some activists professed that they were willing to sacrifice their own lives 
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to protect the environment. Amongst many other motivations, the above 
incident inspired me the most to write this book and to understand what 
made these activists decide to make such a move. 
Since 1990, as a Mongolian I grew up learning to envision the 
future of Mongolia as a modern nation like Japan, where preservation 
of ulamjlal (tradition) and advancement of shinechlel (modernisation) 
can happen together. Yet for many Mongolians a combination of the 
two sometimes appears to be a dilemma. In other words, my experience 
with the topic of the book is itself a dilemma. For example, taking the 
difficulties of the economy and the environment into consideration, 
many Mongolians think that our nation-state and its people are facing 
a dilemma (see also Zulbayar 2015; Jargalsaikhan 2018). The dilemma 
is between modern and traditional, local and global, nomadic and 
urban, pastoralism and mining, socialism and capitalism, nationalism 
and neoliberalism, and the environment and economy. Mongolians 
who experience the extreme consequences of the economic boom and 
bust, and witness endless political debates between neoliberal and 
nationalist agents, seem to be torn between the contesting ideologies 
that rule the country (see also Munkherdene 2018). For example, at 
the end of 2014, when Mongolian Prime Minister Saikhanbileg Chimed 
(2014–16) established his cabinet, he immediately announced that the 
country was encountering a severe economic crisis. He was enthusi-
astic to urgently start large mining projects and appeal to investors as 
soon as possible to aid the declining economy (Dulam 2015; Bumochir 
2017, 30; Odonchimeg 2015). One of the projects was the Gatsuurt 
gold mine, on a historical sacred mountain named Noyon, co-owned by 
Canadian Centerra Gold Inc. and the Mongolian state. In January 2016, 
in the parliamentary session to approve the government’s decision to 
contract Canadian Centerra Gold to extract at the sacred mountain – 
with dozens of invaluable archaeological sites from the Xiongnu empire 
(3rd BC–1st AD) – Saikhanbileg responded to the dissent of parliament 
member, former journalist and activist Uyanga Gantumur4 with agony 
and frustration:
Now we have just taken Noyon Mountain under protection 
[historical site]. In ten kilometres’ distance, there is the Gatsuurt 
deposit, which was left halfway extracted and we are about to 
continue and finish [the extraction]. As a result, about 1,000 jobs 
will be available, US$240 million – which is MNT 480 billion – will 
be our tax. Plus, we will have 50 tonnes of gold reserve. These 
50 tonnes of gold reserve will help the dollar rate you are paying for 
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from your pocket. Therefore, we are doing this in order to bring our 
economy into circulation. You demand the government to improve 
the economy, and when the government tries to do something, 
then you demand the government resign. In your action of a pair 
of scissors, what kind of government, what kind of state and what 
kind of Mongolia can move forward and develop?5
In parliament, Uyanga actively represented the voices of nationalist and 
environmentalist movements and fought against extractive industry 
destruction and mining corporations. In that sense, this was a reaction 
not only to Uyanga and other members in parliament who resisted 
but also to vast numbers of environmental and nationalist movement 
members, local residents and the public, who campaigned and protested 
for more than a year by organising hunger strikes, performing shamanic 
rituals on the central square, worshipping the mountain, and developing 
scholarly documentation of archaeological findings. The parliamen-
tary session issued a decision approving the government proposal to 
register 11,000 hectares of the Noyon Mountain in the network of 
special state protection (töriin tusgai khamgaalalt), under the category 
of ‘natural resource’, and 405 hectares in another network of state special 
protection, under the category of ‘historical site’ (also singularity). 
Parliament also approved the government’s deal with Canadian Centerra 
Gold, and agreed Mongolian state ownership to be 34 per cent. These 
two categories of the state protection of the same mountain divide the 
mountain into two parts. The smaller part, designated a ‘historical site’, 
is to protect the sacred mountain, as some protestors and politicians in 
parliament demanded. The larger part is a ‘natural resource’ to mine the 
gold deposit – with the investment of Canadian Centerra Gold company 
– in order to ease Mongolia’s economic crisis.
As we saw above, the prime minister described contradictory 
necessities and demands of actors as two blades of a pair of scissors. 
This is an interesting way to present the situation of the government in 
a dilemma of two conflicting goals: to secure the economic development 
of the country and also to protect its history and environment.6 With 
the metaphor of the scissors, if the government promotes one of the 
necessities or demands and drops the other, then the other necessity 
(depicted as the other scissor blade) cuts or causes damage. Therefore, 
to keep both sides happy, the government decided to accept and 
promote both of the contradicting demands at the same time. The prime 
minister’s presentation of the situation is indicative of his desperation 
to solve the dilemma. However, there are those who do not accept the 
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decision, and they argue that the scissor blade represents the economy/
development and that corporations will still cause damage by scissoring 
historical and natural sites. As a reaction, the other scissor blade 
represents the nationalist movements and environmental attempts to 
scissor the government, corporations and the project to aid the national 
economy. Therefore, the prime minister had to actively demand Uyanga 
and the other politicians and movements – representing the opposition, 
the other blade of the scissors – to cease their resistance. In the prime 
minister’s description, the movements are depicted as being in control 
of one of the two blades of a pair of scissors. The movement can still 
inflict damage, even if the government manages to secure the action 
of the other scissor blade. The government does not have the power or 
authority to fully control the situation, as it can secure only one of the 
scissor blades, not two.
For those who did not accept the above decision of the government, 
the first dilemma of economy/development versus history/environment 
is false. They argue that there are other ways to solve the crisis of the 
economy – that is, rather than by extracting the sacred mountain. The 
prime minister justifies his decision by explaining that this was the best 
solution to save the national economy and the environment at the same 
time. However, it is difficult to know whether the decision was solely 
for the sake of the national economy or for the environment. How 
much consideration was given to his individual reputation and the 
interest of his political party? The prime minister wanted to keep and 
increase the number of supporters’ votes in the coming parliamentary 
election, which was less than six months away. People also suspect that 
behind the discourse of scissors and dilemmas, there exists corruption, 
individual deals with investors and donations to political parties. In 
other words, the presentation of the political and economic situation in 
the framework of a dilemma is a useful tool to obscure reality and justify 
political decisions.7
However, many also question whether the economic and envi-
ronmental dilemmas are inevitable. For example, Ian Goldin and Alan 
Winters (1995, 14) conclude that ‘economic growth and development 
are perfectly consistent with environmental protection’. While others, 
namely Herman E. Daly (1996, 1), suggest that terms such as the 
economy and the environment together create an ‘oxymoron’. Moreover, 
Raúl R. Cordero, Pedro Roth and Luis Da Silva (Cordero et al. 2005, 1) 
conclude that environmental care and economic growth are not incom-
patible but to reconcile them is not easy.8 Paul Ekins (2002), in his 
account of ‘green growth’, writes about how to find the compatibility 
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between economic growth and environmental sustainability. While it is 
not easy, it is possible, and thus they consider it to be a false dilemma.
I do not aim to contribute to this debate and prove or disprove 
contradiction or consistency in the relationship of the economy and the 
environment. Instead, it is interesting to see how the resource economy 
and environment are believed to be a dilemma in certain cultures, or how 
the so-called dilemma develops into a conflict, or how a false dilemma is 
presented to be a real dilemma for political purposes. These questions 
about dilemmas are useful to understand and show the complexity of the 
multipartite relationship of agents in the state, mining companies, donors 
and movements. In other words, despite what international financial and 
development organisations suggest – and what scholars debate – true or 
false, some Mongolian rulers present certain challenges as a dilemma or 
struggle, and fail to find the difficult or perhaps non-achievable marriage 
of economic growth and environmental protection.
In his discussion about the ‘resource trap’, Paul Collier notes that 
‘each rich, resource-hungry country is locked into a prisoner’s dilemma 
of inaction’ (Collier 2007, 47). Similarly, Stuart Kirsch also notes that 
deep in the heart of the resource problem there are ‘underlying dilemmas 
associated with the capitalist modes of production [that] can never be 
completely resolved; they can only be renegotiated in new forms’ (Kirsch 
2014, 3). In other words, it is a mechanism of neoliberal capitalism, 
foreign investment and forms of financialisation that forces the state into 
dilemmas. For Collier, the dilemma imprisons and prevents action, while 
for Kirsch, the dilemma cannot be resolved entirely, but it can be renego-
tiated. Renegotiation is precisely what the Mongolian government had 
been attempting.
It is useful to take this brief account of Collier and Kirsch into 
consideration and explore experiences of dilemmas as they emerged 
in Mongolia. For example, Katherine Verdery and Caroline Humphrey 
(2004, 17) discuss the postsocialist dilemma or ‘political impasse’ and 
show how the government of Mongolia tangled with the issue of whether 
(and how) to acknowledge the Mongols’ cultural practices of past eras 
and international advice to create private property. In reference to 
natural resources and mining, Mette High (2012, 249) describes how 
‘some historical epochs have sought to limit the extraction of minerals 
in the Mongolian cultural region, others have celebrated mining for its 
potential promotion of economic growth and large-scale industriali-
sation’ (see also High and Schlesinger 2010). In their critique against 
the accusation of ‘resource nationalism’, Rebecca Empson and Tristan 
Webb (2014, 232) argue that the Mongolian state9 attempts to establish 
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‘trusting partnerships’. ‘The idea of “trusting partnerships” can refer to 
the relationship between the Mongolian State and foreign investors, as 
well as in specific ways to that relationship between the State and the 
Mongolian people’. In this relationship, the state struggles to ‘balance 
expectations from all of the partnerships’ (Empson and Webb 2014, 247). 
In this book I present the different dilemmas of the national 
government, parliament and rulers of Mongolia caught between liberal, 
neoliberal, market and capitalist, and the so-called populist, nationalist 
and patriotic tendencies and approaches: the establishment of the liberal 
economy and mining industry in Chapter 1; state control in Chapter 2; 
and the approval of the environmental protection law in Chapter 5, which 
were all political ‘renegotiations’ made under the pressure of different 
dilemmas between environmental well-being and economic prosperity, 
and popular mobilisations and mining corporations and investors. 
Anticipating the political, economic, social, cultural, religious and 
environmental dilemmas of the nation-state government, rulers, local 
residents and nationalist movements in the neoliberal, democratic and 
global world is an alternative way to understand and interpret difficul-
ties of countries such as Mongolia. Pascale Hatcher (2014, 128) argues 
that ‘the cases of the Philippines and Mongolia, and to a lesser extent 
Laos, rather show that the recent changes in policy are symptoms of the 
increasing dilemma forced upon the state by the very third generation of 
mining regimes promoted by the multilateral institutions’. In the sense 
of being a force produced by multilateral institutions or agents, false or 
not, dilemmas tell us about struggles, challenges of individual rulers, 
protestors, local residents, company owners and investors and all other 
inner workings in the resource-abundant country.
As a Mongolian who shares experiences of such dilemmas, in 
order to draw a comprehensive picture of Mongolian resource economy, 
environment, mobilisation, nationalism and state, I conducted research 
on multilateral institutions and agents. To do this, I met and interviewed 
political leaders such as Ochirbat Punsalmaa, the first president of 
Mongolia (1990–7), and Byambasuren Dash, the last prime minister 
of the Mongolian People’s Republic (1990–2), and their colleagues 
and other politicians and technocrats, who had prominent roles in 
the establishment of the liberal mining economy. In addition to such 
politicians and officials, I also visited Mongolian and foreign gold mining 
companies and interviewed their owners, operators and managers, who 
support the liberal economy and free market principles. They directly 
benefited from the liberal policy on mining economy; they were also 
disturbed by the results of laws, regulations and political decisions to 
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control natural resources as well as successful protests of nationalist 
environmental movements. In order to provide an account of the other 
side of the conflict, I met the so-called ‘resource nationalist’ politicians, 
economists, lawyers, technocrats and scholars, who succeeded in 
implementing different forms of state control over natural resources 
and placed restraints on mining companies. The popular mobilisations 
make up another influential group of people who contributed to nation-
alistic politics. Local people – including herders and those who inhabit 
the administrative unit centre settlements – are those who were most 
negatively affected by the destruction of the mining operations and 
started fighting against gold mining companies and the state. They are 
also the ones who contributed most to shape nationalism, environmen-
talism and the state in Mongolia: they closed down dozens of mining 
operations and stalled some hundreds of mining licences, and defeated 
the government in the supreme court when it did not implement a law to 
protect the environment.
As an anthropologist, I sought to understand and describe the 
above-mentioned opposing groups and their approaches. I informed 
and explained to everyone I met that I would also meet and interview 
people who were in direct opposition and that this was important to 
draw a full picture of the scenario. All of the people I met understood 
my situation and accepted my position as an anthropologist and a 
Mongolian who was trying to develop a multi-faceted approach. I ended 
up in relationships with these people – I worked with many people with 
competing ideologies for years – and I know that I cannot judge them or 
prioritise any of them over any other. It is impossible (or futile) to prove 
or disprove all of the information that emerged in the interviews – for 
example, I cannot prove or disprove popular suspicions about nationalist 
movements and the extortion of mining companies; I cannot confirm or 
deny the corruption of politicians; and there is no final word to be found 
regarding private mining company owners who possess many mining 
licences, which make up a significant portion of Mongolian mineral 
wealth. In my work, I present my materials as they present themselves, 
and how these actors make sense of their approaches, and how they 
justify their actions. This book does not prove or disprove whether 
the liberal or nationalistic political decisions and actions were right or 
wrong. Instead, it lets opposing voices be heard, and allows them to 
propose their justifications.
My position as an anthropologist is not a dilemma for me, because 
I can write about all of these people, about both neoliberalism and 
nationalism and how they conflict and resist each other. However, my 
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personal position between the two ideologies and those who promote 
them is a dilemma for me; that is, as a Mongolian. Here, my dilemma 
should not be confused with my anthropological concerns with 
ethics, methodology and the scholarly discourses with which my work 
engages. However, as a Mongolian intellectual, I do worry about the 
country’s vulnerable condition, just as many other Mongolians do. Many 
Mongolians ask me whether the neoliberal or nationalistic approaches 
are correct for Mongolia to advance. This might be what many readers 
seek an answer to when they read this book. After observing both sides, 
I concluded that contemporary Mongolia reveals the interaction of indi-
genisation and neoliberalisation, and how different dilemmas force the 
two processes to shape one another. For example, a dilemma between the 
economy and the environment – real or not – forces the indigenous aspects 
of the nation to shape neoliberal policies and the capitalist free market. 
In other words, the indigenous shaping of neoliberalism is a product 
of different dilemmas. In the same way, I find that in consequence of a 
dilemma between neoliberalism and nationalism, or the economy and 
environment in Mongolia, matters of the indigenous nation-state shape 
neoliberal policies and markets. This should be expected. As Amarjargal 
Rinchinnyam, the former prime minister of Mongolia (1999–2000), 
once said, ‘We are just 22 years old in terms of having a market economy 
– you cannot compare us to Hong Kong or Singapore’ (Sanchata 2012). 
Empson and Webb write that ‘This argument promotes the idea, not so 
much of “resource nationalism”, but more of an image of an “innocent 
newcomer” that is learning the practice of contemporary international 
political economy: the importance of private contractual agreements 
and the detached yet supportive role of the State in underpinning that 
environment; the raising of private finance and financial governance 
requirements; and macroeconomic planning generally’ (Empson and 
Webb 2014, 241). The learning experience of this ‘innocent newcomer’ 
from the contemporary international political economy and nationalistic 
responses to different consequences of the global economy has been a 
process of the indigenous shaping neoliberalism, not just how neoliberal-
ism shapes the local (see also Tsing 2005) as many previous works depict.
Notes
 1 At the subsequent trial, the court found that a state special security officer was responsible for 
the gunshot, not the protestors (see Chapter 5).
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 2 The square was originally named after the communist revolutionary leader Sükhbaatar 
Damdin, and the name changed to Chinggis from 2013 to 2016. The above incident occurred 
on the square when it was called Chinggis Square.
 3 The peace was also interrupted on 1 July 2008, by protestors who resisted the results of the 
election. In the riot, police used tear gas and non-lethal weapons and killed five people. Unlike 
this riot, on 16 September 2013, it was the activists who brought arms in order to show their 
resistance against decisions of the central government and Parliament.
 4 Uyanga is a woman in her forties who is a journalist and activist. She had been organising and 
leading dozens of nationalist movements and demonstrations against the state rulers, and was 
elected to the Parliament in 2012.
 5 For the full video, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQiaMYSGdO0.
 6 For other dilemmas in Mongolia, see also Badral Zulbayar (2015) and Mendee 
Jargalsaikhan (2018).
 7 Many others also write about how other countries (Cordero et al. 2005, 1; Song and Woo 2008) 
experience similar economic and environment dilemmas in their own ways. International 
organisations, analysts and the media frequently address the economic slowdown triggered by 
environmental policy. Also, major surveys also suggest the same. For example, Forbes Insights 
survey shows that the United States regulatory environment has more impact on business than 
the economy (Moreno 2014).
 8 Raúl R. Cordero, Pedro Roth and Luis Da Silva use a simple graphical model to show co-related 
growth of GDP and carbon dioxide emission. They argue that in order to meet both economic 
growth and environmental protection it is necessary to diminish the rate between pollutant 
emission and economic growth unit and the rate between resource consumption and economic 
growth unit (Cordero et al. 2005, 1).
 9 By State they ‘mean the Constitution and all the rules and actions of public services that flow 




This book presents the debates, discourses and reactions in Mongolia 
after the collapse of the socialist regime, which were triggered by critical 
economic situations, the development of the extractive industry, and 
environmental degradation that came about during efforts to craft the 
Mongolian nation-state (for crafting the state in Inner Asia see also 
Sneath 2006). It presents the emerging interactions and conflicts in 
what I refer to as the multipartite relationship of different agents. These 
agents and stakeholders in multipartite relationships use sets of concepts 
as discursive resources to understand, explain and justify their decisions 
and actions – by radically rethinking what it means to be a Mongolian, 
the importance of the nation, the proper form of state authority, the 
role of citizens, which forms of economy are just, and how nature, the 
environment, territory and sovereignty should be protected. The set of 
concepts that are mobilised include ‘neoliberalism’, ‘capitalism’, ‘national 
economy’, ‘political independence’, ‘resource nationalism’, ‘alternative 
economy’, ‘state’, ‘environmentalism’, ‘tradition’, ‘pastoralism’ and 
‘nomadism’, and this book shows how they are contested in public culture 
and how they are assembled to form different ideological platforms with 
normative and therefore political implications. Accordingly, throughout 
the book, I treat these terms as concepts, perspectives and categories 
held and articulated by certain people towards certain entities for their 
own reasons. 
The ethnographically driven multipartite scope that I employ in 
this book allows me to inclusively capture the breadth, and accurately 
portray the complexity, of Mongolia’s political economy – including 
resources stretched across multiple local, national and transnational 
agents. Here, I use the aforementioned description to comment on 
existing interpretations of Mongolia’s recent political economy and, 
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further, to understand similar challenges in resource economies in 
different parts of the world. 
Many works in the field of resources, mining and the state ask 
why resource-rich countries fail to reach prosperity. This has led to the 
development of the concept ‘resource curse’ to answer this question. 
‘Resource curse’ refers to the irony that natural resource-abundant 
countries tend to have less economic growth, of which Mongolia can 
be an example. In other words, the term ‘resource curse’ is about a 
failure to benefit from resource endowment, experiencing Dutch 
Disease,1 sovereign debt, bad governance, resource rents, myopic policy, 
corruption and mismanagement (see also Auty 1993; Sachs and Warner 
2001; Gylfason et al. 1999; Krastev 2004; Ross 1999; Rosser 2006). Some 
acknowledge the same paradigm of resource curse to explain Mongolia’s 
economic crisis. Indeed, to a certain extent, Mongolia reveals some 
symptoms of the so-called resource curse. For example, in 2011 Jeffrey 
Reeves elaborates in detail some of these symptoms in his article, ‘Can 
Mongolia Avoid the Resource Curse?’ In his elaboration, he identifies 
some key symptoms of the resource curse in Mongolia. Those include 
weak governance, non-transparency, lack of accountability, corruption 
and violation of mining legislation. He concludes that ‘there is little 
reason to expect it will escape from the resource curse’ (Reeves 2011, 
182). I find that ‘resource curse’ is a generic way to understand different 
countries having similar experiences around the world. Gisa Weszkalnys 
(2011, 345) critiques the ability of the ‘resource curse’ to make sense of 
apprehensions of the past, present and future consequences of extractive 
industry developments. Following Weszkalnys, I seek to reveal the inner 
workings and components concealed in the ‘black box of the resource 
curse’ (Weszkalnys 2011, 356) by developing detailed illustrations of 
why and how Mongolian state rulers failed to bring prosperity. 
Compared to a resource curse, ‘resource nationalism’ is a concept 
that is more appropriate to utilise to discuss Mongolia. Many scholars, 
such as Misheelt Ganbold and Saleem Ali (2017), use the latter concept 
to depict Mongolia. However, many others, such as Rebecca Empson 
and Tristan Webb (2014), Jargalsaikhan Sanchir (2016) and Julian 
Dierkes (2016), argue that ‘resource nationalism’ is a term that serves 
as a political tactic to place pressure on the nation-state of Mongolia. 
Similarly, John Childs (2016) and Natalie Koch and Tom Perreault 
(2018) complain about neoliberal bias and reductionism in the use of the 
term ‘resource nationalism’. In Chapter 2, I argue that although it is not 
right to call it ‘resource nationalism’, it is also incorrect to argue that there 
is no nationalism in Mongolia’s resource economy and policy. Instead, I 
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suggest considering nationalist sentiments that appear in the resource 
business in the broader sphere of ideas of the nation in Mongolia.
Conflict is another theme that many people employ to explain 
resource economies. The conflicts in Mongolia’s resource economy, 
however, are in many ways different from what Michael Watts (2004) 
presents in Nigeria or what Anthony Bebbington (2012a and 2012b) 
presents in Peru. Both of these authors address longstanding national, 
territorial, and historical and ethnic conflicts (Watts 2004, 71–2; 
Bebbington 2012b, 225). In Mongolia, conflicts between movements, 
companies and the state are not longstanding, historical or ethnic. Here, 
conflicts are not primarily between different ethnic groups or nationali-
ties, or different class groups, or between minority and majority, or rural 
and urban, or central and peripheral populations. Instead, I argue that 
the conflicts emerge from the contradiction between nationalist and 
neoliberal ideologies. Since the collapse of socialism, different agents 
have promoted either nationalism or neoliberalism, but they could never 
completely eclipse the other (see Chapters 1, 2 and 5).
‘Resource curse’, ‘resource nationalism’ and conflict all attempt 
to understand and interpret the problems, challenges and conditions 
in the political economy of resources in Mongolia. However, this book 
frames the situation in a broader and comprehensive scope of nation 
building. Agents within the state, mining companies, donor organisa-
tions, and environmentalist and nationalist mobilisations often claim 
that their intentions are in the best interests of the country, nation and 
the environment. In other words, they all engage in different tasks of 
‘commoning’, a process of creating and nurturing a community (or a 
nation in the case of Mongolia) that includes non-human agents (Blaser 
and de la Cadena 2017, 186; Linebaugh 2008, 279; Bollier and Helfrich 
2012; Papadopoulos 2010). Yet the ‘commoning’ in Mongolia differs 
from the form that Peter Linebaugh coined. In the work of Linebaugh 
the ‘common’ refers to natural resources and the ‘commoning’ refers to 
‘relationships in society that are inseparable from relations to nature’ 
(Linebaugh 2008: 279). Yet in this book ‘commoning’ is shown to 
concern not only the environment and resources but also the political 
and economic interests of the nation and the common good, such as 
matters of the sovereignty, political independence, national economy 
and the autonomy of the state. In that sense, the verb form ‘commoning’ 
refers to what Mario Blaser and Marisol de la Cadena call the ‘invocation 
of the national common good’ (2017, 185). In other words, in Mongolia, 
all acts of ‘commoning’ in the end serve the common agenda to build 
an independent nation and craft a sovereign state. For example, the 
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rulers of the state claim that they supported the liberal economy and 
mining industry to save the national economy and to consolidate the 
political independence of the emerging nation-state as a matter of 
urgency (Chapter 1). The so-called ‘resource nationalist’ policymak-
ers and technocrats claim that they supported the state control on 
natural resources to contribute to the security of the nation-state and 
to prevent foreign dominations (Chapter 2). Owners and operators of 
mining companies claim that they ‘produce wealth’ (bayalag büteekh) 
to contribute to the national economy and to fund the sovereign nation-
state following the appeal of the liberal government (Chapter 3). Donors 
claim that they supported environmental movements to protect local 
democracy and civil society (Chapters 4 and 5). Activists claim that 
they intend to protect the common land, water and the environment 
abandoned by the state institutions (Chapters 5 and 6). All of these serve 
the sake of the public and national interests and common good to build 
an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983). 
Contest of Indigenisation and Neoliberalisation 
In their study of social movements, mining and policy, Anthony 
Bebbington et al. (2008, 2902) argue that ‘the institutions, structures, 
and discourses that govern asset distribution, security, and productivity 
are not pre-given. They are struggled over, re-worked, and co-produced 
through the actions and interactions of a range of market, state, and 
civil society actors.’ The same argument helps to understand problems 
in Mongolia. To condense the complexity and breadth of the political 
economy of resources in Mongolia, I consider two processes that 
Bebbington et al. call the co-production – indigenisation and neoliber-
alisation – in the above-mentioned framework of nation-state. With the 
term indigenisation, I refer to nationalist and statist initiatives intended 
to transform elements to be ethnically, historically, traditionally and 
authentically Mongolian. With the term neoliberalisation, I describe 
the neoliberal policies that established the global capitalist free market 
economy in Mongolia. The central project to build the sovereign nation 
and the state neither fully acknowledges nor entirely rejects the two; 
instead, many agents in this book suggest the incorporation of the two by 
finding the right balance. For this reason, since the collapse of socialism, 
challenging procedures and experiences, along with political, economic, 
social and cultural debates have been required to find the delicate 
balance between indigenisation and neoliberalisation. 
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There are two related but different meanings of the word 
indigenous. As I mentioned above, one concerns the historical, 
traditional and authentic culture thought to represent a nation. The 
second is about minority peoples and communities of different races 
who are distinct from the politically dominant majority population. In 
the context of Mongolia, I adopt the former usage and reject the latter. 
The word indigenous is new to Mongolia, mainly because the population 
of Mongolia cannot be divided into indigenous and non-indigenous 
groups, unlike many other places that use the term indigenous (such as 
in America and Australia). My use of the word indigenous, therefore, 
does not intend to support the use of the term recently developed in 
Mongolia: that is, to introduce the United Nations’ declarations on the 
rights of indigenous people, and to better allocate shares and benefits 
from mining operations to local people. I find such movements to be 
another form of indigenisation happening in Mongolia. The alternative 
form of indigenisation – a focus of this book – is about the making of 
the ethnic Mongolian people. Mongolians often use the word mongolchi-
lokh or mongoljuulakh (to mongolise, or to turn more Mongolian) to talk 
about making things or beings more Mongolian. The concept permits 
and encourages people to convert anything foreign into something more 
Mongolian by enhancing features considered to be Mongolian, or using 
alternative local techniques to transform it.2 In this sense, mongolisation 
is a process and a technique to make things happen or make things more 
indigenous, native and local. I argue that what happened to the political 
economy of resources in Mongolia was nationalist responses to trans-
formations designed to indigenise or mongolise neoliberal policies and 
the capitalist market economy. As a result, neoliberal policies and the 
market economy become an unrecognisable hybrid for some people. For 
this reason, some observers may complain that Mongolia does not have 
free market and liberal economy, while some others argue that because 
consequences of neoliberalisation were not suitable for Mongolia, it 
needed mongolisation or what I call indigenisation. 
With my use of the term neoliberalisation, I intend to respond to 
two related but distinct discussions of neoliberalism. The first considers 
neoliberalism as a ‘conceptual trash heap’ (Mair 2012) and is therefore 
‘an obstacle to the anthropological understanding of the twenty-first 
century’ (Eriksen et al. 2015, 911). Taylor Boas and Jordan Gans-Morse 
‘document three potentially problematic aspects of neoliberalism’s use: 
the term is often undefined; it is employed unevenly across ideological 
divides; and it is used to characterise an excessively broad variety 
of phenomena’ (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009, 137). Following Boas 
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and Gans-Morse, on 1 December 2012, in the Group for Debates in 
Anthropological Theory (GDAT), James Laidlaw and Jonathan Mair 
proposed a motion: ‘The concept of neoliberalism has become an obstacle 
to the anthropological understanding of the twenty-first century’ (Mair 
2012). Later Mair wrote on his webpage that whenever the term neolib-
eralism is tagged, different usages ‘seemed to be talking about quite 
different, even contradictory, things—the neoliberal tag seemed to add 
nothing’ (2012). Mair continued, ‘Or worse, it seemed portentous to 
invoke a whole global theory as a background explanation without doing 
the work of showing how “global forces” are linked to or expressed in 
the sort of “local” settings’ (2012).3 I acknowledge this argument, and I 
agree that cross-culturally, neoliberalism as a concept and a tag can be 
incoherent and even contradictory. Although I do agree with this claim, 
to write about the resource economy in Mongolia it is hard to abandon 
the use of the term neoliberalism. I also think that it is still possible to use 
it by making clear what it means in Mongolia. To overcome the burden 
of the term neoliberalism as something that can be empty and in flux, I 
shall clarify my use of the term, based on how Mongolians understand 
the current era. Mongolians often use the term zakh zeeliin üye (the 
era of the market; see also Sneath 2012) to talk about contemporary 
Mongolia, which is more about neoliberal policies and neoliberalisation 
processes that established the capitalist free market economy. The era 
of zakh zeeliin üye in many ways captures the framework of neoliberal-
ism proposed by Manfred Steger and Ravi Roy (2010, 11). Following 
Steger and Roy, I take neoliberalism as three intertwined manifesta-
tions: an ideology; a mode of governance; and a policy package of 
deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation in the economy. In brief, in 
Mongolia neoliberalism as an ideology was employed by political rulers, 
and economic liberalisation policies they put into action established the 
capitalist market economy. I adopt the definition of Steger and Roy, not 
to test whether it fits in the case of Mongolia but to argue that neoliberal 
policies have been influential in Mongolia, at least in the range of the 
above manifestations.
The second understanding of neoliberalism considers it as an 
external and neocolonial power of international donor organisations, 
transnational corporations and capitalist states such as the United 
States (Harvey 2005; Harvey 2010, 28; Graeber 2011, 2; see also Peet 
2003; Ferguson 2006; Ong 2006), and threatens the sovereignty of the 
nation-state (Sassen 1996). It is common in the literature of neoliber-
alism, nation-state, globalism and capitalism to consider neoliberalism 
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and nation-state projects as contradictory. For instance, in the works that 
discuss neoliberal domination and neocolonialisation (Harvey 2010, 28; 
Graeber 2011, 2; see also Peet 2003; Ferguson 2006; Ong 2006; Harvey 
2005), the death of the nation-state (Sassen 1996), or of ‘resource 
nationalism’ (Bremmer and Johnston 2009, 149; Vivoda 2009, 532; 
Maniruzzaman 2009, 81; Click and Weiner 2010, 784; Kretzschmar, 
Kirchner and Sharifzyanova 2010), neoliberalism for non-Western states 
stands as an external force that inflicts and threatens nation-states and 
indigenous nations (see also Bargh 2007). I do not argue against such 
approaches. My intent is neither to reject this claim nor to take this 
approach. I choose not to repeat this claim in the case of Mongolia; Morris 
Rossabi (2005) and Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene (2012) already did some 
work to this end. In its place, I want to shed light on the employment of 
neoliberal ideologies in the process of nation-building and state-crafting 
in Mongolia, where indigeneity shapes neoliberal policies. Therefore, 
this book focuses not only on how global forces shape Mongolia but also 
on how the nation-building and state-crafting projects in Mongolia shape 
and make neoliberal policies incoherent or hybrid. The hybridity of 
neoliberal policies I present here is not the hybridity discourse about the 
neocolonial structures of power, embodied by ultra-liberalism and how 
international financial institutions (World Bank [WB] and International 
Monetary Fund [IMF]) appropriated and accommodated hybridity to 
achieve their own goals (Acheraïou 2011, 179). Instead it is about how 
indigenisation affects neoliberal policies and free markets. 
In the framework of nation-building and state-crafting, for some 
political leaders neoliberalism became an ideological instrument 
employed in the national agenda and capitalist market economy became 
an opportunity to fund the nation and the state, as I mentioned before. 
In other words, some rulers of Mongolia considered marketisation, 
privatisation and deregulation to be not only neoliberal projects but also 
a mission that tied up with welfare of the nation to fund the emerging 
nation-state (see Chapter 1). Such claims make neoliberal ideologies 
nation-building policies of the nation-state. In this project, the nation-
state rulers have some freedom to decide or debate on which conse-
quences of marketisation to experiment with, which ones to attain and 
which ones to reject, although attempts to reject are always regarded as 
‘resource nationalist’ (see also Joffé et al. 2009, 4; Domjan and Stone 
2010, 38; Bremmer and Johnston 2009, 149; Wilson 2015, 399; Childs 
2016, 539). In Mongolia, it can be regarded as indigenisation or mongol-
isation by adjusting the alien supremacy, which does not have to fit in 
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all of the principles to build the sovereign indigenous nation and the 
state. The mongolisation does not put neoliberal ideologies in a position 
of an alien power. For example, while some rulers of the state employed 
neoliberalism, and established the free market, others expressed critical 
approaches to neoliberal policies and attempted to control the process of 
marketisation; their intentions helped to indigenise the foreignness and 
unfitness of some consequences of neoliberalisation in Mongolia. Here, I 
mean the state control, regulation, navigation by limiting, adjusting and 
removing what is considered to be contrary, conflicting and threatening 
to what is called the ünet zuil (values), yazguur erkh ashig (original 
interests) and bakharhal (pride) of the nation. In other words, some 
Mongolian rulers, politicians, technocrats and activists attempted to 
fight against some neoliberal policies and control some consequences of 
marketisation (some were successful and others were not). In building 
the nation-state, these leaders often highlight different matters of the 
overall national project and use the notion of nation-building and state-
crafting by ‘commoning’ to decide which consequences of neoliberal 
policies correspond or contradict other matters. Therefore, what 
shapes neoliberal policies and neoliberalisation processes is nationalist 
and statist political decisions that are related to the imagined nation-
building (Anderson 1983) and state-crafting. In this vein, the issues 
of hybridity of neoliberalism – that are widely targeted by scholars – 
are related not only to the WB and IMF but also to varied agendas of 
different national actors.
Ascription of Ethnic and Civic Nationalisms
The understandings of the nation, nationalism and state are inseparable 
in Mongolia, and they have radically different meanings compared to 
Euro-American contexts (see also Gankhuyag 2007). In the histori-
cally constructed project to build a sovereign nation and its own state, 
the process of indigenisation on the one hand, and neoliberalisation 
on the other hand, significantly shape the concepts of people, nation, 
sovereignty, state and nationalism. 
This book gives an account of how different agents in the state, 
mining companies and popular mobilisations endorse different 
discursive resources in processes related to political independence, 
sovereignty, environment and economy, and create routes to ratify 
nationalism. For example, some rulers of the state claim that they had 
to consolidate the independence of the state to end the domination of 
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the Soviet Union, to prevent the domination of China, and to balance 
dependences by welcoming power of other countries, organisations and 
transnational corporations (see Chapter 1). Nationalist technocrats and 
politicians claim that they supported the control of the state to protect 
the sovereignty of the country from risks of private mining companies, 
which can cause damage to the environment and territory of the country 
(see Chapter 2). Environmental and nationalist activists consider that by 
protecting the environment, they perform the sovereign right and duty 
of the state (tör) to protect its territory in the absence of state protection 
(see Chapter 5). Lhamsuren’s (2006) work points out that the underlining 
principles of all of these routes effectively endorse nationalism. That 
principle in Mongolia can be described as follows: ‘Mongolian collective 
identity, ethnic, national, or whatsoever it might be labelled, made the 
Mongols see themselves as an inherent community or entity that had its 
own distinct origin, culture, lifestyle, homeland and ruling institution, 
and was thus destined to live as such’ (Lhamsuren 2006, 92). 
In this book, nationalism is largely used to describe nation-building 
and state-crafting. Although ethnic features are central to nationalism in 
Mongolia, it does not mean that the so-called civic nationalism is absent 
in nation-building. Socialist and postsocialist nationalism successfully 
incorporated the ideas of modernity such as urbanisation, industrialisa-
tion, democracy, human rights and globalisation. In Mongolia’s nation-
building, there are forms of ethnicised nation-protecting in addition to 
features of civic nation-building, although not in the sense of protecting 
the culture of minority groups or an ethnic other. Instead, it is about 
protecting the ‘traditional’ (ulamjlalt) ‘cultural practices of past eras’ 
(Verdery and Humphrey 2004, 17) of the Mongol nation. Or in the words 
of Lowell Barrington, ‘in the case of ethnic-nations such [nation-build-
ing] policies would privilege the majority group at the expense of ethnic 
minorities’ (Barrington 2006, 21).
In the absence of the majority and minority conflicts, the contra-
diction of the civic and ethnic features in contemporary Mongolian 
nationalism are the main points of contestation in the building of the 
nation and nationalism. The civic features endorse the free market, 
liberal economy, mining industry and democracy, while the ethnic 
features endorse the protection of the environment, ‘tradition’ and 
indigenous culture. In other words, for many Mongolians nationalism 
should embody both the civic and ethnic principles; it is impossible to 
completely abandon any of the two in the project to build a modern 
Mongolian nation (see also Brubaker 1999). The most challenging task 
is to find an accurate balance of the two – but it is possible for certain 
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groups to support one more than the other. For example, environmen-
tal and nationalist movements tend to promote the ethnic (Bumochir 
2018a, 106), while some Mongolian rulers, policymakers and 
technocrats promote civic tendencies, such as the neoliberal economy 
and mining industry. Using these features, some critique the former to 
be extremely nationalist, while others also accuse the latter of being not 
nationalistic enough. However, because of the inseparable fusion of the 
two kinds of nationalistic tendency, none of them can entirely ignore 
the other. In the following elaboration of the recent historical overview 
of nationalism in Mongolia, I will explain the historical and political 
consequences that produce a division between the so-called good and 
bad nationalistic tendencies, and how the boundary between civic and 
ethnic blurs.
It is obvious that the distinction between good and bad nationalism 
is a political matter. Barrington (2006, 10) writes that ‘civic nationalism 
is often portrayed as good’. Unlike in Barrington’s work, in Mongolia civic 
nationalism is not generally portrayed as good and ethnic nationalism 
as bad. In Mongolia, in addition to ündesnii üzel for nationalism, which 
means a view, perception and ideology of root and origin that can 
contain both civic and ethnic nationalistic tendencies, Mongolians also 
use another term, ündserheg üzel, which indicates an act to highlight, 
rank, dominate, discriminate and violate human rights. For example, 
in Mongolia those who promote neoliberalism often translate the term 
resource nationalism into bayalgiin ündserkheg üzel (see also Semuun 
2013) not ündesnii üzel, to address its negative consequences. Apparently, 
such a division between good and bad nationalisms appeared after the 
collapse of the Soviet regime, at the time when Mongolia required a 
form of nationalism to ideologically support the nation-state on the one 
hand, while responding to the critique of bad nationalism on the other 
hand. Although this is how Mongolians commonly divide nationalism, 
materials in Chapter 2 show that sometimes it is impossible to identify 
whether an instance of nationalism is good ündesnii üzel or bad 
ündserkheg üzel. In other words, the good or bad division of nationalism 
is a political matter as I mentioned earlier and the same also applies 
to the Mongolian translation of ‘resource nationalism’. Although it is 
translated as ündserkheg üzel, depicting some negative consequences on 
the national economy, for many it is also inseparable from ündesnii üzel, 
the so-called good nationalism.
The breadth and embedded nature of nationalism in Mongolia 
challenges what Barrington (2006, 4) calls the misuse of nation, the 
error made by equating it with ‘state’ or ‘country’. Different terms can 
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indicate different things, which of course is also true in contemporary 
Mongolia. However, as we have seen, not equating nationalism with 
state or country will not help to understand the nation (ündesten or uls), 
nationalism (ündesnii üzel) and the state (tör) in Mongolia. Rather, the 
embeddedness of nation and state in Mongolia arises from a particular 
history of a certain people and therefore the manner in which they 
generated nationalism.
The De-reification of the State
Antony Bebbington notes that in the political economy of natural 
resources the ‘state is largely produced and moulded through social 
mobilisation, social conflict and the ways in which these processes are 
mediated’ (Bebbington 2012b, 221). Along the same lines, in Mongolia 
conflicts between environmental movements and mining companies 
require state authorities, institutions and laws to turn to a mediator or 
a central agent. In this book, I provide an account of the ways in which 
different agents in the state institutions, mining companies and popular 
mobilisations produce and mould the state, and transform both the 
understanding and the institution of the state by what I call de-reifying 
the historical and cultural concept of the state. 
The chapters of this book show how different agents in the mining 
companies, protest movements, NGOs and donors take the opportunity 
to engage with the state (the president, government and parliament, 
and institutions, decisions, law and regulations). The book presents 
narratives of key figures who have been central to political processes and 
debates. These different agents take one of two contradictory trajecto-
ries that I explained above: neoliberalism, free market and the liberal 
economy of resources; or nationalism, environmental protection and 
state control of natural resources. In other words, mining company 
representatives and liberal politicians maintain that the Mongolian state 
exceeded its power to rule and control the market, while environmen-
tal protestors and nationalist politicians complain about the absence of 
the state and argue that what is needed is to bring back state control in 
order to solve conflicts. For example, when I participated in the ‘Discover 
Mongolia’ annual investment forum of the MNMA in September 2015 – 
which appealed ‘For Mining Without Populism’ – many of the presenta-
tions complained that the Mongolian economy was not liberal, and that 
there was too much state participation and control. Jargalsaikhan Dugar, 
mining economist and the former president of the MNMA, presented 
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a paper titled ‘Business Freedom in the Mining Industry’. He noted 
that the state violation of the business freedom in the mining industry 
abuses some of the basic principles of Mongolia’s constitution; that is, to 
provide human rights and private property rights (Jargalsaikhan 2015). 
However, I heard the opposite many times – for instance, from some 
environmental and nationalist activists and protestors. For example, in 
Chapter 6, another prominent figure of my book, Munkhbayar Tsetsegee, 
the founder and leader of the river movements, winner of the Goldman 
Environmental Prize in 20074 (known as the ‘Green Nobel Prize’) for his 
achievements in closing down gold mines, and the National Geographic 
Emerging Explorer in 2008 for successfully protecting rivers in Mongolia, 
develops an argument on the absence (rather than excess) of state 
protection of the environment, territory and people (see Chapter 5). 
Epifanio San Juan describes how after World War II, when speaking 
of the nation-state, it ‘became axiomatic for postmodernist thinkers to 
condemn the nation and its corollary terms, “nationalism” and “nation-
state”, as the classic evils of modern industrial society. The nation-state, 
its reality if not its concept, has become a kind of malignant paradox 
if not a sinister conundrum’ (San Juan 2002, 11). This analysis of the 
nation-state and nationalism can be a surprise for many Mongolians 
whose understanding of the nation-state is completely different, as we 
have just seen. In Mongolia, nation-state mostly refers to what Barrington 
(2006, 21) calls the ‘ethnic-nation-state’: ‘The ideas of the nation as an 
ethnic nation and the state as a nation-state combine to produce an 
“ethnic-nation-state”’. He also writes that in the minds of nationalists, 
the state, as a nation-state, exists for the benefit of the nation. As such, if 
the nation’s cultural identity is threatened, state policy must be adopted 
to protect the culture from the threatening ‘other’. Apparently, although 
neoliberal and nationalist agents demand opposed things from the state, 
they both share state protection as a focal point. For example, for liberal 
rulers who launched capitalism and an international economy in postso-
cialist Mongolia, the state had to protect the national economy to fund 
the nation-state (see Chapter 1). For environmental protestors, it was 
more important for the state to protect its environment from mining-
induced damage, as it is an important part of the state’s duty to protect 
its territory. Although liberal and nationalist agents support contradic-
tory trajectories, they all agree on the importance of the fact that the 
Mongolian state is an ethnic-nation-state that is expected to protect 
its people, culture, territory, economy and sovereignty. In brief, this 
agreement also demands that the state follow three principles: a political 
independence that is free from any external powers and influences; 
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visibility and presence of the state that declares its sovereign right; and 
the homogenous Mongol nation entitled to claim the rule of the state. 
The widespread cultural acceptance of the state power and its protection 
helps to explain why and how statism and discursive resources related to 
the nation-state and its security often appear as the most powerful ones 
to shape neoliberal policies and the market economy. In that sense, the 
de-reification of the state provides different agents not just an opportunity 
to participate and influence the state, but also to maintain the state by 
demanding its protection on the national economy and the environment.
Mining and Popular Mobilisations
There are many works in the field of mining, resource, environment, 
activism, governance, state and capitalism that present conflicts 
between mining, protest movements and the state from different parts 
of the world,5 such as Indonesia (Tsing 20056; Welker 20147), Colombian 
Pacific (Escobar 20088), Nigeria (Watts 20049), Bangladesh (Gardner 
201210), Argentina (Shever 201211), Papua New Guinea (Kirsch 201412; 
Golub 201413), Peru (Li 201514) and Bolivia (Andreucci and Radhuber 
201715). Much of this literature has three striking similarities. First, they 
often utilise a dual or triad ‘stakeholder’, ‘agency’ and ‘actor’ framework 
referring to a corporation, community and the state (Ballard and Banks 
2003, 290; Watts 2004, 54; Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014, 9–11; 
Welker 2014, 4; Gilberthorpe and Rajak 2016, 189). Second, these works 
depict local communities as powerless and corporations as powerful. 
Third, they often find that the state or government generally supports 
the mining industry. This book argues that these three commonalities 
are not present in Mongolia. 
Regarding the first point, Emma Gilberthorpe and Dinah Rajak 
(2016, 187) suggest that ‘at the heart of debates about the resource curse 
… lie persistent questions about the relationship between extractive 
TNCs [transnational corporations], governments of resource-rich 
countries, and local populations (or stakeholders)’. However, this study 
of Mongolia shows that there are more than two or three groups and 
parties involved in the resource conflict, which I refer to as a multipar-
tite relationship. I argue that the situation often involves many disparate 
groups and people with complicated relationships to each other; in 
addition, those different parties, people and their divisions are not 
stable. For example, in the so-called local community, there are the local 
government employers, local residents who live in settlements of the 
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administrative unit centre, and local herders who live in the countryside. 
In the protest movements, there are varied groups from different places, 
sometimes with distinct purposes or methods of protest, all of which 
sometimes unite and split. Different foreign donor organisations from 
Germany, Japan and the United States have supported popular mobili-
sations, but some have had severe conflicts with the river movements. 
State stakeholders also have significant distinctions, such as the central 
government, parliament, the president of Mongolia, political parties and 
other politicians. Mining companies also cannot be considered as one 
group of agents, as there is a vast difference between small- and medium-
scale mining companies and transnational corporations. One should not 
lump all of these groups and individual agents into two or three groups. 
This book provides proper consideration of them as distinct parties, and 
agencies with different interests, visions, principles and purposes; and 
through it all, their relationships to each other remain fluid.
Second, the literature mentioned above usually portrays how 
resource extraction causes environmental problems for the powerless, 
frontier, and minority, tribal, indigenous and local populations (Tsing 
2005, 3; see also Chapter 4), while often depicting powerful transna-
tional corporations foreign to the local population and the nation-state 
(Ballard and Banks 2003, 293–4; Kirsch 2014, 1; see also Chapter 3). 
In Mongolia, the local population that faces environmental problems 
is not an ethnic minority, tribal community, or indigenous group of 
a different race. The context of the nation in Mongolia does not put 
the local population in the position of the peripheral, powerless and 
minority other. Moreover, in many cases of environmental nationalist 
protests in Mongolia, local governments and authorities started and 
promoted strikes and movements against those promoting, advocating 
and operating mines. Movement leaders often run for parliamentary 
elections, and sometimes become parliament members. They lobby 
politicians and environmental laws to stop mining damage (see Chapters 
4 and 5). Therefore, the conventional presentation of the powerless 
and peripheral whose voices are not often heard in national and global 
arenas is not the basis of my work. The power of protestors places 
mining companies in a position other than the conventional position of 
the powerful. Also, the image of ‘powerful’ does not apply to all corpo-
rations, especially to the small- and medium-scale mining companies, 
investors, and Mongolian corporations, which are also the focus of this 
book. Most of the literature rarely discusses the situation of small- and 
medium-scale corporations, and national mining companies that are 
powerless in the face of the powerful local resistance movements, state 
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policies and regulations to protect the environment and local residents. 
My work attempts to deconstruct this generalised image of mining 
corporations and unmask the complexity of the issue. I argue that 
the overall transnationalisation of corporations tends to obscure the 
challenges and struggles of many other small- and medium-scale corpo-
rations and national mining companies. 
Third, despite the power of communities and corporations, state 
officials often intervene in the conflict and make political decisions 
sometimes in support of national/local movements and sometimes in 
support of mining companies, which makes the powerless and powerful 
designations further irrelevant (Bebbington et al. 2008, 2891). Unlike in 
most countries where the central government or the state is committed 
to expanding the resource industry and the mining economy (Coronil 
1997; Bebbington 2012a, 10; Andreucci and Radhuber 2017, 280),16 
the nation-state rulers, the central government and the Parliament of 
Mongolia do not always sustainably support the mining industry and the 
neoliberal economy, as most of the works mentioned above delineate.
Structure of the Book
The chapters of this book follow a chronological order of events that 
happened to and in Mongolia since 1990. Throughout, I provide the 
accounts and narrations of historical and contemporary events by 
key figures involved in varied parts of Mongolian society and political 
debate. These accounts are an attempt to provide a form of counter-
narrative from the Mongolian perspective to decentre the dominance of 
the ‘resource curse’ perspectives outlined above. Three chapters in the 
first half of the book are about the emergence of neoliberalism, liberal 
economy, nationalist debates to control the resource economy, and the 
expansion and challenges of mining companies. The three chapters in 
the second half of the book are dedicated to the environmental and 
nationalist popular mobilisations, their achievements, challenges and 
ideas about the state, environment, pastoralism and national identity.
Chapter 1 details the political economic situation of Mongolia after 
the collapse of socialism, and the solutions of the state (parliament, 
central government and the president) to help the situation. One 
important solution was the opening and development of the mining 
sector, led by the first president of Mongolia and the democratic union. 
This solution has had wide-ranging impact and consequences, including 
the relentless growth of mining capitalism. The five chapters that 
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follow present different consequences, responses and resistances to 
the different impacts of mining, capitalism and neoliberal policies that 
were established in Mongolia. Chapter 1 focuses on the reification of the 
concept of the national economy and the anxiety of the loss of political 
independence as narrated by some Mongolian rulers, such as Prime 
Minister Byambasuren Dash and President Ochirbat Punsalmaa, who 
ruled Mongolia after the collapse of socialism in the 1990s. They discuss 
the problems and challenges related to political independence and 
reification of the national economy to justify the establishment of mining 
capitalism in postsocialist Mongolia. According to their justifications, 
they were forced to employ neoliberal ideologies and establish capitalist 
market economy as an urgent solution to economic instability. I argue 
that political leaders marked the political independence of Mongolia in 
order to reify the national economy and this marking contributed to the 
nationalist building of the nation and crafting of the state.
Chapter 2 presents how some nationalist politicians and technocrats 
resisted the liberal mining economy supported and established by those 
introduced in Chapter 1. This chapter introduces Khurts Choijin, a former 
geologist and mining minister in the times of socialism, who pioneered 
movements to support the state control of natural resources that were 
intended to constrain the operation and business of mining companies 
and the liberal principles of the free market economy. Literature on 
resources and mining commonly depict Khurts’s position and other 
similar approaches as ‘resource nationalist’. Instead of rushing to ‘pejo-
ratively label’ such positions as ‘resource nationalist’ and ‘populist’ 
(Myadar and Jackson 2018: 1), this chapter attempts to understand 
the cultural, historical and political influences in such positions that 
are often ignored in the ‘resource nationalism’ literature. In response to 
such critiques, Khurts’s narrations deploy an indigenous concept of an 
alternative economy and articulates historical narratives of state control 
and protection. Taking cultural and historical discursive resources into 
consideration, this chapter explains that beyond the so-called ‘resource 
nationalist’ positions there are attempts to balance different schools of 
thought and policy. Also, although this chapter declines to employ the 
term ‘resource nationalism’ to discuss Khurts, it argues that Khurts’s 
position was nationalist in the broader sense of nationalism in Mongolia. 
As such, the chapter underlines the wide-ranging scope and distinc-
tiveness of nationalism in Mongolia, in contrast to the reductionist tag 
resource nationalism.
Chapter 3 introduces three small- and medium-scale gold mining 
companies that started around the 1990s and contributed to the 
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national economy. This chapter narrates how they navigated statist 
and nationalist initiatives and policies, along with the critiques and 
resistances made by popular mobilisations. Out of the three described, 
the first stopped its mining operations, enlarged its other businesses in 
the field of agriculture and food production, and started other businesses. 
These manoeuvres helped the company to transform its corporate 
identity into a national food producer. Although the second one used 
similar navigations, unlike the first one, the company made a successful 
entry into national politics by establishing a political party, winning an 
election and establishing a coalition government with the help of the 
Democratic Party. However, the joint forces of political opposition and 
resistance movements against the company and its political party, and 
pressures of statist and nationalist initiatives forced the company to 
abandon its mining business. The owners of the third company in this 
chapter navigated and continued mining by subcontracting and making 
their businesses non-transparent using family and other networks. These 
companies represent those that were later known as bayalag büteegchid 
(wealth producers) who contribute to nation-building and state-crafting 
by assisting the national economy. As wealth producers – a title created 
in response to complaints and resistances of the destruction and exploi-
tation of mining companies – they also reify the national economy and 
build the nation-state in their own nationalistic ways, much as political 
rulers did as shown in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 4 presents popular mobilisations initiated by local 
government employees due to lack of water, and as peaceful local river 
movements against the destruction by mining operations in 2000. Those 
mobilisations started as an advocacy group of local and national elites 
and international donors that was later transformed by its leaders as 
local herders’ grassroots activism. It produced different discursive 
resources; promoted the right to resist mining companies and neoliberal 
policies; and established recognisable ways to protest, with which local 
people might be able to stop mining operations or extract some wealth 
from mining companies or the state. This chapter also explores how the 
movement successfully achieved national and international recognition 
with the support of some donor organisations. However, the alliance 
between the protest movements and donor organisations ultimately 
collapsed due to disparate interests and agendas. All of the above 
achievements of popular mobilisations show, as I mentioned before, 
that popular mobilisations in Mongolia do not present local, peripheral, 
tribal, indigenous or minority voices of the powerless communities but 
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powerful national and international forces that fight against mining 
destructions and the state, as the next chapter illustrates.
Chapter 5 concerns the manner in which the friction of local 
activists and international donors changed the discursive resources, 
emphases and rhetoric of the popular mobilisations. The emphases and 
rhetoric in the mobilisations expanded from mining to the failures of the 
state institutions, policies and rulers to protect its people, environment 
and territory. The use of weapons and explosives in the protest 
movements and their nationalistic discursive resources turned some of 
the river movements into the internationally known violent nationalist 
forces many understand them to be: locked in a seemingly endless battle 
against the state, international donors and mining companies. Of course, 
another way to look at the river movements is as they see themselves: as 
desperate and loyal citizens who sacrifice their lives for the protection 
of the environment or as an expression of the sovereign right of the 
people of Mongolia in absence of state protection. Those nationalist 
popular mobilisations were successful in closing down mines, lobbying 
for different laws and political decisions to protect the environment, and 
winning trials against mining companies and the government. However, 
their final, desperate attempt to seek attention by bringing rifles, 
grenades and explosives to a staged demonstration led to the imprison-
ment of five river movement leaders for committing terrorism, possessing 
arms and extorting mining companies. This chapter argues that activists 
de-deified the state to free state regulations, institutions and officials 
from the culturally salient legacy of the deified power of the state (töriin 
süld) to critique neoliberal policies, resist political decisions, blame state 
institutions, and to bring the state back by lobbying and amending laws, 
protecting the wellbeing of the environment and people and by radically 
rethinking the state.
Chapter 6 describes activists’ responses to the accusation that 
these movements do not exist for the sake of the environment but are 
instead made up of green terrorists who extort mining companies. To 
respond to this accusation and justify popular mobilisations that he led, 
Munkhbayar employs the ‘traditional’ nomadic herder and pastoralist 
identity, way of life and cosmology. This chapter follows the actions of 
Munkhbayar, as he rethinks nomadism, pastoralism, national identity, 
environmentalism and state versus neoliberal policies and capitalist 
markets in Mongolia. He reflects on many important questions, such as 
what it is to be a human being or a Mongolian, what it is to be a nation, 
and what it is to have a sovereign state. To answer these questions, he 
imaginatively fashions what I call an original environmentalist society 
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of the Mongol herders who follow the law of nature (baigaliin khuuli). 
Moreover, this understanding of the original environmentalist society 
helps popular mobilisations to respond to a different accusation – for 
example, the suggestion that mobile pastoralism is unsustainable and 
herders degrade the environment more than the mining. The image of 
pastoralism as an ancient and environmentally harmonious heritage 
helps ‘herder activists’ to reject such accusations.
Notes
 1 ‘Dutch disease’ is a term in economics that indicates an economic dependency on a certain 
sector such as mining. The term was first coined by The Economist to describe the economy of 
the Netherlands in 1977 (Economist 1977).
 2 For example, Mongolians often complain that foreign laws and conventions adopted by 
Mongolia need some mongolisation – that is, the law must be changed to make it more fitting 
to conditions in Mongolia.
 3 Also, many anthropologists find similar problems in their study of neoliberalism. For example, 
Laura Bear (2015, 7) writes that ‘Anthropologists have shown that neoliberalism is not a 
single coherent project, but an assemblage of techniques and institutional structures’ (see 
also Collier 2009; Ong 2006; Murray-Li 2007; Shore and Wright 1997; Shore, Wright and 
Pero 2011).
 4 The Goldman Prize is a prestigious environmental prize. In 1989, Richard N. Goldman (1920–
2010) and his wife, Rhoda H. Goldman (1924–96), established the Goldman Environmental 
Prize. The prize honours the achievements and leadership of grassroots environmental 
activists worldwide.
 5 Richard Howitt, John Connell and Philip Hirsch (1996) discuss the binary or triad relationship 
between a corporation, community and state in the case of Australasia, Melanesia and 
Southeast Asia.
 6 Anna Tsing (2005) writes about the collaboration of Japanese tree trading companies and 
Indonesian politicians that resulted in forest destruction and the resistance of local indigenous 
Kalimantans, and discloses congeries and friction of the local and global.
 7 Marina Welker (2014) seeks an answer to important questions: What is a corporation? What 
does it do to the local population? She explores audit, social responsibility, and state rulers’ 
relationships with the American copper and gold mine corporation in Indonesia.
 8 Arturo Escobar (2008) discusses capitalist development attempts to appropriate the rainforest 
and extract resources, and indigenous and environmental movements and their networks in 
the Colombian Pacific.
 9 Michael Watts (2004) talks about armed movements, violence, indigeneity, nationalism, 
governmentality, multinational oil corporations and the struggle of the federal state in Nigeria.
 10 Katy Gardner (2012) writes about multinational mining company gas plants and discordant 
narratives of dispossessed landowners, urban activists and mining officials in Bangladesh.
 11 Elana Shever (2012) examines protests against the world’s two largest oil companies, Shell 
and Exxon, and conversion from a state-controlled to a private oil market in Argentina.
 12 Stuart Kirsch (2014) focuses on the gold and copper mine environmental disaster and conflict 
between corporations and indigenous peoples, advocacy groups, and lawyers in Papua 
New Guinea.
 13 Alex Golub (2014) writes about the relationship between an indigenous group and a large 
international gold mining company in Papua New Guinea.
 14 Fabiana Li (2015) writes about corporate mining, activism and state advocacy of the 
extractive industry in Peru and analyses the definition of mining pollution, and the concept of 
equivalence and compensation.
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 15 Diego Andreucci and Isabella M. Radhuber (2017) present the anti-neoliberal strike against 
the largest multinational oil corporations in Bolivia and the state’s legislation and promotion 
in order to expand mining and protect the environment at the same time.
 16 This general depiction is not always the case, for example in work mentioned above of 
Diego Andreucci and Isabella M. Radhuber in Bolivia, where many of the advanced law and 
regulations to protect the environment and local population passed. However, in a different 
article Andreucci (2017) argues that central government’s acceptance of the indigenous and 
environmental concerns was a ‘passive revolution’, in the words of Antonio Gramsci (2000, 
261) which weakens or paralyses opponents by taking over their concerns and leaders.
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The Reification of the National 
Economy
This chapter presents the historical narrations made by some of the 
political rulers who were involved in the transition to capitalism in 
Mongolia in the 1990s. Their narrations often address the problems, 
difficulties and challenges related to the political independence and 
national economy of the country. They tend to reveal that politicians in 
the 1990s considered the political independence and national economy 
of Mongolia to have been in an extremely precarious state. Given the 
influence and domination of the two neighbouring powers, Russia and 
China, these political leaders as well as many other Mongolians commonly 
view Mongolia’s political independence to be something difficult and 
challenging to achieve and preserve. I consider such concerns as a form 
of precarity identified and possibly imagined by political rulers. Second, 
regarding the national economy, they make an analogy between the 
political independence and the national economy, and in much the 
same way they depict different difficulties and challenges in the national 
economy of the emerging nation-state of Mongolia. This is another form 
of precarity identified and imagined by those political rulers. According 
to them, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic system in 
the Soviet bloc, Mongolia was left in a critical economic situation to fund 
the nation-state emerging from the ruins of socialism. In such a critical 
situation, political leaders presented the national economy to the public 
as an entity that should be prioritised to fund the nation-state to support 
its vulnerable political independence, which I refer to as the reification of 
the national economy. To find a solution to secure the independence and 
assist the national economy, those political leaders welcomed the free 
market and democracy and the so-called ‘third neighbours’ including 
the US, Japan and other powers in Western Europe. This chapter intends 
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not only to give a historical account of that period but also to provide a 
counter-narrative to the account that Mongolia was a passive victim of 
neoliberal forces of America and its allies (see also Bumochir 2018b). 
In this line, some consider the presence and participation of these third 
neighbours in Mongolia’s reform not a ‘contribution’ but a ‘domination 
and influence’ that makes Mongolia dependant on them (Rossabi 2005; 
Munkh-Erdene 2012, 65). However, the presence of third neighbours 
and international donors that were invited and welcomed by some 
political leaders suggests something different from what some narratives 
depict – for instance, the one developed by Sara Jackson (2015) on how 
transnational corporations and external powers build the nation-state 
in Mongolia. These depictions present one side of the story and miss 
the deliberate intentions of the individual Mongolian political rulers’ 
agendas and contributions in the process of building the nation-state, 
which this chapter demonstrates. 
This chapter also shows how those political rulers generate 
nationalism from narratives of the precarious political independence and 
the reification of the national economy. In the first chapter of an edited 
book on nationalism after independence in postcolonial and postcom-
munist states, Lowell Barrington focuses on the question of how political 
elites ‘maintain the nationalist movement after its ultimate goal – inde-
pendence – has been achieved’ (Barrington 2006, 14). He writes, ‘While 
nationalist elites will be exhausted, ecstatic, or just pleasantly surprised 
when independence comes, they will also generally seek to continue the 
momentum of the nationalist movement. As not only something that 
they believe in but also their ticket to power, nationalists will search for 
ways to keep nationalism alive. But since the nationalism can no longer 
be about achieving independence, it must be transformed’ (Barrington 
2006, 14–15). Subsequently, he introduces two possible transforma-
tions of nationalism, both of which relate to the issue of territory control. 
The first is the ‘homeland claims of minority groups in the state’ and 
the second are the ‘claims on its homeland by other nations outside the 
state’ (Barrington 2006, 16). He notes that ‘few nations in the world in 
control of their own state do not face one of these homeland problems’ 
(16). Postsocialist Mongolia is a recent nation-state that falls into those 
few nation-states of Barrington that ‘do not face one of these homeland 
problems’ and national elites manage to develop and trigger nationalism 
in a somewhat divergent manner. Since the 1990s, Mongolian political 
discourses have tended to further consider the state of tusgaar togtnol 
(political independence), which literally means ‘a separate or autonomous 
existence’, to be precarious not only in regard to the issue of territory but 
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rather in reference to the ‘national economy’. This chapter shows that in 
Mongolia, anxieties regarding economic independence – or fear, worry 
and nervousness of the loss of the independent status of the nation and 
the state – serve to interfere with the very goal of political independence. 
Instead, the focus shifts to the national economy and economic indepen-
dence, which becomes the terrain of political struggle for the movements 
working for national autonomy. As will be shown below in interviews 
with political leaders and their historical narrations, national economy is 
the pillar of national independence, which funds the state and prevents 
economic and financial dependency upon foreign countries and institu-
tions. In this way, discourses concerning the national economy recreate 
a form of nationalism.1 Political discourses of independence and the 
national economy that emerged in the process of building the modern 
nation generates ündesnii üzel, a Mongolian term for nationalism that 
means root- or origin-centred ideology. This process of nation building, 
and the sentiment it generates, in turn supports the liberalised mining 
economy and prioritises issues of the national economy.
There is a great deal of work exploring how concerns of political 
independence and sovereignty generate nationalistic sentiments 
and a substantial amount exploring how these processes might reify 
the national economy. However, there is a remarkable absence of 
material examining how the reification of the national economy might 
itself lead to particular forms of nationalism, an absence this chapter 
seeks to counter. Hannah Appel (2017, 294) begins an article on the 
ethnography of the national economy with the IMF list of the ‘World’s 
Best Economies’. Winners in 2013 included South Sudan – the world’s 
fastest growing economy – and Equatorial Guinea – the economy with 
the most investment. This was in contrast to the previous year (i.e., 
2012) which included Libya – the world’s fastest growing economy – and 
Mongolia – the economy with the most investment (Riley 2012). She 
then asks, if these are the nations of the world with the ‘best’ economies, 
what then is a national economy? Appel argues that national economy 
is an imagined ‘object of the future and a justification for the constant 
deferral of the present’ (Appel 2017, 294), which political rulers, donor 
experts, and economists use to justify their political decisions and actions 
in Equatorial Guinea. She also presents a broader history of the national 
economy in Europe as an epistemological project of the state, born in a 
geopolitical moment of Western independent nation-states to manage 
the Great Depression, mark their sovereignty, and respond to shifting 
global orders (Appel 2017, 297–9; see also Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 
2010; Vanoli 2005). The below historical narrations show how the 
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epistemological project of the state in postsocialist Mongolia (national 
government, parliament, prime minister, and president) targeted at the 
national economy demarcates the sovereignty of Mongolia. However, 
unlike in Appel’s work, it also shows how this marking reinforces the 
making of the state and nationalism (in the sense of ündesnii üzel). The 
sheer volume and variety of difficulties and urgencies in postsocial-
ist Mongolia became the main ground to identify precarity and shape 
discourses of independence, sovereignty and national economy in the 
agenda to build the nation-state.
This chapter has two sections. The first focuses on political 
discourses that identify precarity in the political independence of 
Mongolia in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of socialism. This 
section revisits the political discourses of independence and the third 
neighbour policy and highlights its importance in the justification of 
the political decisions to ally to the United States and other so-called 
third neighbours. The second section is about identification of precarity 
in the national economy to fund the emerging nation-state, where 
natural resources play a pivotal role in addressing perceived precarity 
in the national economy. As a result, what Stuart Kirsch (2014) calls 
‘mining capitalism’ was successfully established in Mongolia (see also 
Plueckhahn and Bumochir 2018). There was an urgent drive to assist the 
national economy in order to strengthen the political independence and 
sovereignty of the emerging nation-state by funding it, and this became 
the main logic to justify why the state (government, parliament, and the 
president) was obligated to promote neoliberal transformations in the 
1990s (Bebbington 2012a, 10). I do not seek to question the historical 
accuracy of the claims of emergency in terms of independence and 
the national economy, but rather to explore how the identification of 
precarity in these issues constructs a political discourse that politicians 
use to justify the establishment of ‘mining capitalism’.
Political Independence
Russia and China, two political and economic superpowers, sandwich 
Mongolia geographically. There is much historical evidence that 
demonstrates how and to what degree Russia and China (and some 
third powers, such as the United States and the United Kingdom) have 
influenced the political independence of Mongolia.2 In the period 
following the end of socialism, to balance the influence of China and 
Russia, Mongolian politicians developed the idea of ‘third neighbours’ by 
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inviting other powers to protect Mongolia from the political domination 
of Russia and China. The invitation of the third neighbours has been 
done by considering the independence of Mongolia to be weak or at 
risk of loss and therefore needing constant protection. Depictions of 
potential threats in the narrative of independence, which has been a 
by-product of intentions to glorify those who fought for independence, 
creates a fear of the loss of independence and warns Mongolians to 
prioritise political independence. Subsequently, such fears generate 
a form of anxiety of independence among Mongolians. As I find in this 
chapter, the circulation of anxiety in the population is a justification to 
politically mobilise by identifying precarity in the independence and 
reifying the national economy. For example, this anxiety is a key factor 
for some political leaders to justify why Mongolian rulers had to embrace 
America and capitalism (see also Bumochir 2018b). They also consider 
the precarity of independence and the importance of third neighbours as 
something that is real and actual.
Yet, not all Mongolian people agree that this policy is inevitable. 
Munkh-Erdene Lhamsuren, a Mongolian anthropologist working at the 
Max Planck Institute in Germany, argues that the precarity of Mongolia’s 
political independence between Russia and China in making the third 
neighbour policy is an ‘ideological construct’ (üzel surtal).3 According 
to Munkh-Erdene, Mongolia does not need third neighbours to establish 
political independence. He believes that even in a worst-case scenario, 
neither of the two superpowers would let the other take over Mongolia. 
In this sense, it is the interest of the two states and their balance of 
power that secures Mongolia’s political independence. Therefore, for 
Munkh-Erdene, the anxiety of independence and the creation of third 
neighbours is a politically constructed ideology to justify the establish-
ment of a particular form of capitalist markets and increases the influence 
of states, such as the United States. Only a few days after I spoke with 
Munkh-Erdene, I coincidentally watched a short video in which the 
Mongolian political scientist D. Bolor made a similar claim. The video 
was posted in a closed Facebook group named ‘Xiongnu-Xianbei, 
Mongol-Gokturk’, which are names of the historical empires and peoples 
associated with the region of Inner Asia. The profile picture depicts 
portraits of some historical emperors and includes accompanying text, 
which says, ‘MONGOL is GRAND NATION. Mongols are originated from 
“Tengri” heaven’. In the video, Bolor can be heard saying, ‘The so-called 
revolution in 1990 was not a revolution, but it was a coup d’état organised 
by the American and British intelligence . . . Since they control media and 
banking system, and they influence the economy and politics . . . To hide 
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the fact that political leaders made Mongolia their colony, they created 
a virtual neighbour called the third neighbour; a concept that does not 
actually exist. Because a neighbour is a country that shares a physical 
border, but it can never be other countries that reside overseas on the 
other side of the world’ (Tömör Temür Tamerlan 2018).
While the inevitability of the third neighbour policy may be up 
for debate, what the above views and further materials I present in 
the chapter exemplifies is that political leaders tend to actively inflame 
anxieties regarding Mongolia’s political independence. Narration of 
those difficulties helps them to justify the established mining capitalism 
and political-economic alliance with America and Europe. Regardless of 
the facts,4 the discourse of the political independence can be a historical 
and political construction that is available to use as the explanation, 
understanding and justification for different political decisions. The 
research materials that follow show how different individual political 
leaders of Mongolia interpret difficulties of political independence and 
present the situation as precarious.
Byambasuren Dash, the last prime minister of the MPR, had direct 
experience with political matters related to independence in the early 
1990s. Now retired, this former prime minister remains quite popular 
and often appears on television and other media to comment on the 
national economy and politics. At the same time, many people also 
blame him for establishing the free market in Mongolia by supporting 
privatisation, price liberalisation and so on. Byambasuren’s narrative is 
an interesting and important side of the story of Mongolia’s transition: 
he was an economist with experience of high political office during 
socialism – including as deputy head of the Council of Ministers (1989) 
and prime minister (1990–92) – and was also the person who led the 
country in times of crucial change.
Due to the desperate situation of the country, in October 1990, only 
a month after he became prime minister, Byambasuren sent requests to 
the World Bank and the IMF to initiate membership. Caroline Humphrey 
(2002, xvii) describes the similar situation in the Soviet Bloc as follows: 
established institutions were disintegrating and decaying, which urged 
decisive and immediate reactions and the establishment of a new political 
economy. In reference to Mongolia, David Sneath (2002, 194) writes, 
‘Soviet support amounted as much as a third of Mongolia’s GDP or more, 
and it was reduced in 1989 and stopped altogether in 1991’. Following 
Sneath, Gantulga Munkherdene (2018, 375) explains ‘Unemployment 
and poverty spread, thrusting the economy into crisis. Due to this crisis, 
in 1991 Mongolia became a member of the International Monetary 
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Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, and started 
to welcome their assistance and recommendations’. In an attempt to 
find solutions other than sending requests to donors, Prime Minister 
Byambasuren Dash visited Washington, DC, in May 1990, just two 
months after the Politburo (uls töriin tovchoo) had stepped down and 
the establishment of the new government (Addleton 2013, 38; see 
also Buyandelgeriyn 2007, 129). Uradyn Bulag explains such visits in 
this way: ‘Mongols rejected the Soviet Union which was the traditional 
guarantor of Mongolia’s independence and had to face China alone’ 
(2017, 121). Moreover, the ‘Mongols were paranoid that an impov-
erished Russia might sell Mongolia to China’ (2017, 212). When I met 
Byambasuren on 12 May 2016 he told me that Russia and China agreed 
in November 1990 to ‘not use Mongolia against each other and not to 
let any third countries use Mongolia’. He also explained that in a critical 
situation such as this, it was dangerous to continue socialism because this 
would have brought Mongolia closer to China. At the same time, China 
had a vested interest in ‘embracing’ (tevrekh) Mongolia, as evidenced in 
many different sources that demonstrate Chinese claims that Mongolia 
should be a part of China (see also Bruun and Odgaard 1996, 39; 
Sanders 1996, 222–3). For Byambasuren, the anxiety was felt when he 
met Li Peng, Premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in Beijing 
on 19 June 1991. Byambasuren said that Li Peng repeatedly mentioned 
to him that ‘China is building socialism’; according to Byambasuren, the 
implication was that Mongolia should join China. Therefore, he felt that 
it was urgent to replace the collapsing guarantor – the Soviet Union – 
with the United States.5
According to Byambasuren, while China revealed its aim to 
influence the MPR, the rulers of the Soviet Union did not simply allow 
Mongolian rulers to replace the Soviet Union with the United States. 
This is counter to the widespread understanding that the rulers of the 
Soviet Union freed Mongolia from its influence without hesitation. 
However, Byambasuren explains the situation based on information and 
materials that were never publicly revealed. He told me that in December 
1990, the Politburo of the Soviet Union passed a top-secret decision to 
politically and economically sanction Mongolia, a reaction to the MPR’s 
decision to abandon socialism and the Soviet Union. On the following 
day, the ambassador of the Soviet Union to the MPR visited the office 
of G. Ochirbat, chairman of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party 
(MPRP). Here, he read aloud the decision of the Soviet Union Politburo 
and left without leaving a copy of the document. Later, Byambasuren 
heard of this sanction from Ochirbat and realised that the sanctions 
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were already in effect when the Soviet Union delayed its supply of oil 
to Mongolia in August 1990. The consumption of petrol in the MPR was 
then (and still is) entirely dependent on the Soviet Union (now Russia), 
which made this sanction highly effective. According to Byambasuren, 
in August 1990, the Soviet Union was supposed to supply 34,000 tonnes 
of petrol to the MPR, but instead Mongolia received only 17,000 tonnes. 
Following this, the Soviet Union completely halted its petrol delivery. 
Byambasuren described how the MPR was left in a vulnerable situation 
and almost completely depleted its national petrol reserves. To help 
alleviate the issue, when Byambasuren visited the United States a second 
time in June 1991, he informed James Baker, then-US Secretary of State, 
about the critical condition of Mongolia and the sanctions of the Soviet 
Union. Baker considered the situation seriously and told Byambasuren 
that he would warn Mikhail Gorbachev, the last president of the Soviet 
Union, that US support to the Soviet Union could not be secured if the 
Soviet Union continued its sanctions against the MPR. Byambasuren 
understands that it was only as a result of Baker’s talk to Gorbachev that, 
on 27 March 1992, Mongolia finally received oil from Russia.
The sanction – if it existed as Byambasuren talks about it – was 
issued just a year before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Further, 
Mongolian rulers’ attempts to diversify its dependence and crystallise its 
guarantors started in the mid-1980s. MPR rulers began to reveal failures 
in its economy and launched a search for alternatives (Bulag 1998, 
17; Rossabi 2005, 8); officials of the MPR also made approaches to the 
United States during the late 1980s (Addleton 2013, 39). Consequently, 
the Soviet military withdrew from the MPR in 1987. Byambasuren 
mentions that the sanction was probably a reaction of the rulers of the 
Soviet Union to those attempts revealed by the rulers of the MPR.
Not long after Byambasuren’s first visit – on 4 May 1990 – Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State Desaix Anderson affirmed that the United 
States had been ‘presented with unique opportunities to be supportive 
of positive developments at a turning point in Mongolia’s history and at a 
time when their leaders are looking to us for assistance’ (Addleton 2013, 
38). It was an important point for the United States to highlight that 
Mongolian leaders approached them for assistance. The approach of the 
Prime Minister of the MPR helps to construct a historical narrative that 
proves the United States did not compel Mongolia to embrace democracy 
and capitalism; instead, Mongolia asked for it. The Mongolian Deputy 
Prime Minister’s visit to Washington unreservedly opened the gate for 
high-profile visitors from the United States; it is worth mentioning just a 
few from the 1990s: US Secretary of State James Baker in August 1990; 
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Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in May 1998; First Lady Hillary 
Clinton in September 1995, and again in 2012 as Secretary of State 
(Addleton 2013, 44, 46, 47), and many more. Mongolia has made efforts 
to seek assistance from third neighbours since the 1980s; consequently, 
Mongolia was not just an ‘oasis of democracy’, as US Secretary of State 
John Kerry claimed during his visit in June 2016 (Torbati 2016): it was 
also an oasis of global capitalism.
The above narrative of Byambasuren about the establishment of 
capitalism in Mongolia is unconventional when considered alongside 
some literature of capitalism (Rossabi 2005), which delineates how 
the United States and the West hook and entrap Third World countries 
to expand global capitalism to increase their surplus. To be sure, some 
Mongolian rulers searched for an alternative social, economic and 
political structure. Yet it is important to also recognise that the third 
neighbour policy met the American interest in expanding capitalism. 
In what follows, I intend to demonstrate that capitalist markets have 
been present in Mongolia since the 1990s, not only due to the influence 
of the United States but also US-based international organisations. For 
example, David Graeber writes about how the IMF and Western banks 
started the Third World debt crisis:
During the ’70s oil crisis, OPEC countries ended up pouring so 
much of their newfound riches into Western banks that the banks 
couldn’t figure out where to invest the money; how Citibank and 
Chase, therefore, began sending agents around the world trying 
to convince Third World dictators and politicians to take out loans 
(at the time, this was called “go-go banking”); how they started 
out at extremely low rates of interest that almost immediately 
skyrocketed to 20 percent or so due to tight US money policies in 
the early ’80s; how during the ’80s and ’90s, this led to the Third 
World debt crisis; how the IMF then stepped in to insist that, in 
order to obtain refinancing, poor countries would be obliged to 
abandon price supports on basic foodstuffs, or even policies of 
keeping strategic food reserves, and abandon free health care and 
free education; how all of this had led to the collapse of all the most 
basic supports for some of the poorest and most vulnerable people 
on earth. (Graeber 2011, 2)
Similarly, David Harvey (2010, 26–9) narrates the history of capital 
accumulation from the 1750s and points out that capitalist accumulation 
constantly requires that new profitable outlets be found. Global profit 
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margins began to fall after a brief revival in the 1980s. Therefore, ‘in a 
desperate attempt to find more places to put the surplus capital, a vast 
wave of privatisation swept around the world carried on the backs of the 
dogma that state-run enterprises are by definition inefficient and lax and 
that the only way to improve their performance is to pass them over to 
the private sector’ (Harvey 2010, 28). This process can be seen in the 
targeting of the dismantling Soviet Bloc, including Mongolia. Mongolia 
did not single-handedly make the form of capitalism that exists within its 
borders; instead, it has been a by-product of local and global processes 
(Tsing 2005). In the words of Timothy Mitchell (2002), it is the ‘rule of 
experts’, or more precisely the rule of Mongolian and foreign experts 
that play an important role in the making of capitalism in Mongolia. 
Morris Rossabi (2005, 38) shares this approach and notes that The 
Asia Foundation (TAF) was the first US private institution to respond to 
Mongolia, launching its first programmes in 1990 and establishing its 
office 1991. The IMF and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) sent groups 
to study the Mongolian economy and to interview Mongolian pioneers of 
capitalism – namely, D. Ganbold, economist and first deputy minister – 
and other like-minded economists. An IMF research team conducted an 
official visit in August 1990, and ADB staff arrived in Mongolia in late May 
1991 (Rossabi 2005, 43).6 Consequently, as Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene 
writes, ‘Under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, Mongolia’s neophyte free 
marketers zealously launched a shock therapy (or structural adjustment) 
program in 1991 to establish a free market economy’ (Munkh-Erdene 
2012, 63). As such, in the next two decades, Mongolia’s opening up to 
the West immediately flooded the country with a wide range of political, 
financial, trade, development, environment, human rights, religious, 
and philanthropic international donor and aid organisations, and trans-
national corporations and investors from all around the world, all of 
which contributed to the making of capitalism in Mongolia.
Reflecting on the situations discussed above, Byambasuren notes 
that the Mongolian government had three critical tasks to urgently 
complete. First, Mongolia had to consolidate its independence, because 
many important decisions about Mongolia were previously made in 
Moscow. Second, Mongolia had to properly eliminate socialism – that is, 
it could not remain a relic of a socialist society. This was also important in 
order to demonstrate to the United States that Mongolia would do more 
than merely change the colour of socialism while continuing to follow 
Russia or China. Third, it was essential to expand Mongolia’s economic 
connections to the world beyond the Soviet Bloc and China. In brief, for 
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Byambasuren, ending the authority of the Soviet Union in Mongolia and 
escaping possible Chinese integration was a top priority for democratic 
reform. Overall, Byambasuren argues that establishing and intensifying 
the relationship between the MPR and the United States was the best 
political move for the MPR to ensure the end of socialism and to make 
space in the region for the influence of third neighbours as powers to 
balance Russian and Chinese domination. Here, then, anxieties over 
the loss of independence were central to the direction in which the 
Mongolian economy developed following the end of socialism. 
The National Economy
Similar to its independence, Mongolia’s national economy was 
precarious, enabling political leaders to reify the national economy and 
justify their decisions (see also Munkherdene 2018, 375) to develop the 
mining industry in order to fund the emerging sovereign nation-state of 
Mongolia. For instance, for Byambasuren, embracing the United States 
was the best political move to properly end socialism and to terminate the 
domination of the Soviet Union and halt the PRC’s attempt to influence 
the MPR. However, for Ochirbat Punsalmaa, a former mining engineer, 
who served as deputy Minister of Mining and Geology (1972), deputy 
of the People’s Great Khural (1976), a member of the MPRP Central 
Committee, Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Supplies 
(1987), and the first President of Mongolia (1990–97), embracing the 
liberal economy and free market principles of capitalism were political 
tactics to entice third neighbours and international donor organisations 
to fund the nation-state and to consolidate political independence. As 
such, the process of market liberalisation, privatisation and resource 
extraction contributed to anxieties over the loss of independence. It is to 
Ochirbat’s account that I now turn to further illustrate.
When I called Ochirbat to set up an appointment, I explained the 
purpose and importance of my work. Towards the end of our telephone 
conversation, Ochirbat spoke about his meeting with Queen Elizabeth II 
during his presidency. He revealed that the Queen had asked him how 
Mongolia had managed to survive as an independent state in the face 
of the dominance of its two gigantic neighbours. Ochirbat, rather than 
revealing his reply, said he wanted me to seek an answer to this question 
through my research. During this telephone conversation, Ochirbat 
expressed a similar fear of the loss of independence that Byambasuren 
expressed, which I term the anxiety of independence. When I met him 
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in his office at the Mongolian University of Science and Technology 
the following day, Ochirbat told me that in the aftermath of the fall of 
socialism, Mongolia had to embrace democracy, the free market, and a 
liberal economy not just to fund the emerging nation-state but also to 
secure the independence of the country by attracting third neighbours.
To assist the collapsing economy, Ochirbat said that he had initiated 
the Gold Programme (Alt khötölbör) in 1991. The first Gold Programme 
started in 1992 and ended in 1999 with success. The programme started 
its continuation in 2000 but encountered heavy resistance and stopped. 
The second Gold Programme started in 2017 and is planned to continue 
till 2020. Ochirbat explained that in the early 1990s in a situation with no 
currency reserve, export, investment or capacity to repay loans (see also 
Ichinkhorloo 2018, 391), and with inflation at 325 per cent, it had been 
impossible for the country to secure loans and attract investment (see 
also Byambajav 2015, 93). As such, he justified his actions by arguing 
that the quickest and easiest way to assist the economy was to exploit 
gold deposits (see also Bold 2013). Later in 2014, writing about such 
prgrammes to assist the national economy, Rebecca Empson and Tristan 
Webb explained that ‘the economic plan of Mongolia’s government 
requires foreign investment from private international investors for three 
main reasons: first, to develop the country’s export-earning potential; 
second, to bring in world-class technology and know-how that will allow 
development of an indigenous capability in this field; and finally, to 
advance Mongolia’s economic and political independence from Russia 
and China. The country has defined all of these areas as important for 
the country’s national security’ (Empson and Webb 2014, 241).
Before meeting Ochirbat, I spent time with his colleague Algaa 
Namgar, a metallurgical engineer and the director of the Mongolian 
National Mining Association (MNMA) founded by Ochirbat and his 
colleagues in 1994. In the early 1990s, Algaa worked for the Government 
Agency for Mining and his duty was to implement the Gold Programme. 
For Algaa, at the start, the Gold Programme was a dream (möröödöl). 
They had to create an attractive political, legal and socio-economic 
environment to appeal to foreign direct investment. Algaa explains that 
the World Bank supported Mongolia in trying to achieve the aims of 
the Gold Programme. The country also carefully followed the guidelines 
of the World Bank as it took steps to develop its mining economy. In 
1991, the World Bank researched Mongolia in order to provide technical 
assistance for the development of mining. The project report produced 
recommendations on the geological potential of mineral resources, 
the capacities of the existing mines, the legal environment, and the 
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government agencies and institutions needed to manage and assist the 
mining sector. Algaa and his colleagues’ main project at the Government 
Agency for Mining was to draft a new Minerals Law following the recom-
mendation of the World Bank. In 1994, the communist party won the 
first democratic election and complained that the bill was too liberal and 
rejected it (see also Chapter 2). As a result, the parliament supported a 
different version of the Minerals Law and passed it in 1994. Ochirbat 
said that many of the potential investors he met during his presidency 
complained that the 1994 Mongolian Minerals Law did not give enough 
clarity to the country’s intention to collaborate with foreign companies 
and could even be read as suggesting that Mongolia would not cooperate. 
According to Ochirbat, the failure of the 1994 Minerals Law to appeal to 
investors forced the government to attempt to draft a different bill, again 
with the help of the World Bank. This time, it was not Algaa but another 
member of the MNMA, Jargalsaikhan Dugar,7 who held a key position in 
the process to draft the new bill and to collaborate with the World Bank. 
I first met Jargalsaikhan in September 2015, at the 13th MNMA annual 
investment forum in Ulaanbaatar, titled ‘For mining without populism’, 
where he was the main organiser of the event. When I met him again 
in April 2018, he explained to me that the 1994 Minerals Law was an 
experimental process that revealed the importance of improving the 
law to make it more appealing to investors (which is the same point that 
Ochirbat had made). 
The failure of the 1994 Minerals Law to appeal to the investors 
became the justification for Ochirbat, Algaa and Jargalsaikhan to further 
promote the liberal version of the Minerals Law. Jargalsaikhan explained 
that behind the liberalisation of the resource economy was not simply 
the will of the World Bank, as many Mongolians often complain (Sanchir 
2016). It was, instead, a by-product of what Mongolian policymakers 
learned from their experiences. It was after the Mongolian Democratic 
Union coalition won the election in 1996 that the goal of fully liberalis-
ing the resource economy was accomplished. This time it was not only 
the president but also Prime Minister Enkhsaikhan Mendsaikhan who 
supported the law and pioneered the new mining economy. By winning 
the election, the democratic and market reformers therefore became 
another major state-driven force behind the passing of the 1997 Minerals 
Law, known as the ‘liberal law’. Dalaibuyan Byambajav (2015, 93) 
writes that ‘the new Mineral Law of 1997 was praised by the interna-
tional mining community as one of the most liberal mining laws in Asia: 
it significantly relaxed rules for obtaining a licence and permitted full 
foreign ownership of mining ventures’. According to Algaa, one of the 
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crucial changes in the law was the liberalisation of mining and natural 
resources and the stability agreement with mining companies. 
Consequently, starting from 1997, the law permitted the 
government to issue thousands of exploration licences for almost no 
cost (Bulag 2017, 132), except for a small amount of administrative 
and registration fees and taxes. According to the Mineral Resources and 
Petroleum Authority of Mongolia (MRPAM), as of 2015, approximately 
3,329 mineral licences have been granted to both foreign and domestic 
companies covering 13.9 million hectares (or 8.9 per cent of the entire 
territory of the country), of which 1,494 are operational and 1,835 are 
exploration licences (Ganbold and Ali 2017, 4).
The 1997 Minerals Law successfully transformed Mongolia into 
an attractive country in which to engage in mining operations, drawing 
in mining companies from North America, Europe and Australia. 
Boroo Gold, an Australian mining company, was one of the first and 
most famous examples of the foreign mining companies working in 
Mongolia. Under the Stability Agreement signed with the government of 
Mongolia in 1998, Boroo Gold was exempted from corporate income tax: 
a 100 per cent exemption for three years from the start of commercial 
production in 2004 and 50 per cent exemption for the next three years 
after that. The World Bank, the supporter of this law, praised this move 
as ‘one of the strongest legal presentations of mineral licensee rights and 
obligations in the world, and the most investor-friendly and enabling law 
in Asia’ (World Bank 2004, 52). Some Mongolian economists, namely 
Khashchuluun Chuluundorj and Enkhjargal Dandinbazar, note that the 
liberal economic regime for investments in the mining sector resulted 
in a rapid increase in the inflow of foreign investment in the natural 
resource sectors; Mongolia became one of the top 10 destinations in the 
world in regard to resource exploration investment (Chuluundorj and 
Dandinbazar 2014, 293). In a televised interview with Khashchuluun 
during which he discussed the case of Boroo Gold, he argued that this 
was an important step taken by the government of Mongolia to entice 
foreign investors, enlarge mining and support the national economy. In 
fact, there was a dramatic increase in the annual production of gold from 
4.5 to 10.2 tonnes from 1992 to 2000, and from 11.8 to 24.1 tonnes from 
2000 to 2005, which created about 10,000 jobs, and made significant 
contribution to the GDP, up to 20 per cent (Bold 2013; Mineral Resources 
and Petroleum Authority of Mongolia 2015, 7–8). 
In brief, the above narrations of people who had important 
positions in the building of the emerging nation-state show how different 
discourses – about the critical situation of the economy; regional politics 
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of Russia, China and Mongolia; prospective influence of the so-called 
third neighbours; opportunities of the gold mining – contribute to 
the reification of an imagined entity that can be called the national 
economy. The first President Ochirbat and his colleagues present these 
narratives as a grand story of the national economy to explain and 
justify why neoliberal policies that established capitalism in Mongolia 
were inevitable. The manner in which the national economy was central 
to anxieties surrounding independence can be seen via examining the 
responses of the above figures to criticisms and general discontent 
regarding the direction of economic and mining liberalisation found in 
the population at large. 
Later, many Mongolians, including politicians, technocrats and 
activists, heavily criticised the case of the Boroo Gold and condemned 
those who established the liberal mining economy and invited foreign 
investors. For instance, they complained that land in the form of mining 
licences was distributed to private mining companies and caused 
significant damage to the environment (see Chapter 2). When I brought 
such criticisms up, Algaa responded that almost all of the licences 
were for mining exploration, not for extraction. He claims that mining 
exploration does not impact upon the land and the environment nearly 
as much as process of extraction. One of the final points that Algaa made 
was about the national economy. Those who possessed exploration 
licences had to pay an annual tax per hectare, which was an excellent 
contribution to the national economy. For these reasons, during the 
years when the economy of Mongolia was only just emerging, it was the 
best and most efficient way to use its vast territory for economic profit. 
In other words, soil and subsoil of Mongolia, with or without mineral 
resources, was entirely converted into a zone of economically efficient 
capitalist production in order to support the national economy. Similarly, 
Jargalsaikhan says that with the help of the 1997 Minerals Law, he 
initially wished to bring at least 1 per cent of the total investment in 
global mining exploration to Mongolia. But according to him, the law 
actually managed to bring in 5 per cent of the total global investment, 
which provided an enormous contribution to the Mongolian economy.
There is another common complaint by many Mongolians 
regarding the Boroo Gold mining company. The company stands as an 
ultimate example of how foreign companies exploit Mongolia and how 
mining can be not profitable to Mongolia. Many people also complain 
that the company was not taxed enough (see Chapter 2). Ochirbat 
responds to such accusations by stating that the Boroo Gold project was 
the first significant Western foreign direct investment that helped the 
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Mongolian government make its resource sector appealing to foreign 
investors and to establish trust needed for mining companies to operate 
in Mongolia. For Ochirbat, this was the success of the liberal Minerals 
Law from 1997. Since there were no previous instances of Western 
mining companies operating in Mongolia, and the 1994 Minerals Law 
failed to appeal to investors, Mongolian policymakers in the mid 1990s 
had to create the best possible social, economic, legal and political envi-
ronments for foreign investors to operate mines in Mongolia in order to 
attract investors and to urgently bring growth to the national economy. 
He used a Mongolian proverb to describe the situation: ‘dogs would not 
sniff when covered with fat; cows would not eat when covered in grass’ 
(öökhönd booson ch nokhoi tooj shinshlekhgüi, övsönd booson ch ükher 
tooj shinshlekhgüi). In the case of Mongolia’s mining sector’s political and 
economic environment, the liberal Minerals Law was the ‘grass’ or ‘fat’ to 
entice investors. Therefore, he considers the Boroo Gold case as a project 
to entice foreign direct investment (FDI) and build trust, which appears 
to have been broadly successful.
The rule of President Ochirbat (1990–97) and his collabora-
tion with the Mongolian Democratic Union coalition government 
(1996–2000) successfully established what Stuart Kirsch (2014) calls 
‘mining capitalism’ in Mongolia. But unlike Kirsch, my focus in this 
chapter is not the conflict between transnational mining corporations 
and local communities conflict (Kirsch 2014, 9–14), but on how mining 
capitalism was embraced by Mongolian political leaders to fund the 
nation-state and to manage its independence.8 The initial purpose, as 
Byambasuren and Ochirbat explained, was to urgently find a solution 
in the precarious situation to support the politically and economi-
cally devastated post-Soviet nation-state of Mongolia. For them, the 
available solution was to be found in the free market, liberal economy 
and global capitalism. However, both Byambasuren and Ochirbat claim 
that they had intentions to build a khümüünleg, ardchilsan, irgenii niigem 
(humane, democratic and civil society) and declared it in the 1992 
constitution. An older version of this imagined society first appeared in 
the 1960 constitution khümüünleg, ardchilsan, sotsialist niigem (humane, 
democratic and socialist society). Finally, in the 1990s, the Mongolian 
state had a chance to make the imagined society real. This is also what 
many other influential democratic politicians claim – namely Zorig 
Sanjaasuren and Oyun Sanjaasuren, as documented by Morris Rossabi 
(2005, 34–5) – that political leaders of Mongolia had no particular 
intention to shift to capitalist markets. Instead, they intended a different 
society that is definable neither as socialism nor capitalism, but rather as 
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a humane, democratic and civil society with the best possible advantages 
of both socialism and capitalism. In this way, the narrations of the above 
individuals demonstrate the agency and deliberate intentionality on 
the part of politicians and technocrats to build an economically and 
politically secure independent nation-state. In other words, for those 
political leaders, all of the above was done with nationalistic purpose 
to save the country. When I talked to Algaa, he said that although few 
people call what he and his colleagues did to preserve independence and 
stabilise the national economy ‘nationalism’, he argues that it should be 
considered as nationalist in the sense of ündesnii üzel.
In conclusion, the narrations by political figures I have provided 
show a number of alternative ways to think about the development of 
the Mongolian economy following the end of socialism. First, anxieties 
surrounding independence, the reification of the national economy, and 
attempts to secure political independence and bolster national economy 
in Mongolia led political leaders to influence the emerging nation-state 
in particular ways. In this process, the matter of sovereignty and the 
national economy became the priorities of the nation-state, or in the 
words of Appel, ‘a privileged object – perhaps the privileged object – in 
official discourse’ (2017, 294).9 Second, the history of the Mongolian 
People’s Republic, heavily influenced by the Soviet Union, consists of 
an entirely different story of the nation-state compared to postcolonial 
states in South America, Africa, South Asia and the Pacific. In other 
words, Mongolia does not have the same relationship that postcolonial 
nation-states have with the United States and other Western states. The 
absence of a colonial relationship enables Mongolian political leaders 
to create alliances with the United States and other Western states and 
embrace capitalism with considerably less coercion (see also Bumochir 
2018b). This means that Mongolia, as a nation-state, is in a position 
that has a unique and unconventional relationship with those states. 
Third, taking advantage of the above historical background and justifi-
cations, those political leaders managed to bring the third neighbours 
(namely, America), international donors (such as the World Bank), 
and mining companies into the process of shaping the nation-state and 
building the modern nation. Fourth, the nationalist tendencies of the 
above-mentioned political leaders help me to explain the differences and 
disparities of forms of nationalism, which is also the focus of the next 
chapter. In this chapter, the nationalist tendency identifies precarity 
in the independence of the emerging nation-state by pointing out the 
weakness in the national economy emerging from the ruins of socialism. 
In contrast, ‘resource nationalism’, which I will explore in chapter two, 
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also addresses issues in the political independence and sovereignty, not 
by reifying the national economy but by critiquing the lack of state control 
on land and territory, and by demanding fair distribution of mineral 
wealth, ownership and shares. The emergence of resource nationalism 
depicts a different political discourse, which supports state control in the 
resource economy in parliament and government, which was a response 
to many concerns, conflicts and resistances, and appeared as a result of 
the rapid growth of the gold mining.
Notes
 1 Nationalism based on the reification of the national economy was a sentiment that was 
established in the MPR. In the Soviet-influenced style of planned economies, the notion of 
a national economy was central, and thus was the beginning of the reification of the national 
economy in Mongolia that this chapter describes. Following the collapse of socialism, many 
Mongolian politicians continued this form of nationalism and infused it with the issue 
of independence. But this chapter does not intend to trace the origin of the reification and 
nationalism of the national economy and much work needs to be done to show it.
 2 For instance, in 1915, as a result of the tripartite conference between Mongolia, China 
and Russia in Khyakhta on the north border, China and Russia imposed their decision to 
keep Mongolia as an autonomous region of China. Consequently, Chinese troops occupied 
Mongolia in 1919 (Bulag 1998, 12; Atwood 2004, 91; Batsaikhan 2007). Also, in February 
1945, just after the Second World War, Joseph Stalin negotiated Mongolia’s independence 
with the United Kingdom and the United States at the Yalta Conference. Here, it is essential 
to address that the United Kingdom and the United States persuaded China to recognise the 
freedom of Mongolia. Christopher Atwood (2004, 92) notes that America’s influence on China 
helped the Nationalist Party to recognise a ‘high-level autonomy’ for Mongolia and Tibet.
 3 Personal communication with Munkh-Erdene Lhamsuren, May 2018.
 4 Many Mongolians, including historians and politicians, might respond to Munkh-Erdene’s and 
Bolor’s claims by arguing that there are many historical facts that demonstrate Mongolia’s 
struggle to gain political independence; therefore, it is based in reality. For example, after the 
collapse of the Qing Dynasty, the government of Tsarist Russia did not recognise Mongolia’s 
independence. It instead allied with the government of the Republic of China and accepted 
their renewed right to deny the recognition of Mongolia’s independence as a legally 
reconstituted successor state to the Qing Dynasty (1636–1912) (Atwood 2004, 91; Bulag 
2012, 1). As a result, this generated the impression that Mongolia was an autonomous state 
under Chinese suzerainty from around 1910 to 1921 – at least according to Tsarist Russia if 
not for Mongolia (see also Bulag 1998, 12; Atwood 2004, 91; Batsaikhan 2007). 
 5 The same thing also happened in the early 1920s. Alicia Campi and Ragchaa Baasan write 
that Prime Minister Bodoo Dogsom (1921–22) ‘wanted the United States, in conjunction with 
Soviet Russia, to act as Mongolia’s protector, especially in regards to negotiations with China’ 
(2009, 105; see also Bulag 1998, 13).
 6 Many scholars made similar commentaries, such as L. Munkh-Erdene: ‘Under the supervision 
of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, 
Mongolia’s neophyte free marketers zealously launched a shock therapy (or structural 
adjustment) program in 1991 to establish a free market economy’ (2012, 63).
 7 Jargalsaikhan is a mining economist who studied in the Soviet Union and trained in the United 
States. Since the 1980s, he has held various government positions, including Officer of the 
Ministry of Geology and Mining, Head of the Mining Department at the Ministry of Heavy 
Industry, Vice President of the state-owned extraction company Mongol Erdene Holding, 
Chairman of the Mineral Resources Authority of Mongolia, and Head of the Geology and 
Mines Department of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
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 8 Not only in 1990 but also in 1911 – when the theocratic government of Mongolia proclaimed 
political independence – mining and particularly gold mining was immediately adopted to 
fund the emerging nation-state and to promote its national economy (Tuya and Battomor 
2012; Bonilla 2016; Jackson and Dear 2016; Bumochir 2018b).
 9 My next chapter shows how this object becomes less privileged in the contest against other 




A nasty bout of resource nationalism in Central Asia is worrying 
investors brave enough to invest in frontier markets. Mongolia 
and Kyrgyzstan are at it, with the Kyrgyz government this week 
announcing it has revoked 46 gold mining licences in what it calls 
an attempt to clean up the mining industry. At least none of the 
Kyrgyz licences are for the country’s major mining operations. 
The situation is different in Mongolia, which on April 16 suddenly 
suspended the mining licences of South Gobi Resources. 
(Watson 2012)
On 26 April 2012, the Financial Times published an article titled 
‘Mongolia: Mine ownership gets political’, in which moves to restrict 
Mongolian resources to be solely available to national actors (that is, 
the suspension of international mining licences) were declared to be ‘a 
nasty bout of resource nationalism’. In the following years, many similar 
accusations emerged that painted Mongolians and the Mongolian state 
as ‘resource nationalist’ (e.g., Stanway and Edwards 2012; Els 2012; 
Cashell 2015; Genota 2017; Venzon 2018). For example, Jean-Sebastien 
Jacques, CEO of Rio Tinto, one of the world’s largest Anglo-Australian 
metals and mining corporation that owns 66 per cent of the Oyu Tolgoi 
(Turquoise Hill) gold and copper mine in Mongolia. In May 2018, after 
‘the government ordered Turquoise Hill Resources, a subsidiary of .  .  . 
Rio Tinto, to pay $155 million in back taxes’, Jacques told investors at a 
conference: ‘A significant industry issue is resource nationalism’ (Venzon 
2018). This rhetoric was amplified by the international press as well 
as some scholars. For example, following the classification of ‘resource 
nationalism’ introduced by Ian Bremmer and Robert Johnston (2009), 
Misheelt Ganbold and Saleem Ali argue that the ‘resource nationalism’ 
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in Mongolia is ‘revolutionary’, which ‘is often expressed as public unrest 
that demands the transfer for natural resources from private owners to 
public coffers’ (Ganbold and Ali 2017, 1, 10). According to them, the 
impact of the type of ‘resource nationalism’ in Mongolia ‘tends to hinder 
profitability of the mineral projects’ and can create ‘a serious lack of 
confidence among investors’ and possibly a ‘diminution in foreign direct 
investment’ (10). 
On the other side, many scholars reject the above use of the term 
‘resource nationalism’. Rebecca Empson and Tristan Webb (2014), 
Jargalsaikhan Sanchir (2016), and Julian Dierkes (2016) all use the term 
‘resource nationalism’ in quotes. Empson and Webb write that ‘resource 
nationalism’ is an ‘accusation’ (2014, 241, 247), while Sanchir and 
Dierkes find that the use of the term is a ‘designated’ (songomol) (Sanchir 
2016, 55) ‘pressure’ (Dierkes 2016) tactic of transnational corpora-
tions and investors designed to influence the nation-state. Similarly, 
Orhon Myadar and Sara Jackson point out that ‘resource nationalism’ is 
often ‘used by those who promote neoliberalism and the open market 
as a pejorative label to silence public grievances’ (2018, 1). Some of 
these authors argue that it is not a nationalism but attempts to ‘balance 
competing responsibilities’ Empson and Webb (2014, 247) or to ‘control 
natural resources’ (Sanchir 2016, 55). Empson and Webb (2014, 247) 
suggest that ‘the charge of “resource nationalism” of Mongolia is perhaps 
an oversimplification of the drivers behind macro-economic and political 
decision-making in Mongolia. An alternative view of the “resource 
nationalism” accusation would be not, perhaps, a nationalist intent per se, 
but rather the outcome of the Government’s having to balance competing 
responsibilities across a spectrum of partnerships.’ To avoid such over-
simplifications, Sanchir translates ‘resource nationalism’ to bayalgiin 
ündesnii khyanalt in Mongolian, which means ‘national resource control’. 
In its avoidance of an under-considered conflation of ‘resource control’ 
and ‘nationalism’, Sanchir’s translation and explanation of ‘resource 
nationalism’ is a sensible one. Therefore, I borrow his translation in this 
chapter to reveal the richness and complexity of matters that are often 
simplified by the use of the pejorative label ‘resource nationalism’. 
The problems found with the term ‘resource nationalism’ can 
also be found elsewhere. John Childs (2016) and Natalie Koch and 
Tom Perreault (2018) problematise the neoliberal bias in the use of the 
term ‘resource nationalism’ and critique the narrowly defined reduc-
tionist framework of the concept in the fields of international relations, 
political science, applied economics, and business as a problem created 
more for neoliberal ideology than reality. Childs (2016, 530) notes that 
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‘the definitions of resource nationalism that follows is highly divergent, 
often contingent on political interests and conceptual biases’ and ‘it is 
also constructed in a number of different ways’. Then he warns that 
‘resource nationalism should be not read as the simple opposite of 
familiar neoliberal imperatives of resource governance but as something 
which is always hybrid and in flux’ (2016, 530). Child’s account of 
‘resource nationalism’ as ‘always hybrid and in flux’ is a description 
of a concept, rather than an existing phenomenon. It is an accusation 
levelled at various parties at different times, so the exact content of the 
term is bound to change. For this reason, Koch and Perreault (2018, 15) 
suggest a ‘critical’ approach to ‘push debates beyond essentialist market- 
and state-based analyses of resource nationalism and to provide a far 
more nuanced approach to its various manifestations’. Taking this call 
into consideration, this chapter attempts to provide a far more nuanced 
approach to the concept as it manifests in Mongolia. 
Following the above arguments developed by Childs and others, 
here I will treat ‘resource nationalism’ as a label and rhetorical or 
discursive device that describes some political processes and tactics 
aiming to control natural resources and to ensure Mongolia and its 
citizens receive their material benefits. The research materials that follow 
– which concern the resource economy in Mongolia – reveal a diversity 
of issues that lurks underneath the ‘resource nationalism’ tag which 
cannot be detached from different cultural and historical aspects that 
are classically associated with nationalism.1 Considering those historical 
constructions and culturally specific ideas, such positions are not a ‘nasty 
bout of resource nationalism’; instead, they are predictable outcomes. My 
focus upon nationalist sentiments in phenomena described as ‘resource 
nationalism’ is different from those of Empson and Webb (2014), Sanchir 
(2016) and Dierkes (2016) who, as I mentioned before, do not explicitly 
examine nationalism in their discussion of ‘resource nationalism’. Rather, 
following Childs (2016) as well as Koch and Perreault (2018), my 
rejection of the use of the term ‘resource nationalism’ does not exclude 
an account of nationalist sentiments in the discourse and movements 
serving to control and protect natural resources. 
Cultural and historical influences are often ignored in the 
existing literature on ‘resource nationalism’. Only few works mention 
the importance of such cultural factors. Koch and Perreault (2018, 
2) note that ‘resource nationalism takes both political economic and 
cultural symbolic form, often in ways that are interwoven and mutually 
reinforcing’. In the case of Mongolia, Empson and Webb (2014, 233–4, 
239) and Ganbold and Ali (2016, 10–11) underline the importance of 
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the cultural factors and provide some illustrations on how the ‘protective 
culture’ of mobile pastoralists in regards to their land and natural 
resources shapes this so-called ‘resource nationalism’. This chapter 
advances such an understanding of the protective culture of natural 
resources by shedding light on the (1) alternative cultural economy, 
(2) historical construction of the state control and protection of natural 
resources, and (3) political acts to balance contesting responsibilities 
and concerns. Thus, the following sections will explain why and how the 
Mongolian state and people promote national resource control. 
The Alternative Economy
Common Mongolian ways of thinking about the economy and its 
connection to politics might be seen as an alternative understanding of 
the economy. In this section, a school of thought of those described as 
‘resource nationalists’ rethink ‘the economy’ and construct an alternative 
understanding of the economy using two concepts. The first one stems 
from strategies from the Soviet practice of planned economies. The 
second one arises from ideas about consumption in Buddhism. 
The key person to have pioneered the development of a so-called 
‘resource nationalism’ in Mongolia is Khurts Choijin, a doctor of 
philosophy in geology and the former minister (1976–80) and vice-minis-
ter (1964–76) of Geology and Mining Productions (Geologi, uul uurkhain 
üildveriin yam) in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition to his positions in the 
ministry, he was also a member of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary 
Party Central Committee and of the People’s Great Khural. It was not a 
surprise that the current President Battulga Khaltmaa, who is known to 
have nationalist sympathies (Dierkes and Jargalsaikhan 2017), awarded 
him the title Khödölmöriin Baatar (Hero of Labour) in December 2017. 
The award was in recognition of Khurts’s achievements in the mining 
sector and his nationalistic position on resource policy. Not long after, 
in July 2018, a popular television documentary Mongol tulgatany zuun 
erkhem (Hundred distinguished figures of the Mongol hearth) – which 
President Battulga often supports – featured Khurts and his nationalis-
tic views.
Khurts shares ideas and approaches with some experts from the 
National University of Mongolia, namely S. Avirmed,2 a mining engineer 
and economist, and J. Byambaa, a geologist who closely collabo-
rated with them to protest against certain neoliberal policies. Algaa 
Namgar, director of the Mongolian National Mining Association that I 
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referred to in the previous chapter, refers to them as technocrats (in the 
following I will refer to them as nationalistic technocrats), based on their 
backgrounds and affiliations, a term that I will also use to describe Khurts 
and his colleagues. In 1994, Khurts was the key person who resisted the 
first liberal version of the Minerals Law that Algaa and his colleagues 
drafted and promoted with the help of the World Bank experts (see 
Chapter 1). At that time, the liberal version was not the only version of 
the bill. Khurts was in the working group to draft a different version of 
the bill that was supported and approved in 1994 (see also Konagaya and 
Lkhagvasuren 2014, 173–4). In other words, Mongolia already had a 
strong force of nationalistic technocrats: politicians who resisted the free 
market and liberal mining economy and instead supported state control, 
which is effectively the counter to the narrative I presented in Chapter 1. 
Not long after in 1997, those who promoted the liberal version of the law 
were successful in securing its passage. 
In April 2018, I discovered that Khurts has an office at the Ministry 
of Mining and Heavy Industry. Khurts is in his 80s, and is retired. Eager 
to find out the precise nature of his role at the ministry, I went to see 
him one afternoon and found his office on the third floor of the ministry. 
Written on the door was Mongolyn erdes bayalgiin salbaryn akhmadyn 
negdsen kholboo (United Committee of Elders of Mongolia’s Mineral 
Wealth Sector). There were two names under the label: ‘Ch. Khurts and 
Ts. Baljinnyam’. Unfortunately, the room was locked. In the corridor, I met 
a man who works in the ministry and asked him about this ‘committee 
of elders’. He said that Khurts comes almost every day and stays until 
around three or four in the afternoon. The man also told me that they 
are chölöötei khümüüs (free people), probably in comparison to people 
like himself, who do not have the same freedom to leave the office during 
working hours or to freely critique the government as these elders do. 
Later, Khurts claimed that their committee office and the employment in 
the ministry is largely symbolic (belgedeliin chanartai),3 and the younger 
generation of policymakers do not take their opinions seriously. The next 
morning, I met Khurts in his office and visited him again several times 
over the following days. Each day I met him, visitors came one after 
another to see him and to congratulate him for receiving the distinction 
from the president. Almost all of the visitors were from the mining and 
geology sectors. Some brought the ceremonial silk scarf khadag, a silver 
bowl with milk, or gifts such as expensive alcoholic drinks. This is a 
common way to show respect in Mongolia. Some of the visitors would 
sit and talk to him for hours, while I served those visitors tea, coffee and 
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biscuits. Their conversations were about Mongolia’s imperial history, 
nomadic culture, socialism, geology and mining.
From these conversations, and also from the interviews I conducted 
with him in the following days, I learned that Khurts deeply regrets that 
the so-called neoliberal transformation – with the help of the World Bank 
– demolished, in his eyes, Mongolia’s economic, political and scientific 
mineral resources institutions, which were developed during socialism 
under his direct leadership. He talked about this intensively with the 
people who came to visit him in his office, including myself. He told me 
that the market and democratic transformation made his 4,500 engineers 
unemployed and turned them into naimaachin (suitcase traders)4 and 
closed down his research institute with over 100 researchers, which was 
a significant loss for the country. He complained that all of the geology 
and mining institutions were dismantled and replaced with apparatuses 
of the free market economy and neoliberalism. Regarding this he said, 
‘chikagogiin malchikuud, Milton Friedman, dendüü muukhai, khudlaa, 
khooson surgaali gargaj irsen’ (Chicago boys such as Milton Friedman 
developed an awfully false and empty teaching). He claimed ‘there is 
no economy without the state’ (törgüi ediin zasag gej baikhgüi) (see also 
Callon 1998; Çaliskan and Callon 2009; Appel 2017, 301). I asked him 
why he thought neoliberal economic theory was false. In answer to this, 
he told me how he became a minister and a politician.
He was an outstanding student in Moscow during socialism, and 
one of the first to return to the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) 
with expert knowledge on geology. Upon his return to Mongolia in 
1963, the National University of Mongolia and the Government Agency 
for Geological Exploration and Research immediately employed him. 
Not long after, he was appointed as the director of the Sector of the 
Economy and Planning in the Agency for Exploration and Research, 
where he began studying the economy. To re-educate himself he had to 
read many Soviet-era Russian books about the economy, planning and 
strategy. These texts claimed that all countries (uls oron) must have a 
centralised strategy (strategi) and policy (bodlogo) to exist. Moreover, 
he explained that such strategies help the state (tör) to complete its 
ultimate duty to protect its people, territory, environment and culture. 
Most importantly, different political strategies do not let any sectors – for 
instance, the mineral sector or the economic sector – remain free from 
national politics.
For Khurts, this necessity creates a level of state participation and 
control in one way or another (see also Polanyi 2001), which means that 
the idea of the free market and liberal economy is a false dream for him. 
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He reached such conclusions from his experience working as the minister 
of Geology and Mining Productions. When he was a minister (1976–80), 
he had to make a strategic decision to not invest in the extraction of 
uranium and crystal used in optics. According to him, there were several 
problems regarding the extraction of these two minerals. The ministry 
was spending 28 per cent of its total budget for the exploration of crystal 
and 8 per cent for uranium mining, while they did not bring much profit 
to the GDP. The Soviet Union needed these minerals and Mongolia had 
to export them at almost no cost, in contrast to the international market 
price. He also complained that uranium mining was highly destructive 
to the local people and the environment, and it was one of the riskiest 
mining explorations. Concerning these two issues, Khurts had to make a 
strategic decision to stop investing in these two mineral explorations and 
to close down their operations. Consequently, 30 per cent of the Russian 
employees in the MPR’s geology and mining industry had to return to 
the Soviet Union. Instead, Khurts recommended investing in building 
industries that process natural resources such as copper, in order to 
support the national economy. While clearly his policies were not 
resisting ‘neoliberalism’, the necessity for interventionist economic policy 
appears to have been solidified through this experience. Unfortunately, 
as a result of this decision and because he fought against the interests of 
the Soviet Union, Khurts eventually lost his position as minister.
According to the principles of the free market and liberal economy 
noted above, political strategies that assert control over the free market 
violate the rights of private companies. To respond to this, Khurts 
explains how the understanding of the economy in Mongolia is and 
should be principally different from the understanding of the economy 
in capitalism. First, he claims that the culture in Mongolia does not 
prioritise private property and individual rights but instead prioritises 
the common and commoners.5 For him, the matter of the nation can 
never be considered as less important than the question of the individual 
or private companies. By prioritising the national economy and the issue 
of funding the emerging nation-state, he shares the same argument with 
Ochirbat Punsalmaa and others, which I presented in Chapter 1. The 
difference is Khurts had to close down mines, while Ochirbat had to open 
mines to support the national economy. For Khurts, the two are both 
strategic political decisions for the sake of the national economy. I must 
add that both are also nationalistic decisions, but the former (as seen in 
Chapter 1) is often considered in the terms of contemporary neoliberal 
ideology and Mongolian discourses as an example of ündesnii üzel (a good 
nationalism that supports prosperity and development), while the latter 
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stands as an example of ündserkheg üzel (a bad nationalism that blocks 
development, prosperity and democracy) or ‘resource nationalism’. 
Moreover, Khurts elaborated on another principle that also 
makes some widespread Mongolian ideas of the economy different 
from those found in so-called liberal economies that justify the state 
strategic intervention in the economy in a different way. To explain 
this, he used teachings from Mongolian Buddhism. He learned about 
‘correct consumption, correct demand, and correct outcome’ (zöv 
khereglee, zöv kheregtsee, zöv ür dün), which summarises a strand of 
Buddhist philosophy concerned with the economy (see also Brown 
2015).6 Khurts elaborated upon this in the following sense: ‘Correct 
consumption’ teaches us how to manage by efficiently using what we 
have. ‘Correct demand’, the opposite of unlimited demand, is about how 
to limit one’s demand or greed (shunal) based on the efficiency of the 
‘correct consumption’. ‘Correct outcome’ is where the ‘correct use’ and 
the ‘correct demand’ meet. He believes that these sorts of ideas should be 
recognised in the way they have influenced conceptions of the economy 
in contemporary Mongolia. In principle, there is a significant difference 
between the certain understandings of the economy in Mongolia and 
capitalism that lies in the idea of greed (shunal): one constrains greed 
while the other, for Khurts, rewards greed. Validating greed in Buddhism 
is a sin that is discussed widely even in contemporary Mongolia. Just 
as the first principle, arising from the soviet planned economy, the 
second principle also justifies state planning, strategy and control of the 
economy. These two principles are important influences upon some of 
the ideas related to the economy that circulate in Mongolia to this day. 
Certainly, they are important in the manner in which they motivated 
Khurts to promote articles related to the state ownership of the minerals 
with strategic importance in the 1994 Minerals Law (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh 
Khural 1994, Article 4), and the state ownership of the deposits with 
similar importance in the 2006 Minerals Law (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 
2006, Article 5). In this sense, the state control of natural resources can 
be rethought as a consequence of the specific ideological resources that 
circulate and are contested in contemporary Mongolia. The salience 
of these two principles is one of the reasons why many people such as 
Khurts support various forms of state control and protection.
Both of the principles mentioned above endorse forms of strategy, 
control and governance of the economy. Indeed, one might argue that 
this can be further seen in the very term ediin zasag which is used to 
translate ‘the economy’. As I argue in a different paper (Plueckhahn and 
Bumochir 2018), the conceptualisations of economy in this term differ 
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from understandings of ‘economy’  in English. It consists of two words. 
Ed means article, item, thing, property, possession, wealth and so on, 
mostly referring to something material. Zasag means governance, rule, 
or authority; its verb version, zasakh, means  fix,  do,  make,  manage, 
organise, control, rule,  master or  govern (Plueckhahn and Bumochir 
2018, 347). As David Sneath (2002, 201) explains, ediin zasag literally 
means the ‘governance of property’ or ‘possessions authority’ and ‘the 
very definition of the economic sphere depends upon the notion of 
political authority’, which reveals a Mongolian linguistic interconnection 
between politics and the economy in the very act of speaking about it. 
State Control and Protection
Varied historical narratives from different periods of the history of 
the nation of Mongolia make state control and protection of natural 
resources a normative discourse that is available for Khurts and other 
nationalist technocrats and politicians to deploy. This section introduces 
several historical narratives that depict a period of time starting from 
the time of Xiongnu Empire in the 3rd century BC–1st century AD 
to the Soviet regime in the twentieth century. As I find in this section, 
state control does not have a particular and stable meaning and a form. 
People give different meanings to state control and construe different 
forms of state control for certain purposes, usually to argue against 
neoliberal and free market ideologies, using historical narratives. The 
historically constructed validation and acceptance puts state control 
and protection of natural resources in a privileged position comparable 
to other privileged objects such as the national economy. Hanna Appel 
writes, ‘In Equatorial Guinea, as elsewhere, the economy is a privileged 
object – perhaps the privileged object – in official discourse’ (2017, 
294). In contrast to Appel’s argument, this section shows how histori-
cally constructed indigenous perspectives on state control and the 
protection of land and natural resources create alternative privileged 
objects besides the economy. As a result, there is a contest of privileged 
objects in Mongolia and, as I illustrated in the previous section, political 
rulers struggle to balance those different priorities. In my reading, the 
term ‘resource nationalism’ has come about without proper consid-
eration of how nationalist sentiments labelled as such are related to 
historical constructions of state control over natural resources. For many 
Mongolians, all of the above-mentioned laws, regulations and decisions 
identified in the framework of ‘resource nationalism’ remain as diverse 
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issues and problems that go far beyond the framework of the reduction-
ist accusation this term conveys. In the discussion below, I will shed light 
on matters of ‘tradition’ and history that are unavoidable in Mongolia. 
As Ganbold and Ali note, ‘the long-held nomadic belief and lifestyle 
of herders in Mongolia is an important factor for shaping such trends’ 
(2017, 6–7). But unlike Ganbold and Ali, I argue that this should not 
apply to understanding nationalism in the reductionist framework of 
‘resource nationalism’. The effects of nomadism and the pastoral way of 
life upon the relationship of land and herders are not captured by the term 
‘resource nationalism’, but are specific to nationalism in Mongolia. Here, 
I will not look at the nomadic and pastoralist culture per se as Ganbold 
and Ali mention, but I will focus on the historical construction of state 
control of natural resources which occurred within a pastoralist context.
Nationalistic technocrats, scholars, politicians and environmen-
tal movement leaders often deploy historical narratives to promote and 
justify state control of natural resources. According to many of these 
agents, and the existing literature on the history of mining in Mongolia, 
the tendency of the state to assert authority over resources existed in 
presocialist times. In Khurts’s office, I found a thick book titled Mining 
of Mongolia 95: Routes of the historical development of mining in Mongolia 
(Magvanjav and Tsogtbaatar 2017) dedicated to the ‘95th anniversary 
of mining in Mongolia’. The first chapter of the book reminds readers of 
the oath of the Xiongnu emperor Modu Chanyu (234 BC–174 BC) that 
circulated during the domination of the Qing Empire (1644–1912) – 
Burkhan guisan ch sööm gazar büü ög (Do not give away an inch of land 
if even God asks for it) – which was often considered as an important 
message of resistance from the past (Magvanjav and Tsogtbaatar 2017, 
24). The authors took this phrase for granted and provided no official 
references. According to some historical sources, this is not what Modu 
Chanyu actually said. In a myth about Modu, depicted by the ancient 
Chinese historian Sima Qian (135 or 145 BC–86 BC), his enemy first 
asked for his famous fast horse and then his favourite consort, which 
he agreed to give. Finally, the enemy asked for his land, and Modu flew 
into rage and said, ‘Land is the basis of the nation’ and ‘he executed 
all the ministers who had advised him to do so’ (Qian 1993, 135). In 
Mongolian, this is often translated as gazar bol ulsyn ündes (land is the 
basis of the people, nation or country; see also Kradin 2012, 54). Further, 
Mongolian historians claim that the Oirat ruler Galdan Khan (1644–97), 
who fought against the rule of the Qing Empire, is the one who said Minii 
nutgiin gazar shoroonoos burkhan guisan ch bitgii ög (do not give away 
my land even if God asks for it) (Dashnyam 2014, 228). It is common 
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in Mongolia to mix those two phrases and quote them with no proper 
references.7 In my interview with Khurts, in addition to mentioning these 
two phrases, he further suggested that the state control, regulation and 
protection of natural resources and the environment in Mongolia started 
in the times of the Mongol Empire (1206–1368), and it was explicitly 
declared in the Great Code of the Mongol Empire called Ikh Zasag (or 
Yasa, Yasag and Jasag).8 Moreover, he went on to claim the advancement 
in production that stemmed from the successful regulation of natural 
resources contributed to the empire’s conquests (see also Konagaya 
and Lkhagvasuren 2014, 158–9). Here, with the state control Khurts 
indicates state’s or emperors’ sovereign authority to use or to let someone 
use natural resources for certain purposes to help the state and people.
Another famous historical record that reveals state sway over 
natural resources comes from the mid-eighteenth century. Many of the 
books on the history of mining in Mongolia (see also Tuya and Battomor 
2012; Sodbaatar 2013) proudly narrate this event. Under the rule of the 
Qing Empire, aristocratic nobles in Zasagt Khan and Sain Noyon Khan 
banners established and organised altan-u qaraγul (a gold patrol) to 
protect wild animals, herbs, gold and all other natural resources from 
illegal exploitations and smuggling by migrant Chinese and Russians 
(Nasanbaljir 1964; Banzragch 2004; Tuya and Battomor 2012, 43–47; 
Jigmeddorj 2015; Magvanjav and Tsogtbaatar 2017, 24). I also had a 
chance to talk to Khurts about this history. He pointed out that gold patrol 
was one the most efficient ways to successfully protect natural resources 
from foreign threats in the history of Mongolia (see also Konagaya and 
Lkhagvasuren 2014, 161).
The first large-scale multinational mine in Mongolia under the 
Qing Empire was known as Mongolor. The company was financed 
by Russian, Belgian and Qing capital; it was also staffed with French 
engineers, American hydrologists, and Russian, Chinese and Mongolian 
miners. It became operational in March 1900 (Tuya and Battomor 2012, 
68–70; Jackson and Dear 2016, 350; see also Dear 2014; Bonilla 2016). 
Many commentators have drawn an analogy between early resistance by 
Mongolian people against the Mongolor project and what is happening 
in contemporary Mongolia. Qing officials decided to transform Mongolia 
into a strategic buffer zone against the encroachment of the Russian 
Empire and into a profitable region through a combination of agricul-
tural land reclamation and mining. The term li yuan (source of profit) 
was adopted to describe Mongolian soil (Sneath 2001; Jackson and Dear 
2016, 349; Dear 2014, 245–7). Mongol aristocrats and civilians enacted 
strong resistance against mining operations (not only this company but 
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mining operations in general) and the policy of the Qing authorities 
to exploit natural resources in Mongolia. Several important aspects 
may be deduced from the complaints and resistance against mining. 
Ya.  Sodbaatar (2013, 31–3, 48, 53, 54, 55) has published extensive 
archival documents that decry Russian and Chinese gold and coal mining 
operations and the operation of Mongolor. According to these materials, 
many people complained about ‘the incompatibility of mining to the way 
of living and the environment’ (aj törökh arga, oron nutagt kharshtai). 
Most of those documents reveal complaints that suggest mining 
operations degrade land and pastures and violate local people’s belief 
in land and water spirits. All of the charges described mining operations 
as foreign to Mongolian culture, not only as Russians, Chinese and other 
foreigners controlled these operations but also in the sense that they are 
destructive to the pastoral way of life and Buddhist and shamanic beliefs 
that teach not to destroy life of earth (Shimamura 2014, 395; see also 
Tanaka 2002).
Although mining turned out to be destructive and incompatible 
to this view of Mongolian culture, in 1911, when the theocratic state 
of Bogd Khan (1869–1924) established its government and proclaimed 
independence, the government immediately decided to nationalise 
mining for the sake of the national economy and its development. In 
other words, because mining turned out to be an opportunity to promote 
the national economy and sovereignty (Tuya and Battomor 2012; Bonilla 
2016), the reification of the national economy became the justification 
to allow mining activities (Appel 2017). In 1913, the new theocratic 
government of Mongolia introduced its Mining Regulations, which 
revealed a desire to expand the mining industry by welcoming foreign 
companies (Batsaikhan 2009, 72; Tuya and Battomor 2012, 75–78; 
Sodbaatar 2013, 92; Bonilla 2016). Significantly, the new government 
continued with contracts with the existing mining companies and put 
efforts into opening further mining explorations (Tuya and Battomor 
2012, 79; Sodbaatar 2013, 93). In the absence of the Qing Dynasty, 
Mongolor no longer had a responsibility to make payments to Beijing. 
Mongolia became the outright owner, thereby resulting in the state’s 
access to revenues from gold mining (Bonilla 2016). As such, the rulers 
of Mongolia started to nationalise and commodify natural resources as 
valuable assets in the economy of the emerging state. Khurts pointed 
out that according to the contract made between Mongolor and the 
Mongolian government in 1908, Mongolia received 16.5 per cent of the 
total amount of gold extracted; this percentage later increased to 20 per 
cent (see also Magvanjav and Tsogtbaatar 2017, 7–8). He also claimed 
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that the theocratic government of Mongolia used to own the deposits, 
and only issued permission to lease subsoil (see also Konagaya and 
Lkhagvasuren 2014, 163). For Khurts, this was again an example of how 
rulers of Mongolia promoted state control of natural resources. 
The historical policies of state ownership, protection and control 
were re-enforced after the revolution in 1921. In the book I found in 
Khurts’s office (Mining in Mongolia), I was eager to read the passages 
referring to 1922; that is, why that year was officially recognised as the 
year mining started in Mongolia. Khurts told me that in 1957, Arad-un 
yeke qural (People’s Great Khural) issued a decision to celebrate 1922 as 
the start of the mining sector in Mongolia, after the revolution supported 
by the Russian Red Army in 1921. In December 1922, the first mine to 
be announced as a state-owned mine was a coal mine in Nalaikh. After 
two years, the first constitution of the MPR, passed in 1924, declared 
that natural resources are the property of people (and therefore the 
state) (arad neyite-yin körüngge). It should be noted that the constitution 
explains that ‘from the past natural resources had been the wealth of the 
people and public’ (erte čag-ača inaγsi arad neyite-yin körüngge bayiγsaγar 
iregsen zang surγal) (Mongγol ulus-un yeke qural 1924, Chapter 1, Article 
1). This article of the constitution not only declares the ownership and 
authority of ard niit (people and public) but also pronounces that this 
is the moral custom and teaching (zan surgaali) that must be adopted 
and privileged by the next generation of Mongols. In other words, the 
constitution explains that it is essential to acknowledge, privilege and 
preserve Mongolian traditional customs and teachings (zang surγal) in 
regard to natural resources. As such, according to David Sneath (2010, 
251), notions of tradition (ulamjlal) and historical narratives become 
resources for politicians to mobilise politically and to historically ensure 
state control, as noted in this chapter. Throughout the development of 
the socialist system, the Mongolian government further reinforced and 
validated the state’s and people’s ownership of natural resources. The 
1940 (Bügüde nayiramdaqu mongγol arad ulus-un yeke qural 1940, 
Chapter  1, Article  5) and 1960 (Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn 
Ardyn Ikh Khural 1960, Chapter 2, Article 10) constitutions of the MPR 
declare that natural resources are ulsyn ömch ard tümnii khöröngö (‘wealth 
of the nation’ or ‘country’ and ‘property of the people’). Mette High 
(2012, 254) asserts that later laws, namely the Law on Subsoil (1988), 
the Constitution of Mongolia (1992), the Environmental Protection Law 
(1995) and the Law on Water (1995) emphasised state interests above 
those of individual mining investors even after the fall of socialism. For 
example, the 1992 constitution of Mongolia declares, ‘except that given 
BeyonD ‘resource nAt IonAl Ism’ 53
to the citizens of Mongolia for private ownership, the land, as well as the 
subsoil with its mineral resources, forests, water resources and wildfowl 
shall be the property of the State’. Moreover, the constitution also states 
that ‘natural resources should be under the authority of people’ (ard 
tümnii medel) and the ‘protection of the state’ (töriin khamgaalalt) (Bügd 
Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn Ardyn Ikh Khural 1992, Article 6). In 
this sense, the anniversary of mining celebrates state ownership and the 
people’s ownership of the territory and natural resources, as reinforced 
through reference to traditional customs and teachings (zang surγal).
As we have seen, the state control and protection of natural resources 
is a salient discourse that is available to deploy. Deployment of such 
constructions of the indigenous experience of history – and its political 
motivations – actively shapes the contemporary political economy of 
natural resources. Therefore, an account of mining in Mongolia, past and 
present, even when involving largely international companies, cannot 
be complete without recognising the availability, circulation and import 
that such Mongolian discourse has on the political economic context. 
By taking historical constructions into consideration, the state and the 
people of Mongolia do not simply control natural resources. They also 
attempt to protect the environment, locality and territory as well as the 
knowledge, beliefs, feelings and customs regarding land and localities 
they inhabit, which is a classic in romantic nationalist thought. These 
constructions also prompt ‘people’ (ard) to acknowledge state control 
instead of undermining it. Therefore, for many Mongolian policymakers 
and people, it is impossible to straightforwardly reject or even undermine 
the historical construction of state control and immediately establish an 
ultimately capitalist market-oriented economy. 
State’s Action to Balance
In the impasse in Mongolia’s resource economy (see also Preface), 
the state attempts to reconcile competing concerns promoted in the 
schools of liberal and nationalist thought. To be more precise, political 
attempts to balance these schools of thought led to situations that can 
be called ‘resource nationalist’ by some people. In the words of Empson 
and Webb, the Mongolian rulers and politicians in parliament and 
government attempt to establish ‘trusting partnerships’ and ‘to balance 
competing responsibilities’ (Empson and Webb 2014, 247). ‘The idea 
of “trusting relationship” can refer to that relationship between the 
Mongolian State and foreign investors, as well as in certain ways to that 
tHe stAte ,  PoPulAr moBIl IsAt Ion AnD golD mIn Ing In mongol IA54
relationship between the State and the Mongolian people’ (2014, 232). 
They go on to note that the Mongolian government ‘cannot serve all 
of its relations’, and this forces the government to put ‘some “on hold” 
while attending to some others’ (2014, 247). In this way, the govern-
ment’s (and parliament’s) delicate attempt to balance contesting part-
nerships and their privileges sometimes puts the economy on hold and 
promotes state control of the resource economy. Such forms of political 
control of natural resources to maximise and distribute its benefits are 
often defined as ‘resource nationalist’ (Bremmer and Johnston 2009, 
149; Wilson 2015, 399; Childs 2016, 539; Koch and Perreault 2018, 1), 
and mask the political struggles to balance competing interests that lay 
behind events. 
For example, Algaa calls the 1997 Minerals Law a liberal law 
that successfully appealed to FDI;9 Jargalsaikhan Dugar says that he 
was proud to promote the national economy by creating this law; and 
Ochirbat claims it helped to fund the emerging sovereign state. Yet many 
nationalistic technocrats, scholars and politicians such as Khurts rejected 
it and called it the ‘black law’ (khar khuuli). In my interview, Khurts 
gave a number of justifications for this. First, he claims that the law was 
written by a foreigner who was a World Bank consultant and who copied 
it from laws in English (Tsogzolmaa 2010) and that the foreigner did not 
consider the uniqueness of the Mongolian context. Second, as a result of 
the law, the territory of Mongolia was distributed in the form of mining 
licences to Mongolian and foreign private mining companies. Khurts 
claims that this violates an article in the constitution of Mongolia, which 
states: ‘In Mongolia, the land, its subsoil, forests, water, fauna and flora 
and other natural resources shall be subject to people’s power and State 
protection’ (Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn Ardyn Ikh Khural 1992, 
Article 6). Third, he complained about the litsenziin naimaa (selling of 
licences). As a result of the liberalisation in the economy, some people 
and companies obtained a large number of mining licences. He considers 
that this led to an unequal distribution of Mongolia’s natural wealth. 
Fourth, he explained to me that the private ownership (ömchlökh) or 
the temporary possession (ezemshikh)10 of land or natural resources (see 
also Sneath 2004; High 2012, 254; Empson and Webb 2014, 234 and 
239) risks the above-mentioned duty of the state to protect and control. 
If the company owns or temporarily possesses the soil and the subsoil, 
then this opens a right for them to transfer and mortgage the soil and 
the subsoil they own or temporarily possess in the form of the mining 
licence, which was actually approved in the Minerals Laws in 1997 
(Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 1997, Article 40) and 2006 (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh 
BeyonD ‘resource nAt IonAl Ism’ 55
Khural 2006, Article 40). Khurts decries this and warns that if mining 
companies fail to repay their loans, the mortgaged soil and subsoil in the 
form of the mining licence will remain mortgaged to one of the foreign 
banks. He worries that in such a case, the Mongolian government will be 
obliged to pay off the debt of a private company in order not to lose its 
land. To prevent such risks, according to him, the soil and subsoil should 
be the property of the state and could only be leased to others (see also 
High 2012, 254). He successfully managed to implement this approach 
in the Law on Subsoil in 1988 (Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn 
Ardyn Ikh Khural 1988, Article 1), and then in the Minerals Law in 1994 
(Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 1994, Article 33–7), but the Minerals Laws of 
1997 and 2006 both eliminated his protection. 
For the above reasons, Khurts and his colleagues fought against the 
‘black law’. This was true not only for Khurts and his colleagues; some 
other politicians and the public also expressed similar concerns. One of 
them was Enkhsaikhan Onomoo,11 who became a parliament member in 
2004. To support the nationalistic technocrats’ group and to lobby the 
amendment, he founded a movement called Minii mongolyn gazar shoroo 
(My Mongolian Land and Earth). With the effort of Enkhsaikhan and 
a few other parliament members, the new Minerals Law was success-
fully passed by parliament in 2006. The new law has some significant 
differences from the previous liberal version. For example, in the new 
version, Khurts and his colleagues managed to introduce articles 
concerning mineral deposits with strategic importance, and 34  per 
cent to 50 per cent state ownership (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 2006, 
Article 5). These articles also allocate a right and authority for the state 
to participate and control natural resources and the mining economy. 
There are also the following important changes: Chapter 2 of the new 
law (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 2006, Article 8–14) is entirely dedicated 
to the sovereign right (büren erkh) of parliament and the central and 
local governments to regulate (zokhitsuulakh) the resource economy; 
it eliminated the section to issue licences to those who first apply, and 
in its place introduced a stricter selection process and criteria (Mongol 
Ulsyn Ikh Khural 2006, Article 18–23, 24–6) and eliminated the section 
on the stability agreement in the new version. Here we see the influence 
of the discursive resources that encourage the state control of resources 
outlined throughout this chapter and the very real impact they have on 
the economy in Mongolia. Yet these amendments in the Minerals Law 
in 2006 marked only the start of the national resource control and the 
overall concern further echoed many more attempts of state control. 
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Another law that placed restraints upon the growth of the gold 
mining economy was the windfall profit tax law (Genetiin ashigiin 
tatvaryn khuuli), which passed in 2006. In May 2006, parliament 
approved a windfall profit tax on copper and gold exports, which 
required companies to pay a fee at a rate of 68 per cent when the copper 
price exceeds US$2,600 per metric ton and the gold price reaches 
US$500 per troy ounce on the London Metal Exchange (Tse 2007, 1). As 
the government and parliament predicted from mining companies’ tax, 
after the implementation of the law, the GDP increased by an average 
of 48 per cent from 2006 to 2008 (Mongolian Mining Journal 2008). For 
those who created and supported the bill, this success was the result of 
the windfall tax law. As such, the national economy appears to be the 
dominant justification for the legitimacy of the windfall tax law. For those 
who introduced the bill and those who supported it in parliament, this 
law was the best possible way for the government to claim its ownership 
of natural resources and to provide the most national benefit from the 
exploitation of natural resources. The high tax was also a response 
by some politicians to the complaints against those few Mongolian 
and foreign private mining companies who benefited the most from 
Mongolia’s mineral wealth. As such, it is important to examine the story 
of how the government came to this idea in the first place.
In Mongolia, this law is also known as the law of Fortuna’s 
daughter (Fortunagiin okhiny khuuli). Fortuna is the nickname of 
Batbayar Nyamjav, an economist and politician, who was a member 
of parliament and a minister of Construction and City Building. There 
are also rumours that he is a shaman. Batbayar started his private 
business in 1992 and established a company, which he called Fortuna. 
Later it became clear that the idea of the law came from his daughter, 
Jargalan Batbayar, who studied economics at Columbia University 
(2001–4). Many Mongolians make jokes by saying that she learned it 
on the internet or the idea came by way of Fortuna’s dream. The origin 
of this law became an example for many people as to how politicians 
in Mongolia initiate and approve laws without serious research or 
knowledge. As the story goes, the law initially targeted copper, not 
gold, and particularly the Mongolian and Russian joint venture Erdenet 
Mining Corporation, with the intent to increase Mongolia’s profits. 
According to Algaa’s version of the story, it was unfair to target Erdenet 
and Russia only; therefore, seizing the opportunity of the gold price 
increase, the government decided to include both copper and gold and 
other gold mining companies in the law.
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Unfortunately, in addition to the increase in the GDP, this law 
brought about a disastrous outcome in the gold mining sector, which I will 
also present in the next chapter on gold mining companies. Gold mining 
companies stopped selling their gold to the Mongol Bank, and the illegal 
trade of gold dramatically expanded in the years that followed. Official 
records indicate that the amount of gold production decreased from 24.1 
tonnes in 2005 to 17.4 tonnes in 2007, and the export of gold dropped 
from 23.8 tonnes in 2005 to 11.5 in 2007. A Mongolian Mining Journal 
(2008) editorial calculated that during those two years, Mongolia lost 
about US$565 million from gold exports because of the windfall tax law 
and illegality it encouraged.
As a consequence of the above laws,12 the production of gold 
further dropped to 5.7 tonnes in 2011 and gold export fell to 2.6 tonnes 
(Gold 2025 Programme baseline research report 2015, 7–8). The Bank 
of Mongolia purchased 15.23 tonnes of gold in 2005, which was an 
all-time high. This amount dramatically dropped to 2.12 tonnes in 2010, 
3.31 tonnes in 2011, and 3.34 tonnes in 2012 (Bank of Mongolia 2017).
Since the 2000s, the boom of nationalistic sentiments and state 
control was not the only issue to generate the laws mentioned above. 
Bans constrained the growth of the small- and medium-scale gold mining 
operations in Mongolia. Further, the increase in the national economy, 
discovery of abundant minerals, and plans to open the world’s largest 
mines to exploit deposits with strategic importance caused Mongolian 
rulers to undermine the operations of the small- and medium-scale gold 
mining companies. The new era of the vast mineral deposits extraction 
of transnational mining corporations such as Rio Tinto started to shape 
the gold mining sector in relation to small- and medium-scale companies. 
Rio Tinto’s investment in the Oyu Tolgoi (OT) gold and copper mine 
made the Mongolian economy most invested in 2012 in the world by 
the IMF metric (Riley 2012). In 2011, Mongolian GDP growth rate 
reached an all-time high at 17.5 per cent. Compared to the 1990s, the 
national economy appeared to be in a much stronger state. In this sense, 
it was the start of the significant strategic mines that caused Mongolian 
rulers to cancel the windfall tax law, not the struggles and battles of 
the small and medium gold mining companies. To pave the way for the 
agreement of Rio Tinto and its partner Ivanhoe Mines to establish Oyu 
Tolgoi copper-gold mine, the government of Mongolia agreed to scrap 
the 68 per cent windfall profit tax on 25 August 2009. In preparation for 
the start of production, scheduled for 2013, the government rescinded 
the windfall law in early 2011 (Swire 2009).
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The growth in the GDP rate and the presence of transnational corpo-
rations created a window of opportunity for some politicians to develop 
a different political campaign and a distinct nationalistic tendency, as we 
have seen in the above case of the windfall tax law. But this window of 
opportunity was temporary and brief, and the GDP growth rate collapsed 
again in 2012. From 2014, Mongolia’s GDP growth rate dramatically 
dropped to -1.6 per cent in 2016 (Trading Economics 2018). At the end 
of 2014, Prime Minister Saikhanbileg Chimed of the Democratic Party 
finally admitted that Mongolia was faced with a severe economic crisis. 
The announcement of the crisis had a specific purpose: the government 
justified the reinforcement of the liberal economy against so-called 
‘resource nationalism’. As a result, in May 2015, Mongolia and Rio Tinto 
signed a US$5.4 billion deal to expand the underground development 
of Oyu Tolgoi. International media outlets quoted Saikhanbileg’s 
statement: ‘Mongolia is back to business’ (Guardian 2015). In his speech, 
he also emphasised the importance of terminating all possible interven-
tions of the Mongolian government and politicians in the business of the 
two companies. In many ways, this announcement was a redeclaration 
of Mongolia’s free market economy. Saikhanbileg’s appeal to terminate 
political intervention in mining was somewhat moot because the nation-
state has a particular policy regarding strategic deposits and their wealth, 
which creates a situation where political interventions are unavoidable 
(Dulam 2015).
In 2016, the regime of the liberal resource economy was further 
enforced during the rule of the subsequent government of the People’s 
Party. In 2017, the Mongolian government started ‘Gold Programme 
Two’, which is reminiscent of the first ‘Gold Programme’ in 1992. The 
purpose of Gold Programme Two was to liberate the resource economy, 
invite foreign investment, encourage activity in the gold mining industry, 
and to grow the GDP rate. Such political decisions made in 1992 and in 
2017 show that the rise and decline of the two competing regimes were 
both tied to the reification of the national economy. The reification of 
the national economy has a dialogical relationship with the issue of the 
environment, social justice and distribution of natural resource wealth. 
When Mongolia achieves fast economic growth, then many rulers 
consider the environment, social justice and distribution of resource 
wealth; when the economy hits a crisis, many of them abandon the envi-
ronmental problems and concerns about the resource economy. Yet in 
both cases, specifically Mongolian discursive resources related to the 
environment and economy shape the political-economic outcomes.
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Notes
 1 Jeffrey Wilson (2015) critiques the focus on the economy in the discussion of ‘resource 
nationalism’ and underlines the importance of political matters. But here he fails to mention 
cultural factors.
 2 He passed away in 2015, and many Mongolians suspect that his death might have to do with 
his fight against mining.
 3 I later discovered that Khurts and Baljinnyam have had this office for more than ten years, and 
the ministry pays a salary for one person. Initially, it was Khurts who received the salary but 
later this was changed to his colleague, Baljinnyam.
 4 In the 1990s, many Mongolians started to bring goods from China and Russia and sold them in 
Mongolia. From Mongolia, they used to bring marmot skin and scrap metal and sold them in 
Russia and China.
 5 In Chapter 6, we will also see Munkhbayar develop the same argument about individual rights 
versus the common good.
 6 Interestingly enough, not only Khurts but also those who support the liberal economy – 
namely, Jargalsaikhan – also told me about the same Buddhist understanding of the economy. 
Jargalsaikhan also said to me that he does not think the market is free and the economy 
liberal. For this reason, he was uncomfortable being labelled as someone who promotes the 
liberal economy. Instead, he thinks what he and his other colleagues did in the 1990s – similar 
to what Ochirbat says in Chapter 1 – was not intended to establish a liberal economy or free 
market; rather, his sole intention was to assist the economy of Mongolia.
 7 Chapter 5 also shows how nationalist movements use these phrases to justify their protests to 
protect the environment.
 8 Although a complete written text was not found, many historians claim that Ikh Zasag was 
an imperial code of conduct of the Mongol Empire and its successor states started from 
Chinggis Khan.
 9 Many others also consider the 1997 Minerals Law to be liberal. For example, Mette High 
(2012, 255) notes that ‘the Minerals Law accentuated the much more liberal position of 
the state’.
 10 ‘We find ideas about the ownership of land and resources that pivot around the notion of a 
master-custodian relationship. This model differs from outright individual ownership. Here 
access to resources, such as pasture, water, etc., is not granted as individual ownership, 
but rather alternates through an idea of “temporary possession” (ezemshil). The notion of 
temporary possession requires on-going connections that put people in relations of debt to 
each other, be it between the Mongolian people and its government, between monastic orders 
and their subjects or between herding households and the spirits or “masters” of local places 
(gazaryn ezed)’ (Empson and Webb 2014, 239).
 11 He passed away in 2006 due to health reasons. But many Mongolians suspect that his death 
might have to do with his fight against mining.
 12 In 2010, for national security purposes, Mongolian President Elbegdorj Tsakhia introduced a 
ban on the issue of exploration licences and the assignment of existing permits. He announced 
that the moratorium was necessary for several reasons: to create better regulation and 
organisation of mining licences, to amend the minerals law again, to find a resolution to 
the corruption and errors in the issuance of some thousands of permits and to address the 
overwhelming sale of land in the form of mining licences (Ninjsemjid 2012). His moratorium 
lasted for about four years, until 2014.
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Navigating Nationalist and Statist 
Initiatives 
Mongolians saw a dramatic rise in the mining sector as a result of the 
Gold Programme and the liberal Minerals Law, as well as other free 
market and liberal economic principles (see Chapter 1). By the 2000s, 
the number of gold mining companies and the number of mining licences 
increased from a dozen to some hundreds. Those who work in the mining 
companies admit that gold mining companies had enormous importance 
in the building of the national economy and in funding the nation-state 
in the 1990s and 2000s (see also the claims of Ochirbat Punsalmaa and 
others in Chapter 1). Moreover, many Mongolian gold mining companies 
successfully managed to expand their businesses to non-mining sectors 
and now present themselves as ‘national companies’ (ündesnii kompani), 
‘national producers’ (ündesnii üildverlegch) or ‘wealth producers’ 
(bayalag büteegchid) that contribute to Mongolia’s national economy and 
development. Hence, they sometimes argue that they can be nationalist 
in a different sense. More precisely, they are nationalist in the sense of 
so-called good nationalism (ündesnii üzel). In other words, the political 
appeal to mining and investors invited mining companies to engage in 
and contribute to the building of the nation and the crafting of the state 
by helping the national economy (see also Jackson 2015). The appeal 
also granted mining companies a prestigious reputation at the national 
level which endorsed their position and influence (for similar cases in 
Peru and Ecuador see also Bebbington et al. 2008, 2901). In this way, 
this chapter briefly demonstrates the role of gold mining companies 
in the nation-building and state-crafting, and shows how they shaped 
Mongolian politics, the state, the economy, capital and nationalism. 
In contrast to these politically supported prestigious positions and 
influences of mining companies, this chapter also shows how pressure 
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from nationalist and statist policies to control natural resources and 
the resistance of protest movements against mining destruction (see 
Chapters 4 and 5) forced mining companies to hide, minimise or stop 
their operations, abandon mining business and start new businesses.
In her book about austerity, Laura Bear (2015) writes about 
how bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and workers implement and navigate 
austerity policies. In this chapter, I borrow her use of the term ‘navigate’ 
to examine how gold mining companies in Mongolia navigate nationalist 
and statist initiatives and policies. In the wake of these two forms 
of initiative, small- and medium-scale gold mining companies faced 
different challenges, tried different manoeuvres, and indeed many of 
them reported that they had to reduce or cease their mining businesses 
and pivot to other sectors. Some used other tactics, such as changing 
names of their companies or subcontracting other companies to continue 
their mining businesses.1 I show in this chapter that as a result of such 
navigations these companies and their operations became non-trans-
parent. In the words of Marina Welker (2014), mining companies in 
Mongolia became unstable collective subjects with multiple authors, 
boundaries and interests. Consequently, it becomes difficult for 
protestors, authorities and the public to know whether a company 
stopped its mining operations and businesses, or whether it is simply 
using a different name or a subcontractor to continue its business. 
Importantly, this was often because of statist and nationalist policies, not 
despite them. 
Such nationalist and statist initiatives and policies put small- and 
medium-scale gold mining companies in a powerless position in terms 
of defining the nature of their operations. Such an outcome shows 
something different to what most of the existing literature suggests. 
There is a conventional framework to understand mining companies 
and corporations as primarily transnational and powerful institutions. 
As Stuart Kirsch (2014, 1) puts it, such multinationals ‘organize much 
of the world’s labor and capital, shape the material form of the modern 
world, and are a prime mover of globalization [with] … a wide range 
of harmful effects’. In this vein, the literature on corporations discusses 
corporate environmental damage and social disruption versus neoliberal, 
colonial and capitalist power (Sawyer 2004; Ferguson 2006; Shever 
2012; Behrends et al. 2011; Andreucci and Radhuber 2017); sustain-
ability, development and corporate social responsibility (Welker 2014; 
Idemudia 2010; Raman and Lipschutz 2010; Rajak 2011; Gilberthorpe 
and Banks 2012; Gardner 2012); audit, accountability and responsibility 
(Li 2015; Welker 2014); labour and mine workers (Godoy 1985; 206–7, 
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Smith 2013); and how corporations avoid regulations and respond to 
critics (Benson and Kirsch 2010; Kirsch 2014). 
However, scholars rarely discuss the absence of power of small- and 
medium-scale mining companies in the face of nationalist and statist 
initiatives such as powerful environmental protest movements, national-
oriented political logics and the state control of natural resources. 
Anthony Bebbington et al. (2008, 2900) point out the relative power of 
different mining companies to do with their ‘sizes and resources’ that 
they ‘can use to manage and dissipate conflicts’. Chris Ballard and Glenn 
Banks (2003, 293–4) acknowledge such problems in the study of mining 
corporations and note that there is a monolithic image of multinational 
corporations as ‘homogenous, powerful, hierarchical, rational, profit-
seeking beasts’, which ‘tends to mask the considerable complexity of 
corporations’. In the same ways, this homogenous image also obscures 
the problems of small- and medium-scale mining companies, investors 
and Mongolian corporations that I introduce in this chapter. This chapter 
attempts to deconstruct this homogenous image of mining corpora-
tions and show the challenges of some small- and medium-scale gold 
mining companies in Mongolia. Small- and medium-scale gold mining 
companies contribute to Mongolia’s labour and capital and help to shape 
modern Mongolia. They are, however, much less powerful than the trans-
national corporations that operate in Mongolia, such as Rio Tinto and 
China Shenhua Energy. I do not focus on the transnational corporations 
in Mongolia here, not least as the resource conflict in Mongolia started 
before transnational corporations began their operations in Mongolia. In 
the 1990s and early 2000s, in the absence of the transnational corpora-
tions, most of the resource conflicts and resistance focused on Mongolian 
companies, and later expanded to include some small- and medium-scale 
foreign mining companies. The absence of transnational corporations in 
the 1990s suggests that in Mongolia, corporate and community disputes 
over the environment are not foundationally transnational but have their 
origin in domestic concerns (see also Hilson and Laing 2016). More 
precisely, much of the ethnography in this chapter concerns Mongolian 
gold mining companies with no foreign investment or shareholder in the 
ownership of the company. Only the last section of the chapter presents a 
medium-scale foreign gold mining company and its struggles to navigate 
those nationalist and statist initiatives.
In addition to the problem of the homogenous image and assumed 
transnationalisation of mining companies, there is a lack of a proper 
account of mining corporations and companies. In their literature 
review, Ballard and Banks (2003, 290) address the lack of attention to 
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corporations and criticised anthropologists’ preference to focus on the 
‘exotic’, centring on the position of local communities in the vicinity of 
multinational corporations. A decade later, Emma Gilberthorpe and 
Dinah Rajak (2016, 6) make the same statement. They claim that the 
contribution of anthropology to the study of natural resources should 
be to bring into focus the agency of corporations including the smaller 
companies that I describe in this chapter. Kirsch (2014, 12; see also 
Benson and Kirsch 2010, 459), who worked with protest movements, 
reveals the same methodological and ethical concern and admits that it 
was impossible for him to adopt a middle position in the conflict between 
protest movements and mining companies as I mentioned in the preface. 
However, I choose to take a multi-faceted approach, in order to achieve an 
accurate balance in my presentation of conflicts between the community 
and company. This approach permits me to present different agents such 
as activists, companies and politicians in the same account and shed light 
on all the parties involved. In this way, my focus on both gold mining 
companies and those working in the mining sector is intended to make a 
contribution to understanding corporations and companies from a more 
balanced and comprehensive perspective.
While Chapter 1 described the establishment of the liberal mining 
economy and the reification of the national economy, and Chapter 2 
examined the growth of national-oriented legislation and resource 
control – and the following chapters will focus on protest movements 
– here it is necessary to discuss what happened to the gold mining 
companies. In other words, this chapter concentrates on one of the 
other sides of the story; it depicts the experiences, positions and justifi-
cations of gold mining companies. There are many questions that often 
remain unanswered: What happened to those companies? Why did they 
cease operations? What happened to them when they ceased? What 
manoeuvres did they use to endure? I collectively refer to these under-
studied and unanswered questions as the ‘other side of the story’. 
This chapter shows the different navigations of three gold mining 
companies, which helped them to manoeuvre, manage and overcome the 
challenges of some nationalist and statist initiatives. In the first case of 
Erel, to combat environmental protest movements the company founders 
and owners attempted to use their political networks and influence by 
establishing a political party and control of the government in coalition 
with the Democratic Party. In the second case, the Gatsuurt company, its 
founder and owner L. Chinbat, although he criticises it, acknowledges 
the power of the culturally sanctioned nationalistic and statist initiatives, 
and considers the precariousness of the resource business in Mongolia. 
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The above-mentioned companies also show how capital generated 
from mining flows to other sectors by establishing other companies 
at that buy other resources in those sectors. Unlike Erel and Gatsuurt, 
Cold Gold Mongolia, a New Zealand company, continues its mining 
business. However, to continue its mining business the company had to 
execute different manoeuvres to navigate varied nationalist and statist 
pressures using its Mongolian family network. A description of these 
three companies’ ‘navigations’ reveals the manner in which mid-range 
mining companies were forced to grapple with Mongolian national 
politics, which in turn arose from a very particular political-economic 
and, indeed, cultural context. 
Erel Company: The Motherland Party
The Erel company plays an important role within this book. Not least as 
the ‘river movements’ that I will present in the following chapters started 
their protest against the operation of Erel and other, smaller companies 
along the river Ongi. During my fieldwork in spring of 2017, my attempt 
to interview the director of Erel and other people from the company failed 
and it was very difficult to get firsthand information about this company. 
Therefore, I briefly present Erel based on the available materials from the 
media and some interviews with environmental protestors and people at 
the Mongolian National Mining Association. As the company describes 
on its webpage, although it started its business from geology and mining 
in 1989, from 1994 it expanded to include construction, education, 
banking, finance, management and real estate. There is no mention of 
mining,2 which is the first example of an act of ‘navigation’ to escape 
from its mining destruction scandal by removing that practice from its 
own history. For those who suspect that Erel still profits from mining, 
such a navigation leads to the creation of an opaque state of affairs. 
Not long after the collapse of socialism, when private property and 
the free market were still new in Mongolia – that is, in the 1990s and 
2000s – Erel was one of the first and largest privately-owned mining 
companies that started its growth from open-pit gold mining. According 
to Bayarsaikhan Namsrai, one of the leaders of the river movements, 
at the time when they started fighting against Erel, the company had 
already managed to establish 13 other businesses in addition to its 
mines, including a bank, a construction company, a secondary school, 
a hospital, an insurance company and more. They were also the most 
significant taxpayers in the country. In other words, the protestors had 
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to fight against the biggest so-called bayalag büteegch (wealth producer) 
in Mongolia of that time. Alongside his 13 businesses, in 1998 the owner, 
B. Erdenebat, founded the Mongolian New Democratic Socialist Party 
(Mongolyn shine ardchilsan sotsialist nam) and not long after changed 
its name to the Ekh oron nam which literally means ‘Mother Land or 
Mother Country Party’ (see also High 2017) to mobilise the culturally 
salient nationalistic tendencies surrounding Mongolian concepts of land 
and territory discussed in the previous chapter. I argue that the change 
in the name of his political party is a form of navigation to re-introduce 
the image of his mining company to Mongolians. The nationalist pres-
entation of the party helped him to succeed in politics by appealing to 
ideas and discursive resources that were attractive to many citizens. Erel 
was an extremely profitable company and its political party was initially 
successful. Erdenebat managed to establish his political party offices 
in almost all provinces and districts across the country. In 2000, in the 
parliamentary election, 73 candidates ran for the Motherland Party, but 
only the party chair and the company owner, B. Erdenebat, were elected 
to parliament. In 2004, in the next election, the Motherland Party 
won seven seats in parliament, which was a tremendous victory, and 
formed a coalition with the Democratic Party. In the new government, 
Erdenebat worked first as a Defence Minister (2004–5) and then as a 
Fuel and Electricity Minister (2006–7). Other company men such as I. 
Erdenebaatar, former CEO of Erel, served as a Minister of Environment, 
and S. Otgonbayar, also from Erel company, a Minister of Emergency. 
However, the success of Erel and the Motherland Party in Mongolian 
politics did not last long. The coalition collapsed: according to the media, 
because Erdenebat (the chair of the Motherland Party) and Enkhsaikhan 
Mendsaikhan (the chair of the Democratic Party) fought over the prime 
minister’s position (Mongol News 2011a). The Motherland Party started 
to receive heavy criticism regarding the environmental destruction 
inflicted by its related companies. At the same time, as the founder 
and leader of river movements Munkhbayar Tsetsegee claims, the 
river movements strongly pressured (dömögkhön shakhaj baisan) Erel 
by collaborating with some of the politicians fighting against Erel for 
different reasons (see Chapter 4). For those politicians fighting Erel, 
Munkhbayar and the river movements became an active ally to defeat 
the company. Mette High writes the following about the situation:
Munkhbayar was relentless in his efforts, and eventually, 
parliamentary commissions conducted the promised research 
in 2007. Followed closely by the public, the inquiry investigated 
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several mining sites, including Erel’s operation in Ölt. In the 
interview published in a widely circulated Mongolian newspaper, 
a member of the commission laid bare the conclusion that Erel 
had been purposely forging the environmental rehabilitation 
procedures mandated by Mongolian law. He stated that ‘the 
responsibility for all the mess created in Uyanga sum should rest 
with Erel Company’ (Ödriin Sonin 2007). Several members of 
parliament began to attack Erel for the situation in Uyanga openly. 
Then a debate followed, broadcast on the state funded TV network 
MNB (Mongolian National Broadcasting). The owners of Erel 
declined to participate, and in their absence, the debate placed the 
responsibility for the ‘ecological catastrophe’, as the State Property 
Committee chairman Zandaahüügiin Enhbold described it, squarely 
on Erel’s shoulders. . . . Declaring Erel, the sole perpetrator was not 
only a potentially fruitful legal strategy but also an attempt among 
politicians to wage their own political battles. (High 2017, 56)
In the next election in 2008, the Motherland Party did not win any seats. 
There are rumours that Erel sold its mine to a Czech company called 
Aum Alt (Aum Gold). However, there is no information about a company 
called Aum Alt or Aum Gold in either English or Mongolian. Munkhbayar 
suspects that Erel has not left mining completely. Instead, he thinks, the 
company became hidden by having multiple layers (dald orchikhdog) of 
other companies up front, while Erel remains in the core. Munkhbayar 
claims that they pretended to sell their licences to other companies and 
then subcontracted them to perform much the same activity (see also 
High 2017, 57).3 In the case of Erel, it is difficult to determine whether 
Munkhbayar’s suspicion has some truth or not. Therefore, it is difficult to 
claim that there is hidden control or show how this works in the case of 
Erel. Yet I do not deny the possibility of other companies that can work 
through subcontracts to help navigate challenges.
Erel’s political career did not end up helping the company; instead, 
it brought a decline to its business. The political power of the company 
did not help it solve its conflicts with environmental protesters. Indeed, 
the situation turned out more or less the opposite. Erel’s involvement in 
politics helped the river movements to bring the issue of mining-induced 
destruction and their nationalist initiatives to a higher level of political 
relevance and to receive recognition and support from politicians that 
fought against Erel and the Motherland Party. It was also a bad financial 
move for Erel to establish a political party with hundreds of offices across 
the country. According to Algaa Namgar, it can be assumed that Erel 
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spent too much money to fund the Motherland Party, and as a result, the 
operations of its offices across the country and the election campaigns of 
its candidates severely damaged the company’s financial security. Despite 
its failures in politics, the success story of Erel and the Motherland 
Party remains an excellent example of a gold mining company in the 
contest of the nation-building and state-crafting in Mongolia (see also 
Jackson 2015). 
Besides the decline of its power in politics, at around the same 
time in 2007, the Erel mine faced strong resistance from local protestors. 
Munkhbayar and his colleagues stopped the operation of 35 gold mines 
out of a total of 37. Erel had to stop its mining operation for about three 
months. Furthermore, in addition to the effect of the protests of river 
movements, the 2006 windfall tax and the 2009 ‘law with the long 
name’ (Law to prohibit mineral exploration and mining operations at 
headwaters of rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir and forest 
area)4 had a major impact on gold mining. I turn now to an ethnography 
of two companies, which show how some of the gold mining companies 
survived such nationalist and statist initiatives.
Gatsuurt Company: The National Food Producer
Chinbat Lhagva, founder and owner of Gatsuurt Company, claims that 
all of its mining operations ceased5 due to the 68 per cent windfall tax 
and the seizure of all mining licences in accordance with the ‘law with 
the long name’. For this reason, the company is currently known by 
the Mongolian public not as a mining company but as one involved in 
agriculture and food production. 
Founded in 1992, Gatsuurt is one of the largest, wealthiest and 
most successful Mongolian companies. Chinbat was born and raised in 
a herding family of 15 children. As is the case for many environmental 
protestors, Chinbat, his parents and many of his relatives were herders. 
Professionally trained as a geologist in the Soviet Union, after graduating 
in 1985 he started a job at the International Geological Expedition 
(Olon Ulsyn Geologiin Ekspeditsi). In 1991, he had an opportunity to 
study satellite geological exploration for one year in France. When he 
returned from France, the expedition was closed. To make his living he 
was involved in naimaa (suitcase-trade) between Beijing, Ulaanbaatar 
and Moscow for a couple of years (for naimaa see also Ichinkhorloo 
2018). His experience working in geological exploration and the profits 
made from trade allowed him to establish a mining company, Gatsuurt, 
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which started gold mining exploitation in 1995 and 1996. The company 
negotiated a bank loan of 200 million MNT to buy some old Russian 
mining equipment in order to start mining operations. Not long after, 
he experienced the disadvantages that come with old equipment and 
technology. About the same time, he met Danny Walker, a miner from 
New Zealand. What he learned from Walker made him decide to visit New 
Zealand to learn more about mining equipment and advanced extraction 
and rehabilitation technologies. After he returned, Chinbat got another 
bank loan to renovate his equipment and technology, this time for US$1 
million from Anod Bank of Mongolia (see also Batsukh and Chinzorig 
2012). He explained to me that mining extraction technology in the 
1990s was very backward (ashiglaltyn arga technologi mash khotsrogdson 
baisan). Companies used to dig massive holes and left them for years, 
rather than fill up the extracted land immediately while continuing to 
extract more land. 
With Soviet mining technology, all the material gets extracted 
and then it is all filled up later. With the modern mining technology, 
filling up and extracting go together. According to Chinbat, protests of 
local people started when companies left the extracted land unfilled 
and without rehabilitation. In the countryside, most Mongolians who 
consider digging up the ground a taboo (Shimamura 2014, 395) felt 
uneasy with the extracted surface of the ground. As someone who grew 
up in herding culture, Chinbat understands the potential of this residue 
and degraded surfaces of the ground to trigger emotional reactions from 
many Mongolians. The Soviet technology was also financially much more 
expensive than the New Zealand technology. In the late 1990s, Gatsuurt 
started to utilise a new technology that Chinbat gained from New 
Zealand, and immediately started both technical and biological rehabili-
tations in the late 1990s (see also Batsukh and Chinzorig 2012). Unlike 
Erel, the technology helped him to avoid being targeted by environmen-
tal activists for protest against mining-induced environment damage. In 
2001, the Ministry of Environment approved its first technically rehabili-
tated 3.5 hectares of land, and both technically and biologically rehabili-
tated 24.8 hectares of land in 2002. The size of the rehabilitated land 
increased from year to year from 3.5 hectares in 2001 to 268.4 hectares 
in 2010. Also, in 2001, the Ministry of Environment awarded Gatsuurt a 
certificate of ‘Number One Rehabilitation Company of Mongolia’ (Mongol 
ulsyn neg nomeriin nökhön sergeegch company). At that time, only a few 
companies were conducting environmental rehabilitation. Therefore, 
in 2001 in Bat-Ülzii sum, Övörkhangai aimag, Gatsuurt organised a 
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national workshop on mining rehabilitation (ulsyn khemjeenii nökhön 
sergeeltiin zövlögöön).6 
Around the same time, Gatsuurt started interacting with environ-
mental protestors, including Munkhbayar. With the help of the above-
mentioned new technology and lawful operation, Gatsuurt did not 
get into a severe fight and conflict with the environmental protestors. 
However, as Chinbat admits, this is beside the point. Even though 
there was no direct conflict between Gatsuurt and the movements, 
and environmental movements did not target Gatsuurt, the company 
was left financially harmed because of the overall impacts of the later 
environmentalist and nationalist initiatives of the windfall tax and the 
‘law with the long name’. In consequence, Chinbat had to stop his gold 
mining operations.
In 2006, after the approval of the windfall profit tax law, I heard 
Chinbat say that the law made it impossible to engage in gold mining in 
Mongolia. He complained that there was no way to make a profit after 
paying the 68 per cent windfall tax. He later explained to me that the high 
tax left no profit for gold mining companies. For this reason, for example, 
Gatsuurt had to speed up the exploitation of the most significant and least 
costly deposit in two years. He was forced to leave the rest of the minor 
deposits untouched due to the high cost of extraction and high tax to sell. 
He further explained that incomplete mining extractions that left some 
gold behind helped to expand the extraction of illegal artisanal mining, 
which is much more harmful to the environment (for artisanal mining 
see High 2017). Consequently, the company sold the gold extracted 
from the most efficient deposit in 2007 and 2008, when the price rate 
was low in comparison to the increase in the international market in the 
following years, which reached as high as US$1,700 in 2013. For Chinbat 
and many other gold mining companies, it was suboptimal to extract and 
sell the main deposit in such a short period and sell them at a low-price 
rate. He complains that the success of Mongolia’s gold mining economy 
and hopes of gold mining companies was tarnished and ultimately 
terminated by such nationalist and statist initiatives.
By 2009, in the aftermath of the windfall tax, the situation for gold 
mining companies worsened with the approval of the ‘Law to prohibit 
mineral exploration and mining operations at headwaters of rivers, 
protected zones of the water reservoir and forest area’ or the ‘law with 
the long name’, which was drafted and lobbied by ‘river movements’ 
(see also Chapters 4 and 5). As a result of the law, about 20 gold mining 
extraction licences of Gatsuurt (see also Sansar 2015) were voided or 
stalled due to the new legislation. This time, the legislation made it 
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impossible for Gatsuurt to operate at all. Chinbat explained that the state 
‘snatched’ (tör khuraagaad avchikhsan) all of his licences. He now owns a 
small per cent of a share in a small gold mining company and most of his 
income comes from non-mining businesses. When I asked him if he will 
return to the gold mining business he indicated that he wouldn’t, due to 
the amount of work and investment it would take to get the necessary 
permissions, licences and equipment. Furthermore, he complained that 
in Mongolia the state can always grab mining licences which makes the 
business precarious. In other words, Chinbat emphasises the impact of 
nationalist and statist initiatives and policies which have gained salience 
in the political logics of Mongolia. 
According to Chinbat, if the windfall tax and the ‘law with the long 
name’ had never happened, his company and many other gold mining 
companies would have made fortunes, and the Mongolian economy 
would have benefitted enormously from the increase in the price of 
gold in the international market. He could have sold the gold deposits 
throughout the periods of the price increases with much higher rates up 
until 2013. According to his calculations, Mongolia would have increased 
its gold production from 43 tonnes in 2006 to 100 tonnes in 2011. He 
claimed that Mongolia lost around US$50 billion. He also speculates 
that about 400 tonnes of gold (about US$14 billion) were smuggled 
into China.
After all of these struggles in the mining sector, he concluded that 
the most secure business was food production, which is not as precarious 
as mining and does not receive the same nationalist and statist pressures. 
The company’s shift from mining to agriculture and food production 
shows how capital works in Mongolia. In a similar way to Erel, the 
company was already investing its profits from gold into other businesses 
such as agriculture, food production, five-star hotels and television. 
Although the company started with gold mining in the mid-1990s, 
agriculture and food production were not entirely new for the company. 
Gatsuurt began to operate in these fields in the early 2000s. From the 
mid-2000s, Gatsuurt successfully diverted its primary focus and the 
overall identity of the company away from mining to agriculture and 
food production. Consequently, Gatsuurt now supplies about 15 per cent 
of wheat, 5 per cent of vegetables and 2 per cent of meat to the domestic 
market of Mongolia.7 In this way, Gatsuurt positioned itself as a national 
food producer not a mining company, and managed to build a better 
reputation than many other mining companies. In 2017, the president of 
Mongolia granted Chinbat the highest and most prestigious distinction 
of the country: ‘Hero of Labour’ (Khödölmöriin baatar). Considering 
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the often negative reputation of mining, many in Mongolia assume 
that the distinction celebrates his achievements in the agriculture and 
food production, rather than in mining. I assume that the decline of his 
mining career and his achievements in Mongolia’s agriculture and food 
production sector granted him an opportunity to receive this distinction. 
In other words, it would have been difficult or maybe impossible for 
Chinbat to become the ‘Hero of Labour’ if he was solely a mining 
company owner. His successful shift from mining to food production and 
other businesses in the country allowed him to receive the award. 
Besides helping the corporate image and reputation, the diversifi-
cation of the businesses of gold mining companies in the case of Erel and 
Gatsuurt, and their shift of capital in critical times functions as a form of 
navigation to minimise loss of potential risks in the precarious mining 
business in Mongolia. However, those with no diversification opportu-
nities, or those not prepared to make a shift in their capital, must find 
alternate forms of navigation to stay in the mining business, as we will 
see in the case below. 
Cold Gold Mongolia (CGM): A Solution to Mining 
Destruction
Cold Gold Mongolia Co. Ltd. (CGM) is an open-pit gold mining company 
established by Danny Walker, a miner from New Zealand. Unlike Erel 
and Gatsuurt, CGM still runs a business in the gold mining industry 
in Mongolia. However, Danny told me that CGM no longer directly 
operates mining in Mongolia, but only manages mining operations for 
Mongolian gold mining companies. With this statement, he meant CGM 
no longer holds licences for mines that CGM manages. More precisely, as 
Danny complained, different pressures made it impossible for a foreign 
company to hold a mining licence. The only way left for CGM was to 
manage mining operations for Mongolian mining companies that hold 
licences. Such a strategy insulates CGM from different pressures, which 
is a further form of navigating nationalist and statist initiatives. 
Danny presented his company as a model of a solution to the envi-
ronmental damage caused by mining in Mongolia. In contrast to Erel and 
Gatsuurt, CGM has a different corporate image based on its rehabilita-
tion technology. Using the advantage of its mining technology, CGM 
usually operates in the sites previously mined with Soviet technology 
and terminates mining projects through rehabilitation. By properly 
terminating mining projects CGM prevents mined areas from further 
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degradation caused by illegal artisanal mining (see also High 2017). 
Without the company, many mined sites have been left for many years 
without rehabilitation. Therefore, CGM presents itself as a company with 
the solution to mining-induced environmental damage which helps the 
company to justify its operation.
In 1994, the Resource Management Amendment Act in New 
Zealand (New Zealand Parliament 1994, Article 30) endowed local 
authorities with the right to regulate permissions to use water and 
disturb the surface of the ground. The amendment made mining 
difficult, and many mining companies fled the country. One of them was 
Danny Walker. He mainly operated underwater gold extraction in New 
Zealand and had a company called Under Water Mining. In 1998, while 
working in Indonesia, he heard about Mongolia from a Canadian miner 
friend who worked in Mongolia at that time. After visiting Mongolia 
in 1998, Walker started Cold Gold Mongolia open-pit gold mining 
company in 1999. According to Walker, he decided to work in Mongolia 
for two main reasons. First, the overall social, economic and political 
environment to operate and run a mining company in Mongolia was 
welcoming and friendly enough, compared to many places he observed 
and experienced. Second, Mongolia was attractive with its rich and large 
gold deposits, where a company could base itself for some years in order 
to grow. According to Walker, it was not only him and his company but 
also many other foreign companies that were very much attracted to 
Mongolia, including AGR Limited, owned by Resolute Australian mining 
company, which started its operation in the Boroo Gold Mine in 1999. In 
early 2002, Cameco (Canadian Mining and Energy Corporation), later 
known as Centerra Gold, entered Boroo Gold Mine. Walker was the first 
to introduce the New Zealand method of placer gold mining of stream 
beds in Mongolia, the one which Chinbat learned and adapted in this 
company. The method uses a ‘mobile screening plant’ and ‘hydro-active 
riffled sluices’. This technology ‘permitted high percentage gold recovery, 
24 hours a day gold washing, same day rehabilitation of mined out areas, 
reduction of truck movements and efficient use of manpower’ (Walker 
2001, 36). This method was revolutionary compared to the Soviet 
method widely used by most of the Mongolian and Russian companies in 
Mongolia. In 1999, CGM started its operation in the abandoned workings 
of the Toson Terrace in the Zaamar Goldfield, which was previously mined 
by a Mongolian company from 1993 to 1996 using traditional Soviet 
mining and washing methods. They produced 460 kilos of gold from 
1993 to 1996, and their gold recovery was 51 per cent (Beaudoin 2000). 
In a four-month-long scavenging operation from previously extracted 
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workings, CGM produced 37 kilos of gold (Walker 2001, 36). At the 
same time, CGM was one of the first – and only – gold mining companies 
that started rehabilitating mining areas. In 2001, the company received 
a distinction from Selenge province (aimag) government where the 
company mined: ‘Environment Friendly Organization’. After Selenge, in 
2004 CGM moved to Urtyn Gol mine in Shine Jinst sum (sub-province) 
of Bayankhongor aimag (province). Gatsuurt company had previously 
mined Urtyn Gol deposit and sold it to CGM. 
In Urtyn Gol, in 2005, CGM first encountered local resistance. 
First, it was one or two people coming to the mine who expressed their 
resistance to mining, despite everything being legal and following all 
standards and regulations, as Walker claims. The local herders’ resistance 
against CGM started to enlarge and became more active in 2006. Local 
herding families in the area joined and arrived with a Russian van, and 
some 20 people came to protest against the mine. They demanded that 
the company stop its extraction. Their primary concern was to not let 
the mine extract areas that were covered with broom-grass (ders), and 
to preserve those areas for pasture. The company had to negotiate with 
local herders and decided to mine in an area with less or no broom-grass. 
However, the areas that local herders permitted CGM to mine did not 
necessarily have good gold deposits.
At that time, Walker married Orgilmaa Zundui-Yondon, who 
was the office manager of CGM. She told me how frustrating it was for 
a foreign man and Mongolian woman to deal with the resistance of 
the local people. Because of such difficulties, the company stopped its 
operations the following year, rehabilitated the area and terminated 
the project. CGM fenced the mined area, used seeds to plant grass and 
watered the rehabilitation area. Some local people, such as Erdene, 
participated in the rehabilitation. Erdene was one of the local herders 
who actively resisted and led the demonstration. Walker and his wife 
came back to see the rehabilitation three times in the following years and 
became good friends with Erdene. In 2006, the General Agency for the 
Specialised Investigation of Mongolia started awarding a distinction to 
mining companies that successfully conducted rehabilitation (nökhön 
sergeeltiin tergüünii company). With the rehabilitation in Urtyn Gol, CGM 
was one of the first four companies to receive this distinction. 
CGM’s next mine site was in Daldyn Am, also in Bayankhongor, 
in a different sum called Bömbögör. This time they managed a mining 
operation for a Mongolian company called Khan Shijir. Before CGM’s 
operation, another Mongolian company called Erkhis Mining operated 
the Daldyn Am mine for Khan Shijir. Erkhis Mining stopped its operation 
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for Khan Shijir due to the 68 per cent windfall tax. As Orgilmaa explains, 
according to the calculation of CGM, the Daldyn Am mine gold deposit 
was large enough to make a profit despite the increased windfall tax 
burden. Considering this calculation and CGM’s desperate situation 
to start a new mining operation, the company came to an agreement 
with Khan Shijir, and CGM started operating in the Daldyn Am in 2006 
and 2007. Here, Walker and Orgilmaa experienced the difference 
between managing a mining operation and holding a mining licence. 
As an operation manager, and not a mining licence holder, Walker and 
Orgilmaa were both kept away and secure from local resistance and 
harassment. Since 2006 local resistance against mining and environmen-
tal movements in the whole country had become more influential than 
ever before (see Chapters 4 and 5). However, Daldyn Am mine faced 
relatively less resistance and struggles because, as Orgilmaa explains, the 
mining licence owner was a Mongolian company and those interacting 
with the local people on behalf of the company were Mongolian men of 
the company, not a foreign man married to a Mongolian woman. The 
owner of Khan Shijir, Dovjid, has two grown sons, and both of them had 
been working and residing at the mine site. The two sons used to deal 
with the local herders’ concerns and disputes. Orgilmaa said that the 
people in the movement and local herders in Daldyn Am treated Khan 
Shijir much better compared to her experience in Urtyn Gol. From their 
experience working for Khan Shijir, Walker and Orgilmaa learned that 
Mongolian companies led by Mongolian men would face fewer problems, 
compared to foreign companies. With the help of the Mongolian mining 
company dealing with conflict and resistance, CGM successfully closed 
the mine with excellent environmental rehabilitation. Consequently, in 
the following year, Khan Shijir won the distinction of the best rehabili-
tator of the year from the General Agency for Specialised Investigation 
of Mongolia.
After the Daldyn Am mine, CGM started operating a mine in 
Nariin Teel, in Bayankhongor. About 100 people from three sums along 
the Nariin Teel river protested against the mining operation, and the 
company had to move again to a different mine in Khüitnii Am, which 
was in Bömbögör, Bayankhongor, and started operating in 2008.
In an interview in 2017, Walker told me that ‘no one [foreigners] 
makes the bureaucracy, no one likes us here’. Because of this, Orgilmaa 
established a Mongolian company called Odod Gold for the next mining 
project, using the facilities and equipment of CGM. The establishment of 
a Mongolian company was a necessary form of navigation to deal with 
local resistance against mining and bureaucracy. The Khüitnii Am mine 
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was a long and narrow gold deposit that occupied pastures of about 
20 herder families. While the company already had all of the necessary 
regulations and permits, those 20 families were the first to fight against 
the mining operation. The first among these protestors was an elderly 
lady whose pasture was the first to be exploited. She brought a gun 
with her and threatened to shoot anyone who came to extract from her 
land. She was not the only person who brought a gun; many others did. 
The company ended up negotiating with the families and agreed to pay 
one million MNT to operate one screen gold wash plant per month. 
The company had nine screens and had to pay nine million per month. 
Orgilmaa says it was an excellent financial contribution to those families. 
Some of them bought more livestock, some bought houses in the 
provincial town, and some paid student fees. Also, Orgilmaa told me, no 
one and no regulations helps mining companies to stop local resistances. 
More precisely, there is no formal arrangement or assistance from the 
central or local governments or police when local people resist mining 
even when mining companies have all the necessary legal paperwork 
and permits. Instead, the state often leaves such incidents for the mining 
company and local people to decide amongst themselves. Within the 
range of their freedom to negotiate, Orgilmaa and her family paid local 
people to get their permissions. However, the real difficulty comes when 
suddenly a new law stops mining operations. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, on 16 July 2009, the ‘Law to 
prohibit mineral exploration and mining operations at headwaters of 
rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir and forest area’ – prohibiting 
mining operations within 200 metres of river and forest areas – passed, 
voiding many mining licences and forcing a large number of gold mining 
companies to terminate their on-going operations and future plans. For 
example, Odod Gold had to halt their activity in Khüitnii Am mine, and 
had their licences suspended for future operations. Odod Gold and many 
other companies were not prepared for this. In these extreme conditions, 
those who were willing to continue gold mining had to buy new mining 
licences in legal areas – that is, away from rivers, lakes and forests, which 
was not typical for open-pit gold mine deposits. 
It took almost three years for the government to identify and 
calculate the size of target areas, impacted companies and licences, and 
to figure out how to implement the law, and most importantly, how to 
compensate8 those mining companies that stopped their operations. 
As Walker and Orgilmaa understood the situation, in 2010, neither 
parliament nor government required those companies to stop their 
operations immediately. Instead, the government approved annual 
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work plans for gold mining companies as the ‘Law to prohibit mineral 
exploration and mining operations at headwaters of rivers, protected 
zones of the water reservoir and forest area’ was violated. The unclear 
situation left a severe and insoluble conflict between movements and 
companies. Odod Gold – and many other companies – had their annual 
work plans approved and permitted by the government. However, 
protestors considered mining operation in such circumstances a violation 
of the law and pressured mining companies and the government to 
implement and follow the law. Odod Gold did not immediately stop its 
operation: they operated in Khüitnii Am for only one year, which was 
not a long enough period to create new plans and facilities for their 
next operation, and to replace all their suspended licences. Further, to 
cease its operation in Khüitnii Am, such a short extraction time was too 
great a financial loss for the company. As a result, Odod Gold continued 
to operate and struggled through chaotic conditions throughout 2009 
and 2010.
Bömbögör sum, with a population of about 3,000, had four different 
protest movements against mining. These were in addition to the bigger 
movements established in the provincial centre, such as Khongor Nutgiin 
Duudlaga (Call of the Khongor Homeland), one of the 11 movements that 
joined the 2005 Mongol Nutag Minu Evsel (My Mongol Homeland known 
as Mongolian Nature Protection Coalition) united by Munkhbayar (see 
Chapter 4). Following the new law and throughout 2010, almost every 
week people from different movements visited the mine in Khüitnii Am, 
travelling from sum, aimag and the capital city to demand that operations 
be stopped. The whole situation persuaded those 20 herding families at 
the Khüitnii Am mine site to strengthen their resistance against Odod 
Gold. The only way to negotiate was to increase the monthly payments 
to those families. 
In 2011, the government stopped giving gold mining companies 
permission to operate and provided no compensation. Many companies 
continued to operate illegally without state approval or permission. 
Others declared bankruptcy, while many others searched for alternative 
business, as was the case for Erel and Gatsuurt. Those who illegally 
operated had to spend fortunes to pay local people, movements and 
authorities. In the same way, Odod Gold operated illegally in order to 
avoid bankruptcy and to generate funding for a new mining operation in 
legal areas. In this way, the whole situation – that is, with no compensa-
tion from the government – eliminated many companies and put them 
into desperate positions which in turn led them to operate illegally. 
Walker and Orgilmaa remember this as their toughest year, and only 
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those companies that managed to secure funding for their next mining 
project survived. The consequences of their illegality led them to 
experience all sorts of pressure from the national and local government 
authorities, local herders, movements, artisanal miners and even their 
employees. For Odod Gold, being a successful mining company with 
the record of highest possible gold recovery, advanced operation tech-
nologies, minimal environmental destructions, best practices of reha-
bilitation, fair tax payment, contributions for rural development and 
national reserves of gold did not help them to survive the year. It had 
been Mongolia’s policy from the 1990s to encourage and enlarge the 
mining sector and appeal to many mining companies, so of course, many 
in the mining sector considered that it was unfair to sacrifice mining 
companies, especially those that had previously strictly followed the law.
Ultimately, as a result of the turmoil, which lasted for about three 
years, Odod Gold finally stopped its operation in the Khüitnii Am mine. 
They conducted rehabilitation in the mined areas and planted about 
18,000 trees and bushes, and then abandoned their remaining gold 
deposits in the mining field. After struggling for three years, Walker and 
Orgilmaa finally managed to start a different mining project. In 2012, 
Danny and Orgilmaa moved away from Bayankhongor to mine in Zaamar, 
Töv aimag. As a result of the president’s moratorium, it was indefinitely 
forbidden to sell mining licences and to explore new gold mine sites. 
Because of these constraints, CGM and Odod Gold had come up with 
new techniques of navigation, and this time they had to collaborate with 
a different mining company with licences to operate in the permitted 
areas. Z. Batbaatar, Orgilmaa’s brother, owns a mining company called 
Uuls Zaamar. When I visited Danny and Orgilmaa at the Uuls Zaamar 
mine in spring 2017, CGM, as Danny explained to me, was managing a 
mining operation for Uuls Zaamar. They were about to finish environ-
mental rehabilitation of the mined area and had started operating the 
neighbouring site left by the Russian company Golden East Mongolia 
(Altan Dornod Mongol), which now has a Mongolian owner.
Zaamar is a site with a long history of gold mining dating back 
to Soviet times. This history makes mining in Zaamar different from 
Bayankhongor. In 2012, when Uuls Zaamar started its operation, the 
company faced a different conflict with the residents. This time the 
residents were artisanal miners, not herders. Those miners live in a small 
settlement only a few kilometres away from the Uuls Zaamar mine site. 
This tiny settlement is often referred to as güür (the bridge), indicating 
the close location of the settlement to a bridge. Within  15  kilometres, 
there is another much larger mining settlement called Sov, also populated 
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mainly by artisanal miners, possibly dating back to the Soviet period. 
One evening not long after Walker and Orgilmaa settled at the Uuls 
Zaamar mine site, local artisanal miners protested against the company 
and demanded to be granted areas to operate in. This demand was legal 
due to the regulation lobbied for by the Swiss Agency for Development 
and Corporation in Mongolia to support local artisanal miners forming 
small cooperatives (nökhörlöl). Orgilmaa, together with two of her 
brothers and members of the company, had a meeting with the repre-
sentatives of the protestors and explained why its mining technology 
and the deposits’ location deep under the ground was not suitable for 
artisanal miners to exploit. The protestors nevertheless insisted that 
the company grant them immediate access, and warned them that the 
protestors gathered outside the mine were ready for violence (yu ch khiij 
magadgüi). Nevertheless, the company made a decision not to let the 
artisanal miners work and warned them that the protestors would be 
charged for their illegal and violent acts. The company employed around 
ten security guards to protect the mine site, and they were prepared 
to fight against the strike of local artisanal miners. Orgilmaa said that 
there is always some resistance when a mining company starts operation 
and the company should be prepared for this. The beginning is always a 
crucial moment, which decides what will happen to the company in the 
next couple of years. The only place they could not negotiate at all was 
in Nariin Teel in Bayankhongor, where the company did not operate at 
all and left (see above). This experience caused Orgilmaa and her family 
to make the tough decision in Zaamar: to fight against the protests of 
the artisanal miners, instead of accepting protestors’ requests and trying 
to negotiate. Mining company’s aggressive responses to the resistance of 
protest movements is another form of navigation, perhaps the fiercest 
and the most desperate kind, compared to earlier examples we have seen 
in this chapter.
To conclude, the ethnographic material in this chapter allows one to 
understand agency within the management of small- and medium-scale 
gold mining companies. To understand small- and medium-scale gold 
mining companies and their operations in Mongolia, one has to focus 
on the individual agent or agents who own and manage the company 
or companies in collaboration (for the same situation of other small and 
medium businesses in Mongolia see also Chuluunbat and Empson 2018). 
Although as a mining company Batbaatar owns Uuls Zaamar, and this 
is the company that officially holds the mining licence, family members 
who own other companies share different duties and operations of Uuls 
Zaamar. Walker explains that it is now his family who mines in Zaamar; 
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his company, CGM, only manages the mining operation. The relation-
ships and interconnections of these companies, which are owned by 
different family members, appear to me an entangled relationship of 
three different mining companies, and the complexity of their relation-
ship creates some level of non-transparency which may be the key to 
survival. What is clear is that the arrangements made between these 
three companies enable Walker, Orgilmaa and Batbaatar to manage or 
operate mining and continue their business in the open-pit gold mining 
sector. Considering such a complex relationship, one cannot discuss a 
monolithic or even singular company. Instead one must trace the agents 
who own these companies and manage such tangled relationships. 
Walker and Orgilmaa’s story shows how they managed to survive in 
Mongolia’s mining sector. The entanglement of these three companies 
is a by-product of Mongolia’s uneven gold mining policy in the past 
two decades. The law and regulations made it impossible to have one 
company sustainably operate in a transparent manner – instead, the 
collaboration of different companies is required. Furthermore, the presi-
dential moratorium temporarily banned any form of exchange or sale of 
mining licences and exploration of new mines, so the only way to access 
and use a new mining licence was to buy or to collaborate with a company 
that possesses such a licence. In this way, some companies closed down 
their operations while others hid within the entangled relationships 
between multiple mining companies. Such relationships, along with a 
general lack of transparency, protect companies or their owners from 
possible problems and conflicts. In Mongolia, a mining company and its 
operation is a multiple and complex process of navigation of sometimes 
desperate individual agents acting on behalf of different companies in 
the unpromising environment of the resource economy brought about by 
national as much as international political-economic processes. 
Notes
 1 I must make clear that I do not argue that environmentalist and nationalist movements 
and state control are the only causes of the decline of these gold mining companies. There 
are many other related factors and causes to do with their technology, management, 
accountability, expertise and investment and the fall of price in the international market 
as some environmentalists, politicians, gold mining companies and experts in the mining 
associations note and acknowledge. 
 2 For more information see http://erel.mn.
 3 Chapter 4 and 5 show how the movement successfully closed down many mining operations 
and stalled mining licences. These chapters suggest that local river movements are powerless 
in the ‘mining war’, but they are a powerful group in the battle.
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 4 As I mentioned in the Introduction, the official name of the law is Gol, mörnii ursats büreldekh, 
usny san bükhii gazryn khamgaalaltyn büs, oin san bükhii gazart ashigt maltmal khaikh, 
ashiglakhyg khoriglokh tukhai khuuli (Law to prohibit mineral exploration and mining 
operations at headwaters of rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir and forest area). 
Munkhbayar, the leader of the river movement, complains that nicknaming the law such as 
the ‘law with the long name’ is a political tactic to obscure the indication of the law. For him, 
the intention of the law that appears in the ‘long name’ of the law gives a proper indication 
(see Chapter 5).
 5 Many other companies also reveal the same. For example, the historical outline of the Altan 
Dornod Mongol (Golden East Mongolia; est. 1997) gold mining company, on its webpage, 
says that the company did not operate from December 2009 to September 2011 due to the 
National Police Agency investigation. Furthermore, the website states that due to the stall, the 
company owes 360 billion MNT, 1,000 hectares of the field was left without rehabilitation and 
caused enormous environmental damage, and all the equipment was left unattended and was 
therefore looted and eroded. For more information, see www.adm.mn/mn/бидний_тухай/c/
Түүхэн_замнал.html
 6 For more information, see the company website www.gatsuurt.mn
 7 For more information, see the company website www.gatsuurt.mn
 8 Later official calculations of the government revealed that the government had to compensate 
about 222.5 billion MNT which was two or three years’ GDP (Bilguun 2015).
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4
Advocacy and Activism in Popular 
Mobilisations
This chapter provides an account of a series of mobilisations that began 
in 2001 with the Ongi River Movement (ORM) to protect the Ongi River 
from mining-induced environmental damage in the south of Mongolia. 
In reference to these movements, Dalaibuyan Byambajav writes that: 
The interaction between local, national, and transnational 
actors constituted dynamic and contested framing processes. 
The discrepancy between local values and opportunities and 
transnational norms had a significant effect on the trajectory of the 
movement. The models of local movements that the foreign donors 
sought to promote in Mongolia mutated into different ‘blended 
forms’. Most local movement organisations are increasingly 
transforming into advocacy organisations rather than community-
based organisations that the donors anticipated (Byambajav 
2015, 97).
His observation of the difference between advocacy organisations and 
community-based organisations is something that interests me in this 
chapter. Although there is much overlap and connection, the ethnography 
of this and the next chapter allows me to take the difference further and 
show how the ORM did not have its origin in the activism of ordinary 
local people and herders. Rather, it was originally a working group of 
local, regional and national officials, elites and experts with important 
positions in the local and central governments, ministry, academic insti-
tutions and national media, and received support from different interna-
tional donors with the capacity to advocate through different channels. I 
use the term advocacy to mean promotion by professionals with expertise 
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knowledge, experience and positions to help ordinary local residents 
such as herders. Unlike advocates, activists do not necessarily speak for 
or in support of ordinary people but rather for their own interests. While 
advocacy was a primary characteristic of the ORM to begin with, friction 
between donors and activists inspired some of the movement leaders to 
take a community-based approach which resulted increasingly in the 
adoption of features of activism later on. In other words, the process 
was more or less the opposite of how Byambajav puts it. Advocacy led to 
activism, not the reverse. However, the ethnography also warns us that 
it would be misleading to make a stark division between advocacy and 
activism, as both function as different tactics available for protestors to 
deploy, often simultaneously. 
This chapter also shows how the advocacy group started to produce 
and distribute discursive resources that articulated problems relevant 
to mining, environment, wealth and policy, and how those discursive 
resources established a right and recognisable way to protest. For 
example, with regard to protest movements, Orgilmaa Zundui-Yondon, 
a member of the family alliance of three gold mining companies, Cold 
Gold Mongolia, Odod Gold and Uuls Zaamar, said that after the windfall 
tax and the ‘Law to prohibit mineral exploration and mining operations 
at headwaters of rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir and forest 
area’ (known as the ‘law with the long name’) in 2009, many Mongolian 
people were transformed into potential ‘movement persons’ (khödölgöö-
nii khün). As I find from my interview with her, people did not have to 
have a membership and movements did not have to be registered to form 
a movement (khödölgöön). There was no division between someone 
who was a member of a movement and someone who was not. Every 
request of any individual local person – such as student tuitions and 
fixing motorcycles – was backed up or secured with possible individual 
or group demonstrations against mining companies. Here, first, these 
discursive resources and the right to resist gave some leverage to people 
against mining companies and a chance for some small share of the 
wealth. Second, it does not seem as if there is a single giant ‘movement’, 
but rather a recognisable way to protest at the heart of the mobilisations. 
I take these points as an entry to this chapter to account for the series of 
mobilisations against gold mining companies and state (government and 
parliament) policies. 
Regarding the first point about discursive resources and the right 
to protest, the first section of this chapter shows how from the start the 
popular mobilisation as an advocacy group produced and distributed 
different discursive resources; promoted the right to resist mining 
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companies and neoliberal policies; and established recognisable ways to 
protest with which local people might be able to stop mining operations 
or extract some wealth from mining companies or the state. Regarding 
the second point about the singularity of the movement, I must note that 
my depiction of the success and power of those popular mobilisations 
does not intend to show as if there is a single movement. In this and also 
in the next chapter on protest movements, I examine the formation and 
dissolution of different advocacy groups and movements with different 
sizes, names, memberships, interests, purposes and methods of protest, 
and links along with the changes of emphasis and rhetoric in the process 
of constant formation and dissolution of the groups, all of which cannot 
be reduced to one thing and considered as one single movement. For 
this reason, none of the existing generic terms used to identify those 
popular mobilisations, such as populist, nationalist (ündserkheg), envi-
ronmentalist (baigali orchny), civil society (irgenii niigmiin), local (oron 
nutgiin) and river (gol mörnii) properly captures the fluid, mobile and 
multifunctional features of those popular mobilisations. Each of these 
terms depicts a particular emphasis of certain mobilisations that last for 
a certain period of time, but fails to capture above-mentioned links and 
changes of emphasis and rhetoric and so the mobilisations as a whole.
The final point that I bring into consideration in this chapter is a 
discussion of power relations. As mentioned in the Introduction, in most 
of the works in the field of mining, resources, environment, activism, 
governance, state and capitalism, the protestors who fight against 
powerful international corporations are often powerless, frontier, 
minority, tribal, indigenous and local populations. On the other side, 
the corporations are often transnational and foreign (cf. Chapter  3). 
Chapters 4 and 5 show that this is not the case for these movements in 
Mongolia. Regarding this point, Anna Tsing (2005, 3) notes that ‘it has 
become possible for scholars to accept the idea that powerless minorities 
have accommodated themselves to global forces’. She rejects this and 
turns the statement around to argue that ‘global forces are themselves 
congeries of local/global interaction’ and ‘illustrates friction of global 
connections’. Similarly, mobilisations in Mongolia discussed in this 
chapter are powerful forces that shape mining companies, resource 
economy and politics. My ethnography of the series of mobilisations 
in Mongolia suggests that the local protestors cannot be reduced to 
a conventional presentation of the powerless; they can be powerful in 
different ways. This is partly because, in Mongolia, the local populations 
facing environmental problems are not ethnic minorities, tribal 
communities or indigenous groups of different races or even ethnicities. 
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Moreover, in many cases of environmental protest in Mongolia, it is 
sometimes the local government and authorities who start, advocate 
and fund strikes and movements against mining companies. Movement 
leaders often run for the parliamentary elections, and some become 
parliament members. They lobby politicians and laws to stop mining-
caused environmental damage. Consequently, the state (government, 
parliament and sometimes the president) authorities often intervene 
into the power relationship between mobilisations and companies. For 
example,1 Munkhbayar Tsetsegee, who founded the ORM, in addition to 
his experience with several parliamentary elections, is the winner of the 
internationally renowned Goldman Environmental Prize of 2007, and 
was named a National Geographic Emerging Explorer of 2008. Taking 
his achievements into consideration, the conventional presentation of 
the powerless and peripheral whose voices are not often heard in the 
national and global arenas is not necessarily the case in Mongolia.
Furthermore, in the literature I mentioned in the Introduction, 
there is a general depiction of the nation-state’s stance to authorise 
the expansion of the extractive industry to improve the national 
economy. For this purpose, many nation-states tend to prioritise the 
extractive sector and national economy over the well-being of the local 
population and environmental destructions.2 However, in the nation-
state of Mongolia, including different rulers, politicians and policymak-
ers in parliament and government, never continuously and sustainably 
promote and prioritise the extractive industry sector over the local 
population and environmental destruction. For example, the two main 
parties had a clear policy distinction regarding the extractive sector. 
Since the 1990s, the Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP) continuously 
showed enthusiasm and effort – especially when they ruled the country 
from 1996 to 2000 and 2012 to 2016 – to speed up democratisation, 
free marketisation, privatisation, foreign investment and the business of 
vast national reserves in the global market. Meanwhile, the Mongolian 
People’s Party (MPP) has been conservative, careful and hesitant to 
make significant moves toward neoliberalisation (see also Rossabi 2005; 
Addleton 2013). As such, extractive industry projects are not continu-
ously and uniformly prioritised in Mongolia. Consequently, some pivotal 
political decisions, laws and regulations to protect the environment, and 
the entitlement of the local population and local authority often bring 
detrimental impacts in the extractive sector (see Chapter 3).
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Emergence of Advocacy, Discursive Resources and a 
Right to Protest
As we have seen in Chapter 1, in the 1990s and early 2000s, the 
immediate actions of the president Ochirbat Punsalmaa and the rule of 
the Democratic Party government served to urgently develop the mining 
sector and appealed to foreign investors to assist the national economy 
(see Chapter 1). As a result of the development of mining, some people 
started to experience environmental degradation and lack of natural 
water. One of the first incidents to become public was the case of Ulaan 
Lake (Ulaan nuur) and the Ongi River (Ongi gol). 
In the late 1990s, many herders in the south of Mongolia started 
migrating due to the lack of water. Many of them were herders who lived 
along the Ongi River and Ulaan Lake in the eight sums (sub-provinces) 
(Bulgan, Mandal-Ovoo, Saikhan-Ovoo, Bayangol, Taragt, Züünbayan-
Ulaan, Uyanga and Arvaikheer) of three aimags (provinces) (Ömnögovi, 
Dundgovi and Övörkhangai). Ulaan Lake started to shrink, and its 
primary source of water, the Ongi River, vanished by 2001. The gold 
mining left about 60,000 people – most of whom are herders – and a 
million head of livestock of eight sums along the river with no source 
of water (see also Snow 2010; Upton 2012, 240; Byambajav 2015, 93). 
The migration of herders created conflicts in the use of pastureland in 
the neighbouring sums. Bayarsaikhan Namsrai, a former school teacher 
and a newly elected chair of the Citizens’ Representative Meeting of 
Bulgan sum of the Ömnögovi province, where Ongi River connects 
to Ulaan Lake, decided to meet officials of the neighbouring sums to 
discuss the problems of herders’ migrations and pasture conflicts. When 
she met officials of the neighbouring sums, she discovered that many 
herders of those sums were also migrating due to the lack of water. 
There, she met Munkhbayar Tsetsegee in Saikhan-Ovoo, Dundgovi, who 
was at that time the chair of his sum Citizens’ Representative Meeting, 
and other officials from the rest of the eight sums. Munkhbayar says 
that their local herders had been turned into ‘ecological migrants’ 
(ekologiin dürvegchid). Herders migrated some hundreds of kilometres 
to different provinces. However, Munkhbayar’s focus was not only on 
those herders who migrated but also on those living in the sumyn töv 
(sum settlement) where the local government, school, hospital and all 
other services are. Many sumyn tövs are on the side of the Ongi River, 
and the natural water of the river is the main water supply for residents. 
One of those sum settlements is Saikhan-Ovoo, where Munkhbayar and 
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his family lived. National Geographic (2008) portrayed a bleak situation: 
‘Desperate for drinking water, Munkhbayar’s family and neighbours dug 
wells. However, groundwater was so contaminated that dozens of local 
children suffered serious liver damage. Munkhbayar’s son was taken 
ill, and his mother lost her life’.3 As such in the meeting of sum officials 
the lack of water, health care, the migration of herders and pasture 
conflict became the initial basis of the discursive resources which further 
generated rights to, and methods of, protest.
In the meeting of the sum officials, Munkhbayar suggested driving 
along the river course to its source to discover why it was drying up. 
From 23 to 30 September 2001, a group of local leaders including sum 
governors, chairs of Citizens’ Representative Meetings, three journalists 
and a lama from the Saikhan-Ovoo monastery organised a trip along the 
river course and travelled to the place where the river commences in 
Uyanga (Amarsanaa and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 17). During the trip, they 
discovered the presence of more than thirty open-pit gold mines, and 
most importantly the unlawful and destructive nature of their operations 
(Amarsanaa and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 24). In Uyanga, close to where 
the river starts, they discovered a mining operation of Erel (described 
in Chapter 3). Erel made three dams to close the river in order to use its 
water for gold extraction. Those three dams closed the flow of the river 
water and left local people and livestock along the river with no source of 
water (see also High 2017, 56). They met the mining company and asked 
them to let the river water flow. The company responded that they could 
only open one of the three dams. The company’s refusal led the group of 
locals and others to start a movement against Erel and other mines along 
the river.
Upon their return, on 18 and 19 October, they organised a meeting 
in Saikhan-Ovoo with local people and officials of the eight sums in order 
to inform them of the reason why the river dried up. In the meeting, they 
decided to establish a movement to protect the river. They called the 
movement Ongi golynkhon (People of the Ongi River), also known as the 
Ongi River Movement (ORM) (see also Sneath 2010, 262; Byambajav 
2015, 93; High 2017, 55). The movement had 34 founding members: 
three sum governors; four chairs and one secretary of the sum Citizens’ 
Representative Meetings; three government officials from the Ministry 
of Environment, including an international consultant from Japan; four 
local environmental officers; three media persons; two persons from the 
Gobi Regional Economic Growth Initiative (Gobi Initiative) Programme, 
managed by Mercy Corps and Pact and funded by the United States Agency 
for International Development; two monks from local monasteries; the 
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mine director of Erel company; and other people such as the local school 
director, cultural centre director, weather forecast department director, 
tourist camp director, and archival worker and elders’ association chair 
(Amarsanaa and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 17–19). While many of these 
elites might claim to be herders or to have herder ancestries, there 
was no one directly involved in pastoral subsistence.4 As such, the 
movement was initially based on the unification of local government 
institutions – except the monastery and the association of elders. In 
addition to those local elites and leaders living in the region, some of 
the founding members were local people who moved to and were based 
in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia’s capital. They were the main allies for the 
movement to link this rural place to the nation’s capital. The movement 
also had a board of 11 people, three of them governors and five of them 
chairs of the Citizens’ Representative Meetings from the eight sums, plus 
another mine director and a professor from the Mongolian University 
of Agriculture. Munkhbayar was appointed leader of the movement. 
Regarding funding, each of the eight sum governments decided to donate 
100,000 MNT in initial seed money. There were also other donations 
from the founding members, individuals and organisations. The 
network, influence and expertise of the founding members and board 
members helped the movement to immediately gain publicity through 
different media sources, such as a 13-minute television documentary on 
the Mongolian national television channel (Badamsambuu 2007, 126), 
a 50-minute radio programme that was broadcast on national radio, and 
reports in local and national newspapers (Amarsanaa and Bayarsaikhan 
2007, 23, 28).
By talking to Munkhbayar I discovered that many of those members 
from outside the region were initially from these localities but had moved 
to and settled in Ulaanbaatar. To bridge the rural and urban, Munkhbayar 
suggested that those who lived in Ulaanbaatar should establish a council 
for people from Saikhan-Ovoo, known as nutgiin zövlöl (local homeland 
council or homeland association) (see also Sneath 2010, 258). Nutgiin 
zövlöl is a non-governmental organisation of people from the same 
homeland, who reside in the capital of the country or secondary 
provincial towns and other urban regions. The purpose of the council is 
to bring together politicians, businesspeople, artists, athletes and others 
with important positions to act for the well-being and development of 
the home locality, by informing, advertising, promoting and fundraising. 
Therefore, it was important for the movement to have people from the 
local homeland council in Ulaanbaatar. For example, one of the people to 
bridge the rural–urban gap for the ORM was Dr Chandmani Dambabazar, 
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a water engineer from the University of Agriculture. Chandmani was 
born and raised in Saikhan-Ovoo, was a founder of the Saikhan-Ovoo 
local council in Ulaanbaatar, and became a board member of the ORM. 
Other founding members representing the central government from the 
Ministry of Environment, gold mining companies and media also had 
important roles: to enlarge the movement and attain recognition in the 
short term. 
The ORM was also successful in forming collaborations with 
international donor organisations. Only a few months after the estab-
lishment of the movement, a German political foundation called Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) contacted the ORM and offered support to 
run the movement and establish a grassroots civil society (see also 
Byambajav 2015, 93). KAS is named after the first  Chancellor of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and is closely associated with the Christian 
Democratic Union of Germany. The foundation supports education on 
freedom and liberty, peace and justice. Dr Peter Gluchowski was the 
regional director of KAS in Mongolia. He heard of the movement from 
his Mongolian employer B. Battuvshin, who witnessed the process while 
he was working as a teacher for a workshop on the local governance in 
Saikhan-Ovoo in autumn 2001 (Battuvshin 2007, 115). The purpose of 
KAS – to support civil society, democracy and justice – found in the ORM 
a perfect case to promote. For this purpose, members of KAS, including 
the regional director Gluchowski and his wife, travelled to the south 
of Mongolia to participate in the second meeting of the movement, 
which was on 6 April 2002 (Buyantogtokh 2007, 89–90). The contri-
bution of KAS to the ORM was not only financial and technical but also 
conceptual. Michael Henke, invited by Gluchowski and funded by KAS 
to assist the ORM, made enormous contributions through his design of 
annual action plans of the movement and the education of movement 
members on subjects such as democracy, civil society and the state 
(see also Amarsanaa and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 27–33, 46–52). Henke 
was an experienced activist and mentor. Each year from 2002 to 2006, 
with the support of KAS, Henke visited Mongolia to teach and help to 
design the action plan and manage the movement. Amarsanaa and 
Bayarsaikhan wrote that Henke’s teaching and guidance were ‘eye-
opening’ (Amarsanaa and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 28). In other words, from 
the start the movement was not straightforwardly a grassroots one. 
Bayarsaikhan later told me that in Henke’s classes she learned many 
Western concepts such as the civil (legal), liberal and welfare states, 
civil society, and the role of people in building a modern civil society. In 
the edited volume, she deliberately included some illustrations and the 
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contents of what Henke taught the movement members (Amarsanaa and 
Bayarsaikhan 2007, 30–3). Movement members respectfully call him 
bagsh, which means teacher or master in Mongolian. This respect (see 
also Dulam 2006) places Henke and KAS in a position to influence, lead 
and mentor the movement. The most important thing the movement 
members learned was the systematic progression of actions, starting 
from peaceful resistance such as letter writing campaigns, collecting 
signatures and organising rituals and events, and eventually moving 
on to extreme and hard actions such as court appeals. In fact, the ORM 
tried almost all of those actions gleaned from Henke’s workshops (see 
also Chapter 5). It must be noted that Henke’s mentorship helped to 
recreate the understanding of the state as something that is high, distinct 
and respected (see also Dulam 2006), and split the deified and secular 
forms of the state (see Chapter 5). According to Bayarsaikhan, in Henke’s 
classes, she first realised that she could shape the state by critiquing, 
complaining, demanding or even fighting against the political rulers. As 
a result, the movement expanded its resistance and fought against the 
state (government, parliament and the president; see Chapter 5).
In the following years, in addition to KAS there were many other 
donor organisations and companies that promoted the ORM, such as 
Merci Corps, World Bank, Soros Foundation, The Asia Foundation and 
Ivanhoe Mines (Amarsanaa and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 50, 54). According 
to Bayarsaikhan, funds for travel, field trips, visits, workshops and 
more were generously and frequently offered from different donors 
and companies. The funding sources required movement members to 
submit project proposals one after another (see also Addleton 2013, 
39–40, 64–5). Among them was TAF, which offered funding from 2004 
to promote river movement activities, and became the funder of the 
ORM after KAS. Layton Croft, who was director of TAF in Mongolia and 
who later became the director of the Canadian Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia, 
claims that ‘ORM was not a government puppet operation or an interna-
tional donor-initiated organisation; rather, it was the first and genuine 
local movement’. Moreover, he states, ‘to help the movement to continue, 
TAF had to fund even its daily operation costs which foreign non-govern-
mental organisations tend not to do’ (Amarsanaa and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 
118). With this funding, in 2004 the ORM opened an office in the centre 
of Ulaanbaatar and employed five people to work there (Amarsanaa 
and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 53). Yet, Croft’s depiction of the movement as 
‘first’ and ‘genuine’ may well be the way he needed to view and present 
the movement to justify his assistance. Unlike Croft’s depiction, the last 
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section of this chapter tells the opposite, which shows friction between 
local and donor interests.
What is clear is that from the start the ORM was not simply made 
up of herders and grassroots, peripheral, tribal or indigenous groups 
that represent a local community in the model of the dual and triad 
relationship of local community, state and mining company, as I noted 
elsewhere. Rather, the movement was not limited to the remote regional 
territory and network. To establish the movement, local leaders, such 
as Munkhbayar, Bayarsaikhan and others, intended to bring together 
people with different backgrounds, experiences, expertise, positions, 
residences and interests, which is evident from the list of the founding 
members and board members. These ‘actors play an important role’, as 
Anthony Bebbington et al. (2008, 2892) describe, ‘in keeping movements 
“moving” – by maintaining debates, supporting events nurturing leaders 
and sustaining networks during those periods when movement activity 
has slowed down’. Therefore, the establishment of the ORM was the 
formation of a strong local advocacy group with good regional, national 
and international connections and with the capacity to produce different 
discursive resources such as those on the state, civil society, and rights 
and ways to protest. The range of membership helped the movement to 
create discursive resources that became deployable in diverse settings. 
More precisely, those discursive resources were a product of an intention 
in the working group to peacefully and jointly find a solution to local 
environmental problems through means other than fierce resistance, 
which nevertheless occurred in the later years of the movement.
Nationalisation and the Internationalisation of Activism
By 2003, Bayarsaikhan recalls that her group had started to view the 
drying-up of the Ongi River as a ‘failure of the state’ (töriin buruu), 
despite almost all of the founding members and leaders of the ORM 
having high positions in the local governments. By tör or the state she was 
referring to the ruling institution, namely the government, parliament 
and the president and their political decisions and legislations. 
Moreover, Bayarsaikhan says their obligations in the local governments 
to implement central government policies to promote mining were in 
conflict with their intention to protest against those policies. Therefore 
in 2003 Munkhbayar and Bayarsaikhan left their jobs and were followed 
by several others in the next few years. Their abandonment of their 
positions in local government made many of them into full-time activists 
ADvocAcy AnD Act Iv Ism In PoPulAr moBIl IsAt Ions 91
in the protest movement rather than advocates in the working group. 
Here, we see a significant change of emphasis and rhetoric. The emphasis 
on the mining-induced environmental damage shifted to an emphasis 
on policy. The focus of their rhetoric changed from a critique of mining 
companies to a critique of the state.
In the midst of the 2004 parliamentary election campaign, the 
ORM leaders organised a protest march alongside the Ongi River to 
persuade local people to vote for candidates who would work for the 
protection of the river. Twenty-four people spent about four weeks 
walking from the mouth to the head of the river, holding public meetings 
with the local herders along the way. As a result, some candidates joined 
the march and proclaimed their intention to advocate for the movement 
(see also Byambajav 2015, 94). For instance, R. Raash, D. Lundeejantsan 
and Z. Enkhbold joined the march. Bayarsaikhan suggested that the 
action plan of those candidates to support the movement, environment 
and well-being of the local people became an important criterion to 
win the election (see also Amarsanaa and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 76–7). 
After winning the election, R. Raash established a parliamentary lobby 
group to support the movement as planned, resulting in a continuity 
of advocacy at the level of parliament. The lobby group in parliament 
helped the movement leaders to transform the issue from a local struggle 
to something of importance to the nation in what might be called a 
process of nationalisation. 
Although the coalition of the Erel company’s Motherland Party 
(Ekh oron nam) and the Democratic Party saw a tremendous victory and 
established a government (see Chapter 3), this has nevertheless produced 
favourable conditions for advocates and activists to mobilise within. For 
the political opponents who fought against the Motherland Party, Erel’s 
environmental catastrophe and the claims of the movement against Erel 
served to weaken the power of the Motherland Party. The lobby group 
in parliament became a significant force to fight against the power of 
the Motherland Party. The discussion of the mining catastrophe in the 
national-level political debates – and the importance of the movement 
within the debate – helped the local movements to nationalise their 
problem. It was a marked achievement for the movement to generate 
support for the local people in the fight against mining companies. 
Amarsanaa and Bayarsaikhan write that this accomplishment made 
local people realise that they could influence the rule of the state (töriin 
erkhiig barikh) (see Introduction).
With the support of the local people, local governments, their 
allies in Ulaanbaatar, and some politicians in parliament, the ORM 
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dramatically expanded in the next few years. The growth of the 
movement progressed by transforming seemingly local problems into a 
national concern. This came about in two ways: First, politicians used 
the environmental problems to make an argument against the ruling 
Motherland Party in the coalition with the democratic union. Second, 
the movement was able to present the local problem as a national 
problem by involving people representing almost all regions of the 
country. Within two years, the movement established branches in 
the eight sums along the Ongi River, which included 1,400 members 
and 11 member organisations. The number of member organisations 
increased further to 26 by 2005. Member organisations of the movement 
were local governments, hospitals, kindergartens, secondary schools, 
research institutes, monasteries and private companies (Amarsanaa 
and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 48, 56). Among the most critical impacts of 
the movement was their contribution to the establishment of other 
similar river movements across the country. According to Munkhbayar, 
as early as 2003 he realised that the problem was not confined to the 
Ongi River; it also affected many other rivers in very similar situations. 
Eventually, the ORM received requests for help by people from around a 
dozen regions. Members of the ORM were invited to different provinces 
to distribute and establish a right and recognisable way to protest, by 
sharing their experiences and organising, mentoring and managing local 
movements across the country. In 2005, 11 local river movements repre-
senting 14 different provinces5 (out of 18 in total) united and formed the 
Mongol nutag minu evsel (My Mongol Homeland coalition). The coalition 
was also known in English as ‘Homeland and Water Protection Coalition’ 
(HWPC) or ‘Mongolian Nature Protection Coalition’ (MNPC) (Amarsanaa 
and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 53, 58, 83–4; see also Byambajav 2015, 94–5).
The actions of the movements against mining operations were 
publicised as peaceful and non-violent (taivan). The movement 
members visited mines and mining-damaged sites and sent letters of 
resistance to mining companies. Many members also visited local herder 
households and marched along the river course to collect signatures of 
the local people and to organise meetings and workshops. Members of 
the movement collaborated with national and international environ-
mental scientists and scientific institutions to research environmen-
tal damage, participated in conferences and meetings, and produced 
television and radio programmes, newspaper articles and interviews. 
To help the environment, movement members planted berry trees along 
the Ongi River course and created artificial rains by cloud seeding.6 The 
members of the movement introduced a course in the secondary school 
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curriculum and published textbooks on ecology and the environment 
to inform and educate the younger generation. To attract attention 
and influence national politics, they sent letters to the president, prime 
minister and parliament members, and organised meetings with election 
candidates, politicians and political parties. By the end of 2003, however, 
actions of the movement shifted the emphasis of their force to pressure 
mining companies. They requested mining companies report to the local 
authorities and residents, lobbied local governments to make decisions 
to stop the operation of mines that failed to rehabilitate the land, and 
began to threaten the corporate reputations of some companies. As a 
result, some mining companies rehabilitated mined sites, while some 
others had to cease their mining operations (see Chapter 3) (see also 
Amarsanaa and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 48–53, 58, 82, 86). The resultant 
return of the river in the territory of seven sums (out of eight) and 
430 kilometres out of the total of the 435 kilometres’ length became a 
symbol of the success of the movement. From 2005, ‘on behalf of the 
state’ (töriin neriin ömnöös) and with the help of the Center for Human 
Rights and Development, the movement initiated criminal proceedings 
and lodged a complaint against Erel to compensate local people for envi-
ronmental damages (see also Amarsanaa and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 58, 60, 
62). As a result, in the following year, the movement successfully caused 
the closure of 35 of 37 gold mines along the course of the Ongi River.
Here, what I call nationalisation processes highlight how the 
central government and politicians in parliament participated, collabo-
rated and supported the movement, which suggests the opposite of what 
is described in most of the pre-existing literature on the subject, as I 
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. Politicians in the central 
government and parliament did not uniformly support mining and the 
national economy; instead, some supported the river movements. The 
political climate created advantageous conditions for the movement 
to expand. In other words, it was not only the power of the movement 
but the condition of the national politics that allowed the movement to 
be successful. 
In addition to the nationalisation processes described above, 
processes to involve different people and organisations internationally 
and to become known to the international audience which can be termed 
‘internationalisation’ occurred in two steps: first, by way of collabora-
tion with donor organisations to establish and develop the movement 
(see above); and second, by winning internationally prestigious prizes 
and titles. Munkhbayar received the 2007 Goldman Environmental 
Prize for uniting 11 river movements from different parts of the country, 
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closing 35 mines, attracting the attention of parliament and the central 
government and successfully nationalising the movement7 (see also 
Snow 2010). In 2008, Munkhbayar was also named as the National 
Geographic Emerging Explorer. Collaboration with donor organisa-
tions were the main factor for the movement to become internationally 
known. Layton Croft, director of TAF in Mongolia (2003–5), nominated 
Munkhbayar for the prize. Croft began his career as a Peace Corps 
volunteer in Mongolia (1994–7). He later joined the Mongolian office of 
Pact, a large US government and intelligence organisation, where he was 
the Program Director for Information Systems for their Gobi Regional 
Economic Growth Initiative/Mongolia (1999–2002), working for Pact-
Mongolia in an alliance with Mercy Corps and the United States Agency 
for International Development (Snow 2010). Given such experience, 
Croft was well informed about the river and the river movements from 
1999 (Amarsanaa and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 117). He was in an excellent 
position to negotiate between transnational mining corporations and 
environmental movements.
Although the movement leaders risked their authority in the 
movement, as I will illustrate in the following section, the internation-
alisation of the movement – with the support of TAF and other donors – 
helped the movement leaders to gain recognition and power in national 
and international scales (for internationalisation of movements in South 
America see also Bebbington et al. 2008, 2901). In other words, TAF 
created a powerful position for the movement on an international scale. 
Chapter 5 will show how Munkhbayar further used this position to fight 
not only against mining companies but also against the government. 
However, while these nationalisation and internationalisation processes 
empowered the movement, it also made the movement fragile. 
Bebbington et al. (2008, 2892) note that such an internationalisation 
is a source of both weakness and power and that for movement leaders 
it is an immensely difficult feat ‘to hold the movement process together 
around a shared agenda and vision’. The same also applies to the unity 
of river movements and their collaboration with donor organisations in 
Mongolia. The national and international expansion of river movements 
put the success of the movement in jeopardy.
The Friction between Donors and Movement
Here, to examine the relationship of the movement and donors, I am 
using Tsing’s (2005, 4) argument about friction in the confluence of the 
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universal and global on the one hand and the particular and local on 
the other, which together creates what one might describe as capitalism 
and neoliberalism. The friction caused another change in emphasis: 
the movement’s leaders started to emphasise the risks and problems of 
donor funding and advocacy. 
In 2005, TAF director Croft – who was the primary funder and 
supporter of the movement – became the executive vice president for 
corporative affairs for Ivanhoe Mines, operator of the vast Oyu Tolgoi 
gold and copper mine in Ömnögovi, in the province where the Ongi River 
reaches Ulaan Lake. Croft’s new job was a surprise for Munkhbayar and 
his colleagues in the movement. They had to consider how such a shift 
could happen and what it meant for the movement. This new position 
made the movement members realise that Croft had his own agenda 
at TAF. Both Munkhbayar and Bayarsaikhan said they realised that, 
while at TAF, Croft initiated and offered funding to implement different 
projects, but not necessarily to support the movement to fight against 
mining damage. At the same time, the increasing influence of TAF made 
Munkhbayar, Bayarsaikhan and other members question the leadership 
of the movement. Others also noticed this. For example, Jane Smith, a 
conservationist in a small NGO in Mongolia, says that TAF cut off the 
heads of the rural organisations by bringing them to Ulaanbaatar and 
giving them nice offices (Snow 2010). Although Munkhbayar noticed 
these problems, he decided that to receive the Goldman Prize, maintain 
international recognition and bring the voice of the local movement 
to the international level, provided enormous social capital for the 
future of the movement. Immediately after he received the Goldman 
Prize, Munkhbayar decided not to work with TAF; he explained to me 
that TAF was supporting mining and using the status of the movement 
and Munkhbayar as cover for the operation of the Ivanhoe Mines in 
Mongolia. Croft’s intention to use Munkhbayar and the movement 
already appeared in some of his speeches and interviews. In an interview 
in 2007 Croft stated that the ‘movement is not against mining, but 
against illegal mining’ (Amarsanaa and Bayarsaikhan 2007, 119). Croft 
also said something similar in Munkhbayar’s Goldman Prize profile 
video. In the video, he said, ‘the key to Munkhbayar’s success as a leader 
for responsible mining in Mongolia is that he has had the courage to 
acknowledge that mining could be a good thing for Mongolia, as long 
as it is done in a very open and participatory way’.8 As Mette High 
(2017, 57) accurately points out: ‘As a figure of international renown, 
Munkhbayar found himself becoming a valuable commodity for not only 
politicians but also the mining companies he was fighting against. The 
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very people he opposed co-opted his agenda, and he became their key 
icon of Mongolia’s grassroots consent to mining’.
The foreign concept of ‘responsible mining’ (khariutslagatai uul 
uurkhai), successfully introduced in Mongolia by TAF and other donors, 
was one of the main ways to commodify and co-opt Munkhbayar and 
the river movements. For Munkhbayar, the concept was an alternative 
discursive resource for the movement to negotiate and collaborate with 
mines rather than to resist them. Some found the idea of ‘responsible 
mining’ to be a better way to negotiate with mining companies and to 
receive funding, while some others, including Munkhbayar, proposed 
fiercer methods to fight against mining. He suggested the use of force, 
violence and arms for self-defence if necessary. He also suggested that 
the movement should not receive any more donor funding, and claimed 
they should lobby parliament or the government to pass an official 
declaration to prohibit mining in water sources and forest areas, an 
idea that later resulted in the bill ‘Law to prohibit mineral exploration 
and mining operations at headwaters of rivers, protected zones of the 
water reservoir and forest area’. Leaders of the 11 river movements in 
the coalition came to an agreement on the above decisions. However, in 
April 2008, disagreement dissolved the coalition. Five of the movements 
remained in the MNPC and continued their collaboration with TAF. 
As Munkhbayar explains, those five movements felt strongly that they 
would require donor funding to continue, that they should never use 
force, and believed that it would be impossible to make parliament or the 
government pass a decision to prohibit mining in natural water sources 
and forest areas. They decided to continue their actions by creating a 
tripartite contract between the mining companies, local government 
and the local movements. This position of the five movements further 
incorporated the concept of ‘responsible mining’. The remaining six 
movements continued their protest together and, on 4 June 2009, 
renamed themselves as United Movement of Mongolian Rivers and Lakes 
(UMMRL) (see also Simonov 2013).
Writer and activist Keith Harmon Snow visited and travelled in 
Mongolia in 2008 and investigated the river movements and their tricky 
relationships with TAF. In 2010, he published an online article where he 
states that the movement and donor relationships and the award of the 
prize was a ‘Western deception’. He claims that TAF’s agenda was not 
pure and not for the interests of the environment and people. Instead, he 
claims that TAF’s agenda was to maintain control over the movements 
and use their success story to leverage €2.7 million (US$3,630,000) 
from the Dutch government. He also claims TAF had further intentions 
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to shape Mongolian civil society in the interests of Western penetration 
and control and to forbid them from publicly protesting against mining 
companies or government policies in order to suggest a welcoming 
mining climate where companies comply with the environmental 
stewardship. Referring to Croft, Snow admits that his agenda was 
in service of a personal career move to become the Executive Vice-
President for Corporate Affairs and Community Relations at South Gobi 
Resources, an Ivanhoe Mines/Rio Tinto megaproject, and an adviser for 
investor relations in Asia and corporate social responsibility for Ivanhoe 
Mines (Snow 2010). Moreover, Snow notes that ‘Mongolian NGOs were 
expected to defer to TAF when dealing with the media, and they were 
compelled to sign contracts forbidding them from publicly protesting 
against mining companies or government policies. TAF also worked to 
determine and control the members of the boards overseeing the envi-
ronmental coalitions that received TAF funds. Ultimately, river coalition 
members found they had no control over their own groups: TAF tried to 
maintain all control’ (Snow 2010).
When I talked to Munkhbayar about what Snow had written 
about his relationship with TAF and Croft, he said Snow had been naïve 
to trust donor organisations. Bayarsaikhan said the same thing. They 
were sincerely grateful for TAF’s support in understanding the situation 
of mining damage and the river movements’ intentions to protect the 
environment. Yet both of them stated that they later realised why Croft 
was so enthusiastic to help the movement at TAF. The river movements’ 
experience with TAF shaped the future of the movement significantly. 
At a minimum, the experience divided the united force of the 11 river 
movements and introduced an alternative way to negotiate with mining 
companies through the concept of responsible mining, while those 
led by Munkhbayar learned to not trust any donors. The mistrust 
encouraged the movement to self-fund, in order to protect themselves 
from the interests of donors and attempts to commodify the movement. 
The conflict between the river movements and TAF is what Tsing (2005) 
calls the ‘friction’ of local–global collaboration, as I mentioned before. 
She argues that their collaboration does not mean that the local and 
global have common interests but rather the collaboration maintains 
difference and friction at its heart (Tsing 2005, 246, 248–9, 264). 
Therefore, the underlying ‘friction’ in the collaboration creates new 
interests and identities, and new emphases, which are created by local 
environmental protestors while escaping from the global civil society 
(Bumochir 2018a).
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Protecting the Movement from Donors
At the end of November 2015, when my colleague Byambabaatar and I 
first arranged to meet Munkhbayar in Ulaanbaatar, the first question he 
asked us was about the funding for our research. His main concern was 
that international donor organisations and funders could have different 
hidden agendas and at a minimum contribute to creating a repository of 
information which could potentially be used later against the interest of 
local people and the nation. There is increasing suspicion towards donors’ 
agendas and advocacy, which might not mesh well with the protestors’ 
purposes. These suspicions about donor agencies can also taint the 
reputations of the protestors. What can also be called into question are 
their motives and reputations: are they being paid to accomplish certain 
tasks or are they genuinely committed to protecting the environment? In 
Mongolia, many people suspect and reveal their concern about money-
making and money laundering, the interests of politicians, donors and 
transnational corporations. With funding and donor advocacy come 
great risks of the misrepresentation of local protest movements; they 
can be made (or appear to be) puppets for larger international and 
national political institutions and agents, and the protestors’ original 
interests and intentions can be multiplied, split and obscured (see also 
Bumochir 2018a).
Therefore, Munkhbayar decided that the safest way to manage a 
protest movement is to fund its activities with politically unproblem-
atic and secure financial sources, which became a new emphasis of the 
movement. Their rejection of donor funding left those movements and 
local herding families who supported them in a very difficult environment 
to succeed within. To accomplish such a vital and immediate requirement 
and to succeed in a very difficult environment, Munhbayar suggested 
that they plant berries (sea buckthorn) along the course of the Ongi 
River, something he learned from his mother. He took us to a beautiful 
small garden with bushes and berry trees alongside the Ongi River near 
the Saikhan-Ovoo sum settlement his mother built in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. The creation of such gardens in the area has multifunctional 
advantages both for the movement and for local people to succeed. 
First, they intended that this would maintain the water level of the river. 
Second, according to the legislation permits, any land with cultivated 
trees and bushes can be privatised by those who cultivate it; local herders 
can own land along the river, which prevents the loss of local pasture 
around the river to mining companies. Third, they can profit from the 
ADvocAcy AnD Act Iv Ism In PoPulAr moBIl IsAt Ions 99
berries by selling them, and the movement can be self-funded in the 
future by using the income from berries.
Planting berry trees is not the only solution initiated by 
Munkhbayar to self-fund the movement. He also founded a herd for the 
movement, which was a relatively new initiative in comparison to the 
planting of the trees. At the board meeting of the ORM in November 
2015, he presented his idea to create a herd to fund the movement. The 
easiest and quickest way to make it happen was by collecting donations 
from local herders. In the meeting, members representing five different 
sums along the river were present. There was general agreement at 
the meeting that the idea was excellent. It would make the movement 
financially sustainable and protect it from any ambiguous intentions of 
donors. Munkhbayar recalls that he was surprised to see the members 
react so quickly: within a week, every sum had decided to contribute 
around 80 sheep. When I visited him in December 2015, he had over 
200 sheep for the movement outside his yurt. Two young men, both 
herders and members of the movement, decided to help by voluntarily 
taking care of the river movement herd.
Munkhbayar’s initiative to self-fund the movement is completely 
different from how Bayarsaikhan describes the earlier stages of the 
movement and their informal policy on the acceptance of funding. As he 
admits, when Munkhbayar started his protest in the early 2000s, he did 
not know much about concepts such as civil society or grassroots politics, 
nor the consequences of donor advocacies. Therefore, he welcomed 
extensive support from different international donor organisations; 
namely, KAS and TAF. It could be argued that we are now experiencing 
a new phase of the environmental movement, with attempts to divorce 
itself from foreign donors and Western advocacy. The consequences of 
foreign interference sparked the separation and caused the ORM to take 
on a more grassroots approach (see also Upton 2012, 244).
Byambajav’s (2015, 97) conclusion about the increasing transfor-
mation of local movements into non-community based foreign advocacy 
organisations may be true for those in some river movements who 
accepted the donor-initiated concept of ‘responsible mining’. However, 
it is no longer valid and relevant to explain those who sought to escape 
from donor advocacy and attempt to refocus upon grassroots activism. 
As I argue elsewhere (Bumochir 2018a), these environmental protestors 
are reluctant to be associated with even the name ‘civil society’ (irgenii 
niigem) because, for them, ‘civil society’ organisations in Mongolia often 
import Western concepts and practices, which are unacceptable to the 
protestors. The river movements attempt to appeal not to the West, but 
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to the past nomadic history and ‘traditional’ concepts regarding the 
environment and state protection, which have salience in many political 
contexts in Mongolia. Such concepts will be the focus of the next chapter.
Notes
 1 A well-known singer and a founding member of Fire Nation coalition who became an MP in 
the 2016 parliamentary election. He named the coalition as Gal Ündesten, which means ‘Fire 
Nation’. The coalition consisted of different environmental movements across the country.
 2 This general depiction is not accurate in some cases: for example, in the work of Diego 
Andreucci and Isabella M. Radhuber (2015) in Bolivia, where many of the advanced laws and 
regulations to protect the environment and local population passed.
 3 For more information see www.nationalgeographic.org/find-explorers/tsetsegee-
munkhbayar 
 4 However, many of these people have livestock or experience in herding, which is typical all 
over rural Mongolia.
 5 Those include Khangiltsag River movement from Uvs; Salkhin Sandag movement from 
Govi-Altai; Call of the Khongor Homeland (Khongor nutgiin duudlaga) movement from 
Bayankhongor; Sacred Suvraga (Ariun Suvarga) movement from Arkhangai; Toson Zaamar-
Tuul River movement from Töv; Khüder River movement from Selenge; Onon-Ulz River 
movement from Khentii; Native (Uuguul) movement from Ömnögovi; Masters of the Khövsgöl 
Lake (Khövsgöl dalain ezed) movement from Khövsgöl; People’s Envoy (Ardyn elch) movement 
from Selenge; and the Ongi River Movement.
 6 Cloud seeding is the process of combining different kinds of chemical agent – including silver 
iodide, dry ice and even common table salt – with existing clouds in an effort to thicken the 
clouds and increase the chance of rain or snowfall. The chemicals are either shot into the 
clouds or released by flying near and into the clouds (Kirkpatrick 2018).
 7 For more information, see www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/tsetsegee-munkhbayar/
 8 For the full video, see www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/tsetsegee-munkhbayar/ 
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The De-deification of the State
According to Fernando Coronil (1997, 8), in Venezuela the state was 
construed as the legitimate agent of an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 
1983). Moreover, Coronil shows how the state was deified and ‘state 
representatives, the visible embodiments of the invisible powers of oil 
money, appear on the state’s stage as powerful magicians who pull social 
reality, from his public institutions to cosmologies, out of a hat’ (Coronil 
1997, 2). As I have demonstrated elsewhere (Bumochir 2004, Dulam 
2009), there is a history of the deification of the state and its power in 
Mongolia (töriin süld), engaging Chinggis Khan and the supreme deity 
Mönkh Tengger (Eternal Heaven). However, the construction of the state 
generated by the activists discussed in the previous chapter was not a 
deification but the opposite: what I call de-deification. More precisely, 
ethnography in this chapter shows how activists created a division 
between the deified ideal of the state and the actual form such as its 
institutions, structure, system and authority (for the two forms see also 
Abrams 1988; Taussig 1992; Navaro-Yashin 2002). Here, I must note 
that de-deification does not work precisely against deification. Instead, 
the separation made between state institutions and deified forms of the 
state helps to free state rulers, institutions and law from the culturally 
salient legacy of the deified power of the state (töriin süld), and from 
customs and taboos that restrain action in respect of the state. Therefore, 
once the state system, institutions and agents become free from deified 
state power, then decisions, policies, laws and regulations are rendered 
open to criticism, attack and other forms of resistance against the state. 
Moreover, the separation of the two forms of the state achieved by this 
de-deification permitted activists to participate, involve themselves in 
and influence political decisions and legislation, and even to consider 
taking control of the state.
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It would be misleading to assume that the de-deification of the state 
was simply the result of the transition to democracy (Lhamsuren 2006, 
93). Caroline Humphrey and A. Hürelbaatar (2006, 265–6) located the 
phrase törü-yi abuba (take over the state or government) in a seven-
teenth-century text. They explain that ‘in this period törü was something 
that could be created or established, handed over, corrected, admin-
istered, negotiated and discussed’. The ethnography I present below 
describes how activists construct such histories and actively engage in 
the creation, correction, negotiation and discussion of the state. Activists 
shape the state as something that is not far off, detached and superior 
from people but something that is available to them and can be taken 
over (tör avakh), ruled (tör barikh) and crafted.
Jürgen Habermas (1987) provides an account of the social and 
cultural resources drawn upon by social movement as they emerge. 
Anthony Bebbington et al. (2008, 2890) summarise Habermas’s point 
and write ‘social movements are apt to emerge when people’s lifeworlds 
– their domains of everyday, meaningful practice – are “colonized” by 
forces which threaten these lifeworlds and people’s ability to control 
them’ (see also Habermas 1987; Crossley 2002; Edwards 2008). 
Habermas’s depiction of the threatened ‘lifeworld’ is similar to activists’ 
depiction of their local environments threatened by mining, and expla-
nations for why they protest. Although Habermas was not interested in 
nationalism in this context, his description of the threatened ‘lifeworld’ 
and ‘people’s ability to control’ helps to describe how and why activists 
mobilise nationalist discursive resources. Lowel Barrington (2006, 21) 
explains that ‘in the minds of nationalists, the state, as a nation-state, 
exists for the benefit of the nation’. Therefore, if the nation’s cultural 
identity is threatened, state policy must be adopted to protect the culture 
from the threatening ‘other’. In a similar way, Munkhbayar explains that 
because the state failed to perform its duty of protection, activists had to 
step in to secure the ‘lifeworld’ they live in. Elaborating on Habermas and 
Barrington, I argue that the change in the emphasis and rhetoric away 
from local environment and livelihood protection to the protection of the 
territory and its people of the nation from external forces encourages 
nationalism within the movements. As I show in the last section of the 
chapter, this nationalism yearns for statism and aims to bring the state 
back or to ‘make the state present’ as Bebbington (2012b, 222) explains, 
or to bring some of the ‘state provided services’ (Bebbington 2012b, 
222 cites Watts 2003 and Ferguson 2006) in order to protect its people, 
environment and territory.
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The Law Behind the ‘Long Name’
The use of arms to protect rivers was neither the sole nor main protest 
method for these movements. The primary and most effective method 
was to lobby the government, parliament and the president to pass a 
decision or environmental law to prohibit mining. From around 2005, 
the MNPC started to lobby the central government and parliament to pass 
a decision to prohibit mining at the headwaters of rivers, protected zones 
of the water reservoirs and forest areas. This was not possible for many 
years. As I described in Chapter 4, five of the movements in the MNPC did 
not find this plan to be realistic or accomplishable. After many years of 
failed attempts at lobbying state institutions, the activists came to blame 
the state for the issues. After attempting several different fight tactics, 
activists finally came to recognise failures of state regulations in the 
mining and environment. Both Munkhbayar and Bayarsaikhan narrated 
that in the initial stages of the ORM they did not blame the state. The sole 
purpose of the movement was to take the river back by fighting against 
the gold mining companies, particularly against Erel, the largest and 
the most destructive gold mining company. Almost all members of the 
movement blamed the mining companies, not the state. Bayarsaikhan 
says that it was only G. Badamsambuu, a journalist from the National 
Broadcaster, who argued that the state should be blamed (töriin buruu) 
for the environmental destruction. He accused the state – parliament, 
the central government and the president – for the following: First, the 
government issued mining licences in natural water and forest areas and 
created the risk of environmental degradation for many people. Second, 
the government failed to practise the rule of law to control the operation 
of mining companies to rehabilitate and safeguard the environment. 
Because the policy of the state institutions was initially central to the 
creation of the environmental damage, it should be state institutions that 
should be held responsible for finding solutions. This logic caused the 
river movements to eventually target state institutions, but an important 
question remained: How did they make the state listen to them? How 
did they make the state admit responsibility? To do this, Munkhbayar’s 
and many of his colleagues’ former positions and experiences in the local 
governments helped him to conceptually separate those who work for 
the state from the power of the deified form of the state to allow them to 
critique and blame. 
Munkhbayar met different lawyers to accomplish this mission, 
including several famous ones; almost all of them told Munkhbayar 
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that it is legally and ideologically impossible to make the state admit 
guilt. However, one of the lawyers he met was Dashdemberel Ganbold. 
Dashdemberel was the only lawyer who agreed that it was possible to 
place blame on the state. Dashdemberel helped him to pass the law 
to  prohibit mining in the river and forest areas (the ‘long name’ law), 
and to amend the ‘Environmental Protection Law’ (Baigali orchnyg 
khamgaalakh tukhai khuuli) (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 1995). In July 
2009, the Parliament of Mongolia passed the ‘Law to prohibit mineral 
exploration and mining operations at headwaters of rivers, protected 
zones of the water reservoir and forest area’ (Gol, mörnii usats büreldekh, 
usny san bükhii gazryn khamgaalaltyn büs, oin san bükhii gazart ashigt 
maltmal khaikh, ashiglakhyg khoriglokh tukhai) (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh 
Khural 2009). Munkhbayar complains that nicknaming the law as the 
‘law with the long name’ was a political tactic to mask its intent. For 
him, the full intention of the law appears in its long name. Following his 
complaints, and to reclaim the law back from the ‘long name’ tag, I shall 
use the full and official name of the law in this chapter. 
The idea of the ‘Law to prohibit mineral exploration and mining 
operations at headwaters of rivers, protected zones of the water 
reservoir and forest area’ started not from a bill but from a draft of an 
official decision to lobby, as I mentioned to start this section. According 
to Munkhbayar, the movement members eventually realised that it 
was extremely difficult to make any of the state institutions pass such a 
decision; to lobby such a law had a much better chance of success. In the 
year before the law passed, the movement intensely promoted the law 
both in the local-level and central-level governments. Munkhbayar and 
Dashdemberel met approximately 35–40 parliament members out of a 
total 76, along with the president, prime minister and the speaker. Also, 
in the course of one year, Munkhbayar and his colleagues personally 
visited about 1,000 households, most of which were made up of herders 
and their families along the course of the six rivers of the six movements. 
He briefed them on the environmental situation of those rivers and 
explained the importance of the law. After introducing and explaining 
the issue, Munkhbayar asked whether they would like to promote the 
movement. According to him, almost everyone responded in favour of 
support and often asked him how to promote the movement. Munkhbayar 
suggested three different methods for local herders to participate and 
promote the bill. They suggested sending letters, telegraphs or text 
messages; all of these were available immediately to herding families. 
Munkhbayar and his colleagues carried all of the facilities with them 
when they visited different families. For example, they helped them to 
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write letters and telegrams and place them in envelopes. After each visit 
to a particular region, they brought all of the letters and telegrams to 
the local post office to send them. Text messages were the easiest, and 
Munkhbayar made sure that they sent text messages while he and his 
colleagues were present. In case people in the countryside did not have 
sufficient mobile phone credit, Munkhbayar and his colleagues brought 
different mobile phone operators’ credits. They also had mobile phone 
numbers for all 76 parliament members, the speaker, prime minister and 
president. According to his calculation, in total, the families sent around 
3,600 text messages to these politicians, 270 telegrams to the speaker, 
and 360 letters (with three copies each: one to the speaker, one to the 
prime minister and one to the president, for a total of 1,080 letters). 
Munkhbayar and his colleagues also produced a series of television 
documentaries called Call of the Rivers (Goluudyn duudlaga), which was 
broadcast on numerous television channels. All of these were funded 
by Munkhbayar’s Goldman Prize of US$125,000, which was about 
150 million MNT.
Parliament, the presidential office and central government 
could not ignore those letters, text messages and telegrams. Furthermore, 
the public had enough information about the damage done to different 
river systems across the country. Dashdemberel drafted the bill of 
the ‘Law to prohibit mineral exploration and mining operations at 
headwaters of rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir and forest 
area’. The movement leaders chose Bat-Erdene Badmaanyambuu, a 
famous former national wrestling champion, to introduce the bill into 
parliament, which occurred in November 2008. Even though they had 
adequate support, they had to go through a series of negotiations with 
parliament in order to pass the bill. One item under discussion and 
debate concerned an article in the bill to enable citizens and NGOs to 
take legal action against the government for improper legislation. As a 
result of the series of negotiations with the members of the government 
and parliament, the movement was forced to eliminate the article to 
take legal action against the government. Nevertheless, later in 2010, 
Munkhbayar and his colleagues managed to include this article in the 
‘Environmental Protection Law’ (Baigali orchnyg khamgaalakh tukhai 
khuuli) (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 1995, Article 32). 
The bill intended to prohibit mining operations of river and forest 
areas. Article 4.1 of the law states ‘Mineral exploration and mining 
operations are prohibited at headwaters of rivers, protected zones of 
water reservoirs and forested areas within the territory of Mongolia’ 
(Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 2009, Article 4.1). Then, Article 4.3 states 
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‘The Government shall set the boundaries of the areas referred to in 
Article 4.1 of this law’ (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 2009, Article 4.3). At 
the time the government set the boundary of the area at 200 metres. 
It included a list of mines and mineral deposits of strategic importance 
to the national economy, where most of the gold mines operate. In 
2009, there were about 15 mines and mineral deposits listed as stra-
tegically important that were excluded from the law. These included 
Erdenet, a gold and copper mine that opened in 1974 as a joint Soviet 
and Mongolian government venture, and another much larger mine, 
Oyu Tolgoi (OT), a gold and copper mine venture of Rio Tinto and the 
Mongolian government, the construction of which was about to begin in 
2010. Considering both the symbolic and financial importance of these 
mines for the nation and the national economy, Munkhbayar said that 
they had to agree that the law excluded those mines and deposits with 
strategic importance.
The law passed on 16 July 2009. One year later, in June 2010, the 
government revealed a list of 1,391 exploration licences, 391 operation 
licences and the operation of 242 gold mining companies (Il Tod 2012) 
that were now prohibited by the law, which directly and indirectly 
impacted the business of around 900 companies (Mongol News 2011b). 
The government of Mongolia had to pay compensation of at least MNT 
647.3 billion (approximately US$460 million in September 2012) (Bold-
Erdene 2013). As some officials complained, in addition to affecting 
hundreds of mining operations and licences and negatively affecting 
businesses of some hundreds of companies, the result of the law brought 
difficulties in the other sectors and the national economy. Of the 391 
operation licences, 172 were owned by Mongolian companies, many 
of which invested in the other industries such as construction and food 
productions (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, many of those companies 
had bank loans, and stopping or failing to compensate them would have 
caused severe damage to many banks. Some estimates suggested that 
around 70,000 miners and engineers were at risk of unemployment 
(Mongol News 2011b). Therefore, immediately after its adoption, the 
law encountered strong resistance from many domestic and international 
mining companies, associations, investors and donors. The opposition 
against the law encouraged activists to continue their protests: they felt 
it necessary to press the government to enforce the implementation of 
the law and force mining companies to follow the law. In April 2010, the 
board of the United Movement of Mongolian Rivers and Lakes (UMMRL) 
decided to organise a series of actions to pressure the government and 
mining companies. UMMRL had two main ways to resist. One was to 
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hold an armed protest; the second was to amend the ‘Environmental 
Protection Law’.
Nationalist Movements against the State
In 2010, the leaders of the UMMRL decided to meet leaders of different 
protest movements. On 25 May 2010, UMMRL leaders recruited five 
other nationalist movements to continue and expand their resistance. By 
the end of the year, the new united movement of 11 different nationalist 
movements (bülgem), was officially reorganised as Gal ündesten (Fire 
Nation [FN]) coalition. Initially, there were five movements, including 
the following: Mongol ulsyn ayulgüi baidlyn tölöö zütgeye (Let’s serve the 
security of Mongolia), established by some former military personnel; 
Khokhirogchdyn negdsen kholboo (United union of victims), formed by 
the victims and their family members of the mass violence that resulted 
from the parliamentary election on 1 July 2008; Khökh Nuruut (The 
Blue Ridge), an NGO established by famous singer Javkhlan Samand, 
who became a parliament member in 2016; and two other groups with 
the focus to protect the sovereignty of Mongolia, Tusgaar togtnol evsel 
(Independence coalition) founded and led by L. Tsog, former Minister 
of Law (1999) who became a parliament member in 2012; and Tusgaar 
togtnolyn tölöo negdegsed (Those united for independence) founded 
and led by O. Lkhagvadorj, former director at the National Centre of 
Construction and City Development (2008). These groups announced 
that they were united under the banner ‘To save the country and the 
nation!’ (Uls, ündestnee avarya!); they invited all Mongolians to join 
them. In the following months, additional movements joined. Those 
included Chinggis khaany delkhiin akademi (The world academy of 
Chinggis Khan), an NGO established by P. Davaanyam, who claims to 
be the descendant and successor of Chinggis Khan; and Tenger ugsaa 
niigemleg (Heavenly lineage society), established by N. Davaa, board 
member of the Anod Bank of Mongolia, to search for the burial of 
Chinggis Khan. Three additional movements later joined, bringing the 
total to 11. All of them shared the view that nation-state rulers violated 
and risked the ündesnii yazguur erkh ashig (the original interest of the 
nation), which demands that rulers have a concern for sovereignty and 
national security. In other words, leaders of these movements believe 
that a nation has an original or ‘destined right’ to have a politically 
sovereign state (Lhamsuren 2006). On 2 July 2010, leaders of the united 
movements sent a letter of requisition with eight points developed 
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by each of the eight groups and demanded that the president, prime 
minister and speaker protect the interests of the nation.
The first point concerned the improper implementation of the ‘Law 
to prohibit mineral exploration and mining operations at headwaters 
of rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir and forest area’. The 
second contested that the 10 per cent share of the Tavan Tolgoi coal 
mine that would be distributed to the people of Mongolia was insuffi-
cient. The third was addressed at the OT gold and copper mine contract 
between the Mongolian government and the Canadian Ivanhoe Mines 
company. The complaint argued that the contract violates the right 
of the nation to own its natural resources. The fourth complaint decried 
the increasing number of foreign employers in the mining sector, while 
the country continued to struggle with a high rate of unemployment. The 
fifth complaint was about corruption and accountability in government 
institutions. The sixth renounced the import of foreign products and 
use of US currency in the Mongolian market. The seventh complaint 
sought to protect the rights of victims of the gold mining pollution in 
Khongor. Finally, the eighth complaint was about the accusations of 
election rigging and the resultant violence on 1 July 2008. The letter 
demanded that the authorities respond, otherwise they planned to use 
other ways to resist, and the state would be responsible for any damages. 
None of the authorities responded to the letter. The movement waited 
for exactly 60 days after sending the letter, which was the statutory 
period for authorities to respond to complaints. On 2 September 2010, 
the movements’ coalition, led by Munkhbayar, began their next action 
called och khayakh ajillagaa (operation to make a spark) and fire guns at 
the mining equipment of two companies.
Munkhbayar explained to me that the purpose of the ‘operation to 
make a spark’ was to provide a warning to the mining companies and the 
state, rather than to hurt anyone. They chose two companies to target: 
the Chinese-invested Puraam and the Canadian-funded Centerra Gold. 
These mines were selected for a number of reasons. First, for violations 
of the ‘Law to prohibit mineral exploration and mining operations at 
headwaters of rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir and forest 
area’. Second, the Mongolian owners of these mines were high-ranking 
political authorities or their family members. Third, those mines were in 
historically and culturally sacred regions. Fourth, both of the mines had 
caused significant environmental damage. As the movement members 
discovered, Mongolian shareholders of the Puram mine included some 
high-ranking police and intelligence officers, while Batbold Sukhbaatar, 
the prime minister of Mongolia (2009–12), was the Mongolian 
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shareholder of the Centerra Gold mine. According to the UMMRL, these 
mining companies committed crimes specified in Articles 202, 204, 205, 
206, 207, 208 and 214 of the Criminal Law (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 
2002; see also Simonov 2013). Both of the mines were located on the 
Noyon Mountain in Mandal, Selenge, in the north of Mongolia. The 
mountain is sacred, and it has dozens of burials from the time of the 
Xiongnu (3rd century BC–1st century AD). These were all considered 
excellent reasons for the movement leaders to choose these two mines 
and protest against them. Violations of criminal laws and the issue of 
the sacred historical site helped those movements to justify their actions 
against the two mines.
Immediately after the action, they organised a press conference 
to inform the public about the shooting. Further, they appealed to all 
Mongolians to support and join the movement. They explained that the 
action was to protect their homeland (nutag) and mother country (ekh 
oron) from mines that destroy the environment and the living conditions 
of ordinary people, which is a duty of every citizen of Mongolia as the 
constitution of Mongolia declares (Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn 
Ardyn Ikh Khural 1992, Article 16, 17). They printed an appeal titled 
‘Let’s save the Mongol hearth and our lives and livelihoods!’ (Mongol 
gal golomt, ami amidralaa avartsgaaya!) and publicised it in the media.1 
The slogan and the above actions clearly depict the nationalist changes 
in emphasis and the narrative of the series of mobilisations led by 
Munkhbayar. Although legal action took place against the four members 
of the movement for shooting at the mining equipment, in April 2011, 
the court issued a judgment of innocence, and the incident of shooting 
was considered by the court as an act of desperate self-defence to stop the 
destruction caused by mining. In a media interview, the lawyer of the FN 
coalition of nationalist and environmentalist movements, Dashdemberel, 
stated that the court decision gave them hope and confidence to continue 
their fight (Erdeneburen 2011).
‘The operation to make a spark’ was one of two main actions of 
the FN. The FN leaders also actively engaged in promoting amendments 
to the ‘Environmental Protection Law’ (Baigali orchnyg khamgaalakh 
tukhai khuuli). In the ‘Environmental Protection Law’ Munkhbayar and 
Dashdembrel decided to lobby to add articles that would enable them to 
take legal action against the central government. This was something that 
the MNPC had promoted since 2005, but, as previously mentioned, they 
were unsuccessful in the ‘Law to prohibit mineral exploration and mining 
operations at headwaters of rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir 
and forest area’ in 2009. This time, based on their previous experience, 
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the movement leaders took the decision to promote the amendment 
quietly and secretly. To achieve this, they decided to work with a 
different parliament member who was supportive during the process to 
promote the ‘Law to prohibit mineral exploration and mining operations 
at headwaters of rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir and forest 
area’. Parliament member P. Altangerel introduced the amendment 
to parliament. In July 2010, the Parliament of Mongolia amended the 
‘Environmental Protection Law’ (Baigali orchnyg khamgaalakh tukhai 
khuuli) (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 1995, Article 32), and so made it 
possible to sue the central government for the improper implementation 
of the law. Unsurprisingly, following this achievement, the next move 
of the FN was to take legal action against the government. In October 
2010, leaders of the FN sued the government for improper implementa-
tion of the ‘Law to prohibit mineral exploration and mining operations 
at headwaters of rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir and forest 
area’. Their appeal was moved down to the district court, but in October 
2011, the Supreme Court found the government guilty and ordered it 
to enforce the law and to compensate mining companies affected by 
the law. The amendment in the ‘Environmental Protection Law’ and 
the activists’ victory in the supreme court was an important turn in the 
conceptualisation of the state in Mongolia. The state officially became 
an institution that can be blamed and coerced into certain action, which 
was an instance and consequence of the de-deification of the state.
Both of the above victories of the FN coalition in the court, in 
April and October 2011, legitimised the actions of the movements 
and recognised failures on the part of the state (töriin buruu) and the 
illegality of the mining companies. This empowered these nationalist 
movements and their battles against mining companies and Mongolian 
authorities. The supreme court decision indicated that the movement 
was right, and also that it was capable of defeating both government and 
the mining companies, something that was previously far from obvious. 
These achievements fuelled the future actions of the FN coalition. The 
next campaign of the movement was an ‘operation with horses’ (moritoi 
ajillagaa). Munkhbayar and other leaders of the FN organised an event 
to bring about 100 horse riders from different parts of the country to 
protest in the central square in front of the state house (töriin ordon). 
Starting from around 14 April 2011, they gathered on the square. On 
horse carts, they brought eight gers (felt tents), which were set up on 
the square for almost two months to accommodate the protestors. The 
protest was effectively a depiction of nomadic herders’ camps in the 
middle of the capital city, with horses tied up and dogs watching outside 
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the gers. The Tenger yazguur (Heavenly lineage) society donated the 
gers. For about two months, the movement leaders requested a dialogue 
with the state authorities, but it was not taken up. At one point, they 
even went so far as to try to enter the residence of the president, prime 
minister and speaker in Ikh Tenger, in the Bogd Khan Mountain. On 3 
June 2011, movement leaders shot five arrows at the windows of the 
state house. One of the arrows broke a window.
As became clear, it was expensive for the movement organisers to 
keep all of these men and horses in the city for two months. Munkhbayar 
later explained to me that the movement organisers had to pay for the 
herders’ food to support their stay in Ulaanbaatar throughout the period. 
Munkhbayar said the operation with horses cost around 30 million 
MNT. Aside from some donations, to finance the operation Munkhbayar 
had to sell and pawn all of his possessions (Otgonsuren 2011). Later, 
Munkhbayar told me that he has spent almost all of the US$125,000 
he received from the Goldman Prize to finance the mobilisations since 
2007. That prize was equivalent to about 150 million MNT. He bought 
a two-bedroom flat in Ulaanbaatar for 47  million MNT, and a small 
second-hand Japanese four-wheel drive vehicle for 10 million MNT. 
With the rest of the money, he financed the movement, as it decided to 
stop receiving funding from TAF in 2007. He jokingly told me that the 
Goldman Prize funded the promotion of the ‘Law to prohibit mineral 
exploration and mining operations at headwaters of rivers, protected 
zones of the water reservoir and forest area’ and the activities to pressure 
the government to implement the law. By the time of the operation with 
horses, Munkhbayar was running out of money. To continue financing 
the campaign he had to sell the two-bedroom flat and bought a smaller 
flat. He used the money he made from the downsize to fund the horse 
operation. When he exhausted those funds, he then sold the little flat 
and used the cash to continue the protest.
On 29 June 2011, because it was expensive and difficult to control 
all of the horsemen in Ulaanbaatar for such a long period (and they had 
run out of money), they were forced to move on to the next operation 
called nutag chölöölökh ajillagaa (operation to liberate homeland). After 
two months, the number of riders had dropped to 33. Munkhbayar 
organised the remaining horsemen into two groups. One of the groups 
travelled to the north, while the other group went south. They visited 
every mine operating in the forbidden areas of rivers and forests. When 
they visited mining companies, they demanded that the companies write 
an official letter admitting that they had violated the law and agreeing 
to stop their extractions. The group that went to the north closed the 
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operation of about 20 mines. Munkhbayar went to the south and closed 
only two mines. According to Munkhbayar, some high-ranking police 
officers contacted him and told him that government officials wanted to 
meet him in the local police station to negotiate. However, this turned out 
to be a trap. Munkhbayar and his team were captured and imprisoned for 
a few days.
All of the above events made Munkhbayar understand that 
engagement with the state is the most fruitful avenue to pursue in order 
to accomplish the mission of those movements. He also realised that one 
way to access the state was to influence as many political leaders and 
politicians as possible. The main difficulty was the political structure 
based on the political party system. He claimed that political  parties 
have agendas to gain absolute political power and they tend to prioritise 
the party agenda and reputation above everything else. For this reason, 
he decided to attempt to unite independent election candidates with 
no political party affiliations. In June 2012, before the parliamen-
tary election, he managed to meet about 50 people, all of whom could 
potentially run in the election independently and might support these 
mobilisations. It was challenging to unite different individual candidates 
with varied backgrounds, purposes and agendas. Ultimately, he managed 
to persuade 13 candidates and only a few days before the election 
officially announced the coalition in a press conference. Munkhbayar 
did not initially intend to stand in the election himself. However, other 
members in the alliance convinced him to stand, since he was the central 
person in establishment of the coalition. When I asked him why he did 
not consider standing in the election himself, he explained that organi-
sation was more essential and useful for the movement to accomplish 
its mission than for him to become a member of parliament. Partly due 
to the short notice and poor management, this attempt at election did 
not succeed.
Green Terror?
On the morning of 16 September 2013, during a protest of a dozen envi-
ronmentalist and nationalist protest movements at Chinggis Square 
(now Sükhbaatar Square), Munkhbayar and his colleagues of the FN 
coalition – armed with hunting rifles commonly used by herders in 
the Mongolian countryside – appeared near the entrance of the state 
house (töriin ordon). There was a gunshot as state security services 
(toriin tusgai khamgaalaltyn gazar), intelligence (Tagnuulyn yerönkhii 
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gazar) and police stopped and arrested them. No one was hurt. Eleven 
men of the FN coalition, led by Munkhbayar – most of them dressed in 
Mongolian traditional deel, hat, boots and armed with rifles and hand 
grenades – were arrested. Later in the afternoon, some explosives were 
found in the bin outside the Central Tower on the Sükhbaatar Square, 
only a few hundred metres away from the state house. On the following 
day, more explosives were found near the building of the Ministry of 
Environment and Green Development (see also Campi 2013). Although 
the court found the incident to be a form of zandalchlal (terrorism) and 
a töriin esreg gemt khereg (crime against the state) (see Ul-Oldokh 2014), 
for these men it was a symbolic staged action to seek attention but not to 
inflict any destruction (see also Snow 2010).
The national and international media were filled with extensive 
debate discussing whether this was an act of green or eco-terrorism (see 
also Tolson 2014; Larson 2014; Snow 2014). According to Munkhbayar, 
some political leaders, intelligence agencies and police had specific 
intentions to depict the incidents in the media as terrorism. For example, 
Munkhbayar explains that one of the factors that supported the attempts 
to depict them as terrorists was the gunshot heard during the incident. 
He argues that the security who arrested them intentionally caused the 
gunshot; it was intended to suggest that it was a violent and dangerous 
incident. Until the trial confirmed that state security agents fired the 
gun, it was unclear who had fired. The gunshot left the public free to 
think that the movement members were terrorists. Keith Harmon Snow 
(2014), in his online article, complained that ‘the court refused to 
question state security agents and refused to investigate who had fired 
the shot’. Moreover, he wrote about how national media accused and 
pictured the activists as terrorists:
After the September 16 protest, the media accused the protestors 
of ‘organising a public event without permission’ a ‘mass murder 
attempt’ and even ‘attempted genocide’. Mongolia’s National 
Overview magazine, a copycat of  Time  (Ündestnii Toim in the 
Mongolian language rhymes with  Time), featured Goldman prize 
winner Ts. Munkhbayar on the cover, an old Russian rifle in hand, 
under the headline: ‘НОГООН ТЕРРОР’ – GREEN TERROR. 
(Snow 2014)
For many Mongolians, the news was dreadful; the public was 
devastated. It was unusual for Mongolians to resist the state with 
rifles, hand grenades and explosives. Mongolia is known for and proud 
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of its reputation of making a peaceful democratic transition without 
incidents of political violence. It was also culturally inappropriate and 
unusual to bring rifles against the state, as in the past Mongolians 
have effectively worshipped the state and treated it with high respect 
(see also Bumochir 2004; Humphrey and Hürelbaatar 2006; Dulam 
2009). Munkhbayar told me that these are the very reasons which 
prompted them to bring rifles, grenades and explosives to the protest: 
this was the best way to attract attention. This was accomplished to 
a certain extent. The absence and unprecedentedness of terrorism in 
Mongolia led to attention via the sensationalised media coverage. Yet 
for these same reasons, many Mongolians condemned their attempt 
and sharply scolded them for using rifles, grenades and explosives. 
So, although the activists managed to garner much attention, much 
of it was focused not on the environmental problem but on the acts of 
zandalchlal (terrorism).
The primary court found five out of seven activists guilty and 
charged them with zandalchlal (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 2002, Article 
177.2) and for obtaining and possessing guns and explosives (Mongol 
Ulsyn Ikh Khural 2002, Article 185.1 and 185.2). The primary court 
condemned to prison those five men for 20 to 21 years. When the court 
announced their sentences, the movement leader Munkhbayar stated 
that ‘we are sentenced for our attempt to protect our home country’ 
(Enkhdelger 2014). Many other national and international environ-
mentalist and nationalist movements issued strong disagreements with 
the court decision. On 16 September 2013, a group of environmental 
organisations and activists called a press conference and produced a 
letter to parliament and the central government. Their position did not 
support the use of arms but blamed the government for not listening 
to them. In the letter, they stated that they found the incident to be an 
attempt to warn (Simonov 2013). On 8 November 2013, the Sosnovka 
Coalition of Environmental and Indigenous Civil Organizations of 
Siberia and Russian Fareast sent a letter to the Mongolian authorities 
supporting the law to protect rivers and forest areas and demanded 
justice in Munkhbayar’s case.2 On 20 November 2013, the Goldman 
Prize called for a fair and transparent trial for Munkhbayar. In the call 
posted on their website, they state, ‘While the Goldman Prize does not 
in any way condone the use of weapons or violence, the Prize is calling 
on the Mongolian authorities to ensure a fair and transparent trial for 
Munkhbayar and we will be monitoring the situation as it develops’.3 
US-based activists from Inner Mongolia, China, at the Southern 
tHe De-De If IcAt Ion of tHe stAte 115
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center stated that ‘Munkhbayar’s 
actions highlighted the desperation of helpless Mongolian pastoral-
ists, who had no choice but to resort to an unconventional approach 
to defend their land, rights and way of life after exhausting all other 
means’ (Tolson 2014). Snow (2014) wrote about this incident: 
‘Symbolically armed with hunting rifles and antiquated weapons, 
the most courageous leaders of the grassroots Fire Nation sought to 
draw attention to corruption and collusion between government and 
foreign mining corporations. They are fighting to save their culture 
and people and their very way of life’. There is a long list of supporters 
of Munkhbayar, highlighting the concern about Munkhbayar and 
Mongolia’s environment, and demonstrating how much attention their 
action managed to attract from all around the world. All of these factors 
contributed to pressure the Mongolian government and the appellate 
court to reconsider Munkhbayar and his colleagues’ case carefully. 
The appellate court found those men guilty, but this time for extortion 
(Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 2002, Article 149.3), terrorism (zandalchlal) 
(Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 2002, Article 177.1 and 177.2) and illegally 
obtaining and possessing guns and explosives (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 
2002, Article 185.2). At this stage, the court did not find the case to 
be felonious and condemned them to prison for between one and ten 
years. They appealed against the appellate court decision and went to 
the supreme court. On 27 June 2014, the supreme court decided not to 
change the convictions of the appellate court.4
The incident of the armed protest happened on a day when an 
irregular spring session of the State Great Khural (Parliament) was 
summoned to amend some laws. Activists chose this day because the 
irregular session was planning to amend several laws, including the ‘Law 
to prohibit mineral exploration and mining operations at headwaters of 
rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir and forest area’. According 
to Munkhbayar, the staged protest helped them to delay the amendment 
for a few more years. Unfortunately, two of the members passed away 
in prison due to health problems. In February 2015, when some of 
the key activists were in prison, parliament approved the regulations 
act that amended the law. The amendment changed the distance of 
mining operations from river shores. The distance had previously been 
200  metres, but the regulations act changed it to 50 metres, which 
permitted most mining licences and operations. Munkhbayar and 
Dashdemberel both told me that the purpose of the law to protect river 
and forest areas was entirely diminished by the amendments.
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Thoughts of the State in Prison 
In his demonstration of notions of rights over land and the history of 
pastoralism, David Sneath explains that debates on land ‘reflects the 
awareness that Mongolian culture, indeed the existence of Mongolia as 
a political entity is the product of a history of contested frames for rights 
over land. The modern Mongolian nation was formed in the course of a 
struggle waged by pastoral society and its elite to resist the loss of public 
Mongolian grazing land to agriculture’ (Sneath 2001, 49) or to mining 
in the case of these movements. In the court trial Munkhbayar as a 
pastoralist deployed the same argument, as I will show in the following.
Some media sources claim that at the end of the trial, Munkhbayar 
said, ‘Usgüi bol altaar yakh ve, Ulsgüi bol amiar yakh ve’ (No need of gold 
if there is no water; No need of life if there is no country). When I asked 
Munkhbayar about this phrase, he told me that he had paraphrased a 
quote by Chinggis Khan, a quote he learned from historian B. Baljinnyam 
(see also Shiirev 2017). According to the historian, Chinggis Khan said, 
‘Usgüi bolvol uulyn chinee altaar yakh ve, Uls mongol min mökhvöl utsan 
chinee ulaan amiar yakh ve’ (No value in a mountain of gold if there 
is no water; No value in the red thread of life if my country Mongolia 
collapses).5 During the arrest, he and his colleagues could have been 
killed. They all were aware that they could lose their lives and they were 
prepared for such a possibility. With this quotation, he intended to send 
a message to Mongolians: the original interest of the nation preserved 
in the teaching of Chinggis Khan should not be ranked lower than the 
rights of individual business owners and private companies, and there 
are some Mongolians who will die to protect this interest. 
Munkhbayar also claimed that some of the ideas in his message to 
protect the environment and the country have already been adopted and 
declared in the constitution of Mongolia. For example, the constitution 
starts with the following passages.
We, the people of Mongolia:
Strengthening the independence and sovereignty of the state,
Cherishing human rights and freedoms, justice and national unity,
Inheriting the traditions of national statehood, history and culture,
Respecting the accomplishments of human civilisation,
And aspiring toward the supreme objective of building a human, 
civil and democratic society in our homeland,
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Hereby proclaim the Constitution of Mongolia.
(Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn Ardyn Ihkh Khural 1992)
According to Munkhbayar, lines two and four declare the importance of 
what he calls the interest of the nation to be independent and sovereign, 
and the concern to preserve the ‘traditions’ of historical statehood. 
Moreover, Article 16.2 declares that citizens of Mongolia have ‘the 
right to a healthy and safe environment, and to be protected [by the 
state] against environmental pollution and ecological imbalance’ (Bügd 
Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn Ardyn Ihkh Khural 1992, Article 16.2). 
For him, the well-being and security of the environment and people is a 
significant part in the concept of the sovereignty and national security. 
There is a salient way of thinking about politics in Mongolia that sees 
the environment, land, territory and sovereignty as analogous (see 
Chapter 2), which explains why the movement leaders consider the issue 
of the environmental damage to be a failure to protect the sovereignty of 
the nation; that is, the uls ündestnii niitleg yazguur erkh ashig (the original 
and common interest of the nation). Further, Article 17.2 declares 
that ‘It is a sacred duty for every citizen .  .  . to protect nature and the 
environment’ (Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn Ardyn Ikh Khural 
1992, Article 17.2). Quoting these articles, Munkhbayar claims that he 
had to perform his ‘scared duty’ as the constitution article encourages, 
while the state failed to provide its citizens with the right to live in a 
safe and healthy environment. In other words, Munkhbayar’s argument 
was that the obligation of the state to protect the environment is not 
only something in the minds of nationalist activists, but is written into 
the very constitution. If the idea that ‘the state exists for the benefit of 
the nation’ is nationalist, as Barrington (2006, 21) considers, then such 
nationalism is legitimised in the constitution of Mongolia. According 
to Munkhbayar’s experience, these articles in the constitution not only 
permitted him to be a nationalist, but also provided justification when 
they shot at mining equipment and forced some mining companies to 
cease their operations. The same legal condition also brought the supreme 
court to accuse the government of not enforcing the law to protect the 
environment. Munkhbayar told me that he had an important question: 
Couldn’t the same legal condition justify their staged protest with rifles 
and grenades at the entrance of the state house? He thought that the 
last court decision that found him and his colleagues guilty was made to 
declare the supreme authority of the sovereign state, to demonstrate that 
the state is something that cannot be resisted by its people using arms. 
As a result, five members of the protest, including Munkhbayar, spent 
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about two years in prison. As noted above, two of them died while in 
prison due to health issues. The remaining three members were released 
on 5 November 2015, as a consequence of the ‘Law of Petition’ (Örshööl 
üzüülekh tukhai khuuli), which released about 2,000 out of the total 
6,000 prisoners in Mongolia (see also Ikon.mn 2015).
Munkhbayar said that he could never recognise the current state 
in Mongolia as a ‘legitimate state’ (jinkhene tör). For him, the state is 
something that is more than the presence of institutions and agents who 
fail to rule. According to his experience, although state institutions and 
agents are present, they fail in their duty of protection. He complained 
that every state is expected to enforce the law to protect its environment, 
land, territory and sovereignty, while the state failed to respond to their 
numerous efforts as they sought protection (see also Bebbington 2012b, 
222). Such an expectation is valid according to how Lhamsuren (2006) 
explains the concept of the state as a ruling institution that Mongolians 
have historically experienced. In other words, the current state repeatedly 
failed to meet the expectation and to show people its presence through 
the protection of the environment which would benefit the nation. The 
absence of the state left no option for activists other than to perform the 
duty of the state. The state punished them for completing their ‘sacred 
duty’ (ariun üüreg) to protect. For these reasons, Munkhbayar refuses to 
recognise the current state as a ‘legitimate state’.
Moreover, he claimed that such absence of the state and its failure 
to protect the environment, land, territory and sovereignty could 
potentially generate not just the resistance of environmental protest 
but also a coup d’état (töriin ergelt). He thinks that a coup d’état can be 
the last solution to bring radical changes in the political structure and 
to bring the ‘genuine state’ back. He feels that the state established 
by Chinggis Khan was an example of the ‘genuine state’. In his idea to 
restore this, he envisions an indigenous political system, or a modern 
version of the political system Mongols had during the rule of the 
Mongol Empire (1206–1368). The system he recommended restores 
the historical arrangement of the military units of tens, hundreds and 
thousands, and small and great councils called khuraldai (or kurultai) 
that can be an alternative to parliament (see also Munkherdene 2018). 
Most importantly, he argues that at the top of the state there was not the 
rule of man; instead, there was the power of the Mönkh Tenger (Eternal 
Heaven), as depicted by Mongolian historical documents. Munkhbayar 
explained to me that the power of the Mönkh Tenger was an equivalent 
of the law of nature (baigaliin khuuli), which I will discuss in Chapter 6.
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This argument about the absence of the state and the idea to 
restore the imperial system was what Munkhbayar developed when he 
was in prison. In other words, while the state showed him its presence 
by imprisoning him, he developed his idea about the absence of the 
state. Here, what interests me is the historical construction of the law of 
nature, the power of Mönkh Tenger, how Chinggis Khan acknowledged 
them and how all of these enabled Munkhbayar to argue about the 
absence of the ‘legitimate state’. For Munkhbayar, his attempts to protect 
the environment, land and herders’ way of life were justified not only by 
the court decisions mentioned above but also by historical constructions. 
In other words, he claims that his actions are protected and defended 
by what Chinggis Khan believed in, which means that the activists did 
not do anything wrong (and therefore did not deserve to receive prison 
sentences). The historically constructed justification suggests that 
the demonstrators naturally followed the teaching of Chinggis Khan, 
the ruler of the ‘legitimate state’, and tried to save water from gold 
extractions. To do this, they showed that they are ready to risk their lives 
for the well-being of the country.
After fighting against the gold mining companies for about three 
years, Munkbayar and most of the other protestors started to discuss 
the failures of the state (parliament, the government, the president and 
other state institutions and regulations) from around 2003. To find a 
solution to the failure of the state, activists not only resisted the state 
but attempted to address its shortcomings. Initially, activists unsuccess-
fully tried to lobby the state to make a political decision to ban mining 
in the river and forest areas. Consequently, in 2009 they successfully 
lobbied the ‘Law to prohibit mineral exploration and mining operations 
at headwaters of rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir and forest 
area’ (Gol, mörnii usats büreldekh, usny san bükhii gazryn khamgaalaltyn 
büs, oin san bükhii gazart ashigt maltmal khaikh, ashiglakhyg khoriglokh 
tukhai) (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 2009), known as the ‘law with the 
long name’. The activists’ fight against the state not only found a way to 
ban mining with the ‘law with the long name’ but also a means to prove 
the state’s failure in the supreme court and thus pressure the state to 
implement the law. This successful experience fighting against the state 
motivated Munkhbayar to develop his thoughts of state by conceptually 
divorcing the actual state from what he calls the imagined ‘legitimate 
state’ (jinkhene tör) and by de-deifying the former and deifying the 
latter. In this sense, he fought not only against the ‘legitimate state’, but 
against some people in the actual state who had failed to make the state 
‘legitimate’ (jinkhene).
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Notes
 1 For more information, see http://mongolianviews.blogspot.co.uk/2010/09/statement-from-
civic-groups-on-recent.html; www.tsahimurtuu.mn/index.php/stories/2012-05-10-04-52-
01/1934-archive-story-1758
 2 For the full version of the letter, see www.transrivers.org/2014/1073/
 3 For the full version of the call, see www.goldmanprize.org/blog/goldman-prize-calls-fair-and-
transparent-trial-tsetsegee-munkhbayar/
 4 For official documentation and court decision record reference, see www.shuukh.mn/
eruudavah/1168/view
 5 Many other movements acknowledge and popularise such phrases. For example, on 
26  January  2015, the Bosoo Khökh Mongol (Standing Blue Mongol) movement, in 
collaboration with some other movements, organised a mass strike to resist a gold mining 
operation in the sacred Noyon Mountain, in the north of Mongolia. In the demonstration, 
the organisers printed and exposed the phrase Minii gazar shoroonoos burkhan guisan ch büü 
ög (Do not give away my land even if god asks for it) in huge letters: three metres tall on a 
15-metre-long background (For photos, see http://mass.mn/n/27208). 
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6
An Original Environmentalist Society
Until 2008, the Ongi River Movement (ORM) and its successor the 
Mongolian Nature Protection Coalition (MNPC) were supported by 
local governments and donors. The friction generated in the collabo-
ration of the river movements coalition with TAF not only divided the 
coalition but also transformed six of them (that is, the MNPC) into an 
alliance that became progressively radical nationalist.1 Furthermore, 
they began to resist not only mining companies but also the state (see 
Chapters 4 and 5). They adopted more indigenous and historical, or 
‘traditional’ (ulamjlalt), features of the discursive resources available 
in Mongolia and deployed them in their acts of resistance. Yet such 
tactics were present since the beginning of the movement. For example, 
in 2002, ORM members staged a protest involving hundreds of camels 
at Sükhbaatar Square, right in front of the state house (töriin ordon) 
(High 2017, 56). The camels symbolically represented herders and their 
livelihood in the southern gobi regions of Mongolia. The use of camels 
in the popular protest was a tactic to deploy depictions of ‘traditional’ 
(see also Humphrey 1992, 377; Kaplonski 2005, 166; Marsh 2009, 12; 
and Sneath 2010, 251) culture to the public as an inherent part of the 
movement. The ger protest described in Chapter 5 built on this earlier 
action. David Sneath (2010, 251) argues that ‘notions of both tradition 
and collective identity have become potential resources, particularly for 
politicians, to mobilise public support’. For example, in his paper, Sneath 
mentions how Munkhbayar successfully mobilised the river movements 
using ideas of collective identity: Ongi golynkhon (People of the River 
Ongi) (Sneath 2010, 262). While Sneath addresses the importance of 
collective identity in the ORM, in this chapter I address how the notions 
of ‘tradition’ help the activists to mobilise and respond to accusations 
that Munkhbayar and his colleagues were extortionists. 
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The first part of the chapter describes Munkhbayar’s ‘return’ to 
the countryside after his release from prison and his claims of malchin 
(herder/pastoralist) identity. The essentialist and romantic image of 
pastoralism in Mongolia is an iconic and important national symbol, 
and many often consider pastoralists as bearers of ‘traditional’ culture 
(see also Myadar 2011). I will show that Munkhbayar’s ‘return’ to the 
countryside has symbolic resonance not just in his claim of malchin 
identity but also to construct an ideological claim that Mongols were 
the bearers of ‘an original environmentalist society’, which is the focus 
of the second part of this chapter. In the second part, I borrow Marshall 
Sahlins’s (1972) memorable ‘rehabilitation’ of hunter-gatherer societies, 
in which he argues that such groups were the ‘original affluent society in 
their capacity to match their restricted means to limited wants’. Similarly, 
to rephrase the ideology constructed by Munkhbayar, mobile pastoral-
ists are the ‘original environmentalist society’, which forms the focus of 
the second part of the chapter. This original environmentalist identity of 
pastoralists is a claim that helps Munkhbayar to respond to the accusation 
that the environmental activists extort mining companies for the purpose 
of extracting money, rather than genuinely caring for the environment. 
Munkhbayar argues that pastoralists did not learn or adapt Western envi-
ronmental concepts and practices to protect the environment. Instead, 
the protection of the environment is inherent to their everyday herding 
practices and way of life. The claim of the authentic care of original envi-
ronmentalist pastoralists also helps Munkhbayar to respond to another 
accusation that blames pastoralists for environmental destruction, which 
I will account for in what follows.
The image of pastoralism as a symbolic resource construction of 
national identity and nüüdliin soyol irgenshil or ‘nomadic-culture civilisa-
tion’ arise in part as a reaction to derogatory discourses and historical 
depictions of the Mongols by their permanently settled neighbours 
and foreigners, who portrayed nomads as ‘backward and uncultured 
barbarians’ (Khazanov 1984, 1–15, 228–63; Khan 1996, 127–31; 
Humphrey and Sneath 1999, 1; Sneath 2007, 39–41; Bumochir and 
Chih-yu 2014, 417; Bayar 2014, 440–3). According to B. Tsetsentsolmon, 
the notion of nüüdliin soyol irgenshil emerged in opposition to negative 
presentations of ‘uncivilised Mongolians’ (Tsetsentsolmon 2014, 435). 
She further elaborates the history of the construction of nüüdliin soyol 
irgenshil in the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, mainly by leading Mongol 
scholars, from the early twentieth century to the present. Subsequently, 
the Mongolian concepts nüüdelchin for a nomad and nüüdliin mal aj 
akhui for pastoralism2 have largely positive connotations,3 often playing 
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a crucial role in national pride and holding an honoured place in the 
construction of national identity. 
Yet some recent considerations – climate change, the increasing 
desertification of pastureland in Mongolia and the need to conserve 
the environment – have led to a search for causes of land degradation. 
Specific forms of pastoralism, with different scales of mobility, were 
identified as among the leading human factors in Mongolia and Inner 
Mongolia, China.4 Many scholars, local and international NGOs, stake-
holders and policymakers in Mongolia and elsewhere bring up similar 
concerns regarding the unsustainability of pastoralism. Ian Hannam, 
an expert in international and national legal policy and institutional 
systems for natural resource management, advised Mongolia and many 
other Central Asian countries to develop new legislative and institutional 
structures. According to his advice, ‘Mongolian rangeland is degraded 
because herders are unable to apply sustainable grazing practices. 
Mongolian grassland is not valued, so its regulation and management 
have been avoided in the past. Herders continue to graze their livestock 
on public land unrestrained, where there is high competition for good 
pasture. They use public pasture and water free of charge and without 
initiatives to protect and properly use it’ (Hannam 2012, 418).5 In 
Mongolia, many more contribute to this discussion, namely national and 
international scholars, consultants, NGOs, stakeholders and policymak-
ers. Thus, this conservationist viewpoint on pastoralism constructed an 
image of a harmful and unsustainable practice with adverse effects on 
pasture and natural resources.6 While such conservationist discourses 
problematise pastoralism, there is an alternative approach that considers 
the sustainability of pastoralism in Mongolia. This approach recognises 
that pastoralism involves complex reasoning, knowledge and techniques 
that prevent herders from overgrazing or causing damage to nature, 
which I will demonstrate in detail below. In essence, I will draw attention 
to the manner in which the above conservationist construction of 
unsustainable pastoralism is different from the local understanding in 
Mongolia, and contradicts how herders perceive and interpret pasture 
degradation as well as their well-being in the natural environment (see 
also Bumochir 2017).
Sneath (2003, 441) finds discussions of unsustainable pastoralism 
to be a ‘Western interest in promoting Western conservationist ideology 
and establishing and expanding protected areas to harbour wildlife and 
biodiversity’. Similarly, Elliot Fratkin and Robin Mearns (2003) point 
out that those who employ the concept of sustainability ‘often blame 
poor rural producers for what are perceived to be unsound practices 
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including slash and burn cultivation, overgrazing, and deforestation for 
fuelwood’ (Fratkin and Mearns 2003, 113). Following Sneath, Fratkin 
and Mearns, I focus on how the discourse of unsustainability contributes 
to accusations of blame upon the herders. 
The accusation of the unsustainability of pastoralism conflicts 
with the existing local, indigenous and ‘traditional’ understandings of 
pastoralism as sustainable. In Munkhbayar’s understanding, ‘traditional’ 
Mongolian cosmology and herding practice do not prioritise human 
rights and the individual’s well-being, and do not pronounce human 
domination and triumphalism on earth (see also Stépanoff et al. 2017). 
Instead, the cosmology holds that every being on earth has interdepen-
dent khüin kholboo (umbilical connection) which depicts the mother-
child relationship with the umbilical cord ruled by the law of nature 
(baigaliin khuuli). Munkhbayar affirms that human beings must follow 
the law of nature, rather than ignore it. As the movement leaders 
repeatedly pronounce, Mongol pastoralists embody and transmit this 
knowledge and practice (see also Upton 2010), which I will refer to as the 
indigenous environmentalist cosmology (see also Vitebsky 1995). Many 
scholars also put forward the same argument. For example, Caroline 
Upton writes that the ‘ideas of reciprocal, respectful relations with nature 
were central to belief and practice’ (2010, 309) in Mongolia. Referencing 
Caroline Humphrey et al. (1993), P. Tseren (1996), and A. Terenguto 
(2004), she further writes that ‘in everyday life, these were enacted for 
example through cultural prohibitions on cutting live trees, digging the 
soil and overuse of resources, including allowing livestock to damage 
or overgraze the pasture, nomadism being intrinsically connected with 
these beliefs and practices’ (Upton 2010, 309). In this way, the second 
section of the chapter shows that many Mongolians consider pastoralism 
to be a sophisticated, sustainable technology, and claim that pastoralists 
do not destroy but protect the environment. By developing new meanings 
and deployments of the term pastoralism, activists not only recreate the 
‘nomadic’ and ‘pastoral’ national identities that they perceive as under 
threat, but also construct an indigenous environmentalist understanding 
of an original environmentalism. 
A ‘Return’ to Pastoralism
A hush came across the courtroom as a guard declared, ‘Shüügchid orj irlee 
bostsgoono uu!’ (‘All rise! Judges are coming’). Two women and one man 
in long, black gowns entered the room; the one in the middle announced 
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the court case and the names of the people involved. With a very formal 
tone and cold manner, one judge asked the litigant to stand up and 
identify himself and his address. Munkhbayar, in a Mongolian traditional 
dark green deel (Mongolian coat), a shirt with the same colour and fabric, 
hat and boots, stood up and announced his name and identified himself 
as a malchin (herder or pastoralist) from Saikhan-Ovoo sum (sub-prov-
ince), Dundgovi aimag (province). His self-identification as malchin from 
the countryside reminded everyone that he is someone other than just 
an environmental and nationalist movement leader. In addition to being 
an activist, he is also a father, a husband, a national hero (or a ‘terrorist’, 
according to some people), and a malchin, as he presents himself in 
the courtroom. Of course, he must have a home somewhere, and most 
people would consider his home to be in Ulaanbaatar, the capital city 
of Mongolia, where most of the protest movements happen. But as a 
malchin, his home is almost unavoidably somewhere in the countryside. 
As he claimed in the courtroom, his home is in the Gobi Desert, where 
some of the largest mines operate and impact the environment. 
While Munkhbayar and his colleagues were in prison, accused of 
extortion and terrorism, a new label became associated with Munkhbayar 
and his associates: ‘green terrorist’ rather than ‘activist’ (see Chapter 5). 
It is not uncommon for people in Mongolia to view environmental 
activism as an easy way to make money, through extortion, harassment 
and pretending to be a patriot, nationalist and protector of nature and the 
environment. Even Munkhbayar, as well as G. Dashdemberel, the lawyer 
who drafted the ‘law with the long name’, did not entirely reject such 
suspicions; they acknowledged the possibility that some people might 
extort money from mining companies in the name of the environment. 
In his court appearance, Munkhbayar’s malchin identity partly had the 
effect of allaying such suspicions. Emphasising this identity was an 
attempt to prove that Munkhbayar and his associates were genuine and 
honest in their fight to protect the environment.
In November 2015, not long after the movement members were 
released from prison, an advert on social media invited the public to the 
trial of Munkhbayar and N. Gantulga, executive director of the ORM, 
which they hoped would clear their names (ner töröö nekhemjilekh) 
of extortion charges. On 23 November 2015, I attended the trial with 
my colleague Byambabaabar Ichinkhorloo, as Munkhbayar stated his 
case against the accusation that they extorted money from the AUM 
Gold mining company.7 Sh. Myagmardorj, director of the AUM Gold, 
apologised. He explained that the accusation of extortion was a ‘misun-
derstanding’ (buruu oilgoltsol). He also admitted that for compensation, 
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the company agreed to pay Munkhbayar MNT 80  million and to pay 
Gantulga MNT 50 million. It is rather implausible that the whole scenario 
– extortion charges, prosecution and imprisonment in addition to the 
criminal charges for zandalchilal (terrorism) – was just a ‘misunderstand-
ing’. The trial leads to another conclusion: perhaps the initial accusation 
was an act of politically organised repression (khelmegdüülelt). In the 
televised news interview at the end of the trial, Munkhbayar declared 
that the charge and accusation against him and his colleagues was 
‘political repression’ (uls töriin khelmegdüülelt). Further, Munkhbayar 
was confident that the incident in question – including the extortion 
charge and his prison sentence for the so-called act of terrorism – will 
one day be recognised for what it was: a performance by protestors to 
grab attention for the sake of the environment and not terrorism. He 
believes that exculpation is only a matter of time.
After the court meeting, Byambabaatar and I talked to Munkhbayar 
to arrange a meeting for an interview. He told us that he had scheduled 
many meetings in the two days before his scheduled ‘return’ to the 
countryside to prepare for the winter before the weather gets too cold. It 
was the end of November 2015, and the beginning of the coldest winter 
of the past two decades. Munkhbayar asked us whether we could meet 
early in the morning. We agreed to meet at 6 a.m. on the day he was 
leaving Ulaanbaatar. This was our second meeting at the studio flat he 
was renting in a dormitory on the eastern edge of Ulaanbaatar. Until 
then, Byambabaatar and I did not know that Munkhbayar did not own 
a home in Ulaanbaatar. Nor was he based in Ulaanbaatar, which is the 
centre and the capital of the country. He leads a very different life than 
many might expect. When we visited, he was renting a tiny room with a 
toilet and bathroom in the corner, and simple cooking facilities on the 
floor in the opposite corner. When we arrived, Munkhbayar and his wife 
were already awake and had prepared tea. Two of his children were still 
sleeping on the floor. There was a small space left unoccupied, probably 
where Munkhbayar and his wife had been sleeping, and we sat there to 
start our conversation. We started by discussing his home, which has 
been constantly moving since 1996.
Before the ORM, he was a herder who studied agrotechnology 
in college (technikum) and later journalism (graduating in 2001). In 
1996, Munkhbayar was elected as a member of Saikhan-Ovoo sum 
Citizens’ Representative Meeting (Irgediin tölöölögchdiin khural) and 
lived in the sum administrative district centre until he resigned in 2003. 
In 2004, his family moved to Ulaanbaatar and started renting rooms in 
different flats (karma öröö, or ‘pocket room’, meaning a pocket in a flat 
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or apartment) and dormitories until he received the Goldman Prize in 
2007, which granted him US$125,000 (about 150 million MNT). As 
described in Chapter 5, with the grant he bought a two-bedroom flat in 
Ulaanbaatar and funded protests with the rest of the prize money. Later, 
in order to continue the protest, he sold his flat and bought a smaller one, 
before finally selling this to fund the movement. When he sold the small 
apartment, his entire family was left without a home in Ulaanbaatar, 
except the ger (felt tent) his two sons were living in with a few cattle just 
outside Ulaanbaatar.
In 2013, just before he received his prison sentence, the family 
decided to move back to Saikhan-Ovoo sum to continue their herding 
way of life once and for all. This ‘return’ was not just a ‘return’ to the 
nutag homeland in Mongolia, but to revitalise their herder identity. 
Unfortunately, the family had to stay in the countryside without 
Munkhbayar. The family fell apart and dispersed (tarchikhsan) between 
the countryside and city until the time of Munkhbayar’s release. As he 
put it, his children were staying with different relatives and friends in 
Ulaanbaatar while trying to continue their studies and work. While he 
was in prison, he had to sell some of his cattle to pay the rents, fees and 
other living costs. I heard from different sources that G. Uyanga, an 
activist who was elected to parliament in 2012, whom I introduced in 
the preface, helped Munkhbayar’s family while he was in prison. As soon 
as he was released from prison, the first thing he did was to find a place 
for his children who were in Ulaanbaatar: the small room we visited for 
our discussion. Our conversation was interrupted by a telephone call 
around 7  a.m. It was a journalist from Mass Media Group who hoped 
to interview Munkhbayar. His next appointment reminded us once 
again that Munkhbayar had a truly tight schedule before his departure 
from Ulaanbaatar to set up his ger in the winter pasture before it gets 
too cold. He is no longer, and perhaps was never, based in Ulaanbaatar. 
Certainly, he is now fully occupied as a herder whose home is in Saikhan-
Ovoo sum in the gobi (Dundgovi). His ‘return’ to the countryside was 
not limited to him only; it also transformed the ORM: eight of the nine 
board members are now herders, all of whom permanently live in the 
gobi.8 This ‘return’ to the countryside is a dramatic change compared to 
how they started: the ORM began with no herders, but with chairs of 
sum Citizens’ Representative Meeting and governors, among others (see 
Chapter 3). Munkhbayar noticed the problem Caroline Upton (2012, 
247) observes in her demonstration of the incorporation of Ulaanbaatar-
based river movements and local herders. She claims that ‘disengage-
ment between local herders and UB based river movement activists pose 
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an apparent threat to sustained grassroots activism’. For the same reason 
of disengagement, Munkhbayar wanted the movement to belong to 
herders, centred in the countryside, not in Ulaanbaatar. He clearly sees 
the symbolic usefulness of his ‘return’ to herding. He is a local celebrity 
and he knows that he has lots of local support.
Yet, during the years of active environmental protests, he developed 
alternative identities in addition to his malchin identity. On the Goldman 
Prize website, his biography summarised his trajectory as ‘from herdsman 
to statesman’.9 Similarly, his National Geographic Emerging Explorer 
profile depicts him as an ‘emerging explorer’ who grew up herding on 
the bank of the Ongi River and suffered from the consequences of the 
damage done to it.10 In this way, his environmentalist identity is broadly 
known. Yet his herder identity had been playing an underlying role in 
explaining and narrating the success of his environmentalist and conser-
vationist career. In Mongolia, the media and public rarely identify him 
as a herder but often depict him as a leader of various environmentalist 
movements and organisations of which he has been Chair, namely the 
Ongi River Movement (Ongi golynkhon khödölgöön), United Movement 
of Mongolian Rivers and Lakes (Mongolyn gol nuuruudyn negdsen 
khödölgöön), Mongolian Nature Protection Coalition (Mongol nutag minu 
evsel), and the Fire Nation (Gal ündesten) coalition. Although his malchin 
identity had long been silenced and overlooked, these herder roots were 
finally retrieved, revitalised and publicly announced when Munkhbayar 
declared in the court that he was a malchin from the gobi. The gobi is also 
where we had our next meeting. 
In mid-December, Byambabaatar and I travelled 400 kilometres 
from Ulaanbaatar to meet Munkhbayar again. The winter ride took the 
whole day: we travelled in the snow, half on paved roads and half on 
dirt roads, from early morning to late at night. We arrived in the dark, 
around 9 p.m. The darkness made it challenging to locate Munkhbayar’s 
newly erected ger in the winter camp. Mobile phone network coverage 
barely functions in the area, which made finding him even more 
difficult. The snow-covered dirt road showed no tracks or wheel-prints. 
We looked for his ger for about an hour. Finally, Munkhbayar decided 
to send a young herder – who was also a member of the ORM – to look 
for us with a torch in the darkness. After we spotted the flashing light, 
it took us another half an hour to reach his ger in the bushes nearby 
the frozen Ongi River. It was indeed a perfect place for a winter camp, 
located in the lowland within tall shrubs, well-hidden from wind and 
the coldness of the open steppe, and equally, from our earlier attempts 
to find it. As soon as we arrived, we noticed a few hundred sheep outside 
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his ger. We were surprised to see the sheep; less than a month before, 
in Ulaanbaatar, he told us that he did not have any livestock except 
for a few cattle. Meeting us outside the ger, he smiled and enquired 
whether we had a pleasant trip to his place, and hoped that we did not 
have many difficulties or delays in finding his ger. Inside, it was warm 
and cosy, with a new floor covering and carpets. In the khoimor – the 
most respectful part of the ger, opposite the entrance – there were three 
orange chests. The first one had a portrait of Chinggis Khan on it; the 
middle one had two large books: one was a publication of Chinggis 
Khan’s teachings, the other a volume of his decrees. The third chest had a 
certificate of the Goldman Environmental Prize. Everything else, inside 
the ger and outside, projects the image of a proper Mongol ail (family 
and household), especially when compared to his rented dormitory 
room, which we visited in Ulaanbaatar. We asked him whether he had 
managed to settle down in the winter camp and how the local herders 
in the area had welcomed him. Besides setting up his ger in the current 
location, he had already organised a board meeting of the ORM. An 
immediate outcome of the board meeting was the 200 sheep (and goats) 
outside his ger, donated from herders of five sums along the Ongi River 
to support the movement. In the board meeting, Munkhbayar shared 
his concern about donor organisations, advocacy and the necessity of 
self-funding to sustainably continue the movement (see Chapter 5). The 
board members decided to start a herd for the movement, which could 
serve the purpose of funding its activities. Munkhbayar shared with us 
his surprise: within a week there were donations of sheep from local 
herders of five sums. All of the five sum representatives who participated 
in the meeting decided to collect about 100 sheep from each sum. Most 
herders were happy to voluntarily donate one or two or more livestock 
to keep the movement running. In this way, the story of Munkhbayar 
and the ORM involves the construction of a grassroots movement, 
which started with local government employees and foreign donor 
funding and transformed into a herders’ movement with an increasing 
level of attempts to self-fund. 
Munkhbayar did not ‘return’ alone. He also brought the nation’s 
most successful, powerful and globally known environmental movement 
with him. His ‘return’ challenges the environmentalist perspective 
on pastoralism’s unsustainability and the harm it inflicts upon the 
environment, which I turn to below. Despite this confrontation, his 
‘return’ to pastoralism is symbolically useful mainly because a mobile 
pastoralist identity is the best fit for him to employ as a grassroots envi-
ronmental activist.11 Furthermore, his return is useful to construct his 
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concept of an original environmentalism and to argue that Mongol pasto-
ralists are the original environmentalists, who have been preserving 
the environment in their way of living from generation to generation. 
Therefore, with his ‘return’ to the pastoralist way of life and claim to the 
nomadic pastoralist identity, he is not ending his protest but continuing it 
by appealing for an original environmentalist society.
An Original Environmentalism
In 2015, on a popular television programme, the director of the 
Gatsuurt company Chinbat Lhagva12 (for more on Chinbat Lhagva, see 
Chapter 3) stated that pastoralism is more harmful to the environment 
than mining. His statement suggests that pastoralism is unsustainable, 
an argument that I presented in the introduction of this chapter. As an 
influential public figure in Mongolia, who grew up in a herding family, 
trained as a geologist and with mining experience, his statement was 
a powerful message to many Mongolians. Chinbat claims that herding 
takes a vast territory and the size of the degraded land is often much 
larger than areas damaged by mining operations. In many ways, this 
is Chinbat’s response to herders’ complaints against mining-induced 
environment damage. 
In response to the notion of unsustainable pastoralism of this 
sort, Munkhbayar gave an account of why and how malchin identity 
is a genuinely conservationist one. For Munkhbayar, unsustainability 
has little to do with the nature of mal aj akhui (pastoralism). Instead, 
he argues that it is all about what the ‘West’ (baruunykhan) is doing to 
Mongolia. Munkhbayar continued that the West glorifies its civilisa-
tion as the most ideal and sophisticated in the world. In doing this, they 
also blemish (gutaakh) other cultures by criticising indigenous cultural 
principles (gol amin yum). In the case of Mongolian culture, its principle 
is mal aj akhui, and donor organisations propagate an understanding 
that mal aj akhui is harmful (yavuurgüi) and does not have a future. He 
explains that one should understand this in the framework of how the 
West labels other cultures as risky, vulnerable, uncertain and unsustain-
able. According to his view, if mal aj akhui is ‘unsustainable’ and harms the 
environment, this could only be true if it was something that Mongolian 
herders recently adopted. For him, any harm can only be a consequence 
of the transformation of Mongolian cosmology based on the worship of 
Mönkh Tenger (Eternal Heaven), and its replacement with other foreign 
views embodied in Tibetan Buddhism, Russian Communism and Western 
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democracy and capitalism. To keep pastoralism sustainable, he argues, 
Mongolians need to reclaim its ‘traditional’ cosmology of Mönkh Tenger 
(Eternal Heaven). 
Munkhbayar also talked about the foreignness of anthropogenic 
forces in Mongolia. According to his understanding, in sedentary culture 
the domination of man over nature establishes a shared sense that 
anything can be done for the sake of human beings, and jeopardises 
the existence of all other creatures and species on Earth,13 while such 
an understanding is absent in the history and culture of the Mongols. 
Munkhbayar claims that today this ideology is coming to a dead end 
(mukhardal).14 Contrary to ‘Western’ opinion, the cosmology of the 
Mongols does not make human beings central, does not urge one to 
dominate and conquer earth, and does not consider the earth to be 
granted solely for the human being (see also Stépanoff et al. 2017). 
Munkhbayar argues that the understanding of Mongolian pastoralists 
prevented them from inflicting anthropogenic forces on the environment 
and making pastoralism unsustainable. 
To understand the current environmental problems and reconstruct 
authentic Mongolian pastoralism, Munkhbayar decided to reclaim 
what he considered the genuine Mongolian cosmology or beliefs (itgel 
ünemshil) (see also Sneath 2001, 45–6; Bruun 2006, 232; Marin 2010, 
164; Upton 2010, 305). In his explanation, he repeatedly used three 
keywords: khüi elgen sadan (umbilical liver relatives), baigaliin khuuli 
(law of nature), and Mönkh Tenger (Eternal Heaven). The first one, 
khüi elgen sadan depicts everything on earth that is not man-made. He 
claimed that all things are connected by a familial relationship, just as an 
umbilical cord connects mother and child. Second, there is only one thing 
that is perfect in the world, and that one thing is the baigaliin khuuli (law 
of nature). Munkhbayar sometimes uses Mönkh Tengeriin khuuli (the 
law of the Eternal Heaven) to mean the law of nature. He believes that 
as nomads and pastoralists the Mongols have been learning, practising, 
testing, acknowledging and following this law throughout their history. 
This law creates an order and arranges the relationships of every human 
and nonhuman thing and species via umbilical connections (see also 
Sneath 2001, 45–7; Marin 2010, 164; Upton 2010, 308). Finally, Mönkh 
Tenger (Eternal Heaven) is the supreme deity of the Mongols, broadly 
found both in the folk religious practices of lay people and shamanism, 
and the imperial culture from the middle ages (Dulam 1997). Many 
contemporary Mongolians consider shamanism and belief in the Mönkh 
Tenger to be the authentic and original Mongolian religion in contrast 
to Buddhism (see also Heissig 1980, 6–7; Bulag 2004, 110). Since the 
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1990s, belief in Mönkh Tenger and shamanic practices has dramatically 
increased; Mönkh Tenger was re-established as the contesting national 
religion against Buddhism (Bumochir 2014, 478–81). As many other 
works reveal, the heavenly father Mönkh Tenger and the mother earth 
Etügen are the supreme deities Mongols worship (Dulam 1989; Heissig 
1980, 47–9). It is these deities that Munkhbayar now chooses to believe 
in and employ in his environmentalist perspective. He thinks that all 
of the environmental problems caused by anthropogenic forces are the 
consequences of the failure to submit to the law of nature. According to 
this law, the earth is not granted solely for human beings but is shared 
with all of the other species and creatures. Emerging from his pastoralist 
background, he claims that herders (malchin arduud) have played a 
pivotal role in carrying and transmitting this folk knowledge and practice, 
which has ensured environmental sustainability for thousands of years. 
In this way, the ‘traditional’ Mongolian cosmology and sustainable 
practice of the pastoral way of life embodies the original environmen-
talism. In other words, his ideology posits that malchin (herdsman) is 
the embodiment of a complex of knowledge, practice, belief and ethics 
dedicated to the sustainable natural environment. His activism, built on 
this foundation, is not only intended to save the rivers and pastures but 
also to rehabilitate Mongolian environmentalism that can be transmitted 
to the next generation. 
These are not the beliefs of Munkhbayar – and other activists – 
alone. Scholars and policymakers in Mongolia have expressed similar 
ideas. For example, in 2002, the Council for Sustainable Development 
of Mongolia (led by the prime minister), published Tulkhtai khögjil – 
Mongolyn ireedüi (Sustainable Development – Mongolian Future), an 
edited volume led by prominent Mongolian economist D. Dagvadorj 
(2002). The book argues that the fundamental feature of the nomadic 
way of life is to cohere with nature and the environment, and to secure 
their lives by protecting and restoring it. Similarly, other Mongolian 
scholars who publish on nüüdliin soyol irgenshil (nomadic culture and 
civilisation) and nüüdeliin mal aj akhui (mobile pastoralism) also reveal 
the same elaborations. For instance, S. Dulam writes in his Mongol soyol 
irgenshliin utga tailal (Interpretation of Mongol Culture and Civilization) 
that Mongols realise that nature cannot be produced again as it was; 
however, it can be preserved, and nüüdeliin mal aj akhui (mobile 
pastoralism) can preserve it in its original form (Dulam 2013, 29). 
Also, in the official state document called Ündesnii ayulgüi baidlyn üzel 
barimtlal (National security concept), passed in 2007, Article 47.1 was 
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entirely dedicated to the preservation and enhancement of nüüdliin soyol 
irgenshil (Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural 2010). 
I am not arguing that the whole concept is truly original, unique 
and entirely different from all other similar cosmologies in the rest of the 
world. Here, my intent is not to test whether Mongol herders maintain 
such environmental cosmology and do not overgraze their herds. What 
interests me is the difference that Munkhbayar creates and mobilises 
between the so-called Western environmentalist constructions of ‘unsus-
tainable pastoralism’ and his construction of Mongolian environmentalist 
cosmology to imaginatively create the original environmentalist society. 
Munkhbayar’s indigenous environmentalist cosmology shares 
some essential similarities with Donna J. Haraway’s (2003) account 
of ‘companion species’ and Anna Tsing’s (2012, 152) concept of ‘inter-
species relationships’ that are neglected in global capitalism. Tsing 
(2005, 249) notes that ‘village elder, nature lover, and national activist 
perspectives are produced within different and somewhat autonomously 
formed understandings of nature’. What interests me here is not only 
the understanding of the relationship between man and nature but the 
ways such understandings serve the purpose of the indigenous environ-
mental movement. For the environmental and nationalist movements, 
‘the autonomously formed understanding of nature’ helps them to 
nationally and internationally publicise environmentalist discourses, 
respond to different accusations, and argue against the unsustainability 
of pastoralism. Unlike what we saw for Haraway and Tsing, in Mongolia 
the autonomous knowledge of man and nature is not a ‘neglected 
perspective’ but the knowledge that cannot be neglected. Thus, it 
becomes widely salient in political debate when it is effectively drawn 
upon and mobilised by the movement.15 Malchin (that is, the pastoralist 
identity) – employed self-referentially by Munkhbayar – is inseparable 
from portrayals of imperial and heroic nomadic states and their civili-
sation, which is essential to the construction of the national identity, 
nationalism and independence of the Mongols (Bruun 2006, 227, 232; 
Upton 2010, 205). Reflecting on this, Munkhbayar’s activism was a ‘fight 
to remain with one’s homeland’ (nutagtaigaa üldekhiin tölöökh temtsel), 
and for him, it is a heroic expression of pastoralists’ genuine care for their 
nutag. For this reason, Munkhbayar makes such knowledge the backbone 
of his nationalist sentiment, and a significant aspect in the making of an 
indigenous pastoralist environmentalist national identity that he seeks 
to further mobilise to achieve his political ends.
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Notes
 1 I do not mean that previously these movements were not nationalist at all, or that nationalism 
was absent. Also, when they become radically nationalist I do not mean that they stopped 
being environmentalist. 
 2 In my experience, there is an important difference between the Mongolian term mal aj akhui 
and its English form ‘pastoralism’, and also between the word nüüdeliin and its English 
form ‘nomadic’. In Mongolian, these words do not have the connotations of backward, 
unsophisticated, unskilled or unsustainable, while their English forms do.
 3 Not everyone supports the concept of ‘nomadic civilisation’. Some philosophers, journalists 
and poets argue that civilisation is something to do with sedentary and urban culture 
(Bumochir and Chih-yu 2014, 417). For example, one of the latest encyclopaedias of 
Mongolian culture, On the way Towards Civilisation: Almanah of Mongolian Culture (Irgenshliin 
zamd: Mongolyn soyolyn almanakh), was written by well-known Mongolian poet and writer B. 
Tsenddoo (2015) and published by Nepko Publishing, which is owned by a famous journalist 
and public figure known as Baabar. Baabar is one of the pioneers who argued against the 
concept of nomadic civilisation from the early 1990s.
 4 Environmentalist problematisation of pastoralism and ‘green governmentality’ in North China 
‘converted pastures to grasslands’ (Yeh 2005; Kolås 2014), leaving many herders displaced 
and without herds. This turned many into ex-herders, but the former herders were also left 
with the anxiety of becoming ex-Mongols in Chinese urbanisation (see also Baranovitch 
2016). N. Baranovitch writes about the 2011 protest in Inner Mongolia, sparked by the 10 May 
death of a Mongolian herder called Mergen, who was killed by a coal mining truck driven by 
a Han Chinese driver. He argues that the protest was not just about pasture degradation and 
mining destructions but also about the dying out of Mongolian culture and identity in China 
(2016, 228–30).
 5 In the case of Inner Mongolia, Dee Mack Williams (2000) calls it Han Chinese ‘scientific 
knowledge construction’. He writes that Han Chinese national and regional levels of 
government officials and scholars explicitly express that ‘Mongols never learned to look 
beyond their sheep to the soil, so today they have no regard for the land that farmers have 
cherished’ (2000, 508).
 6 I must note that they are not saying that all pastoralists and their acts are universally harmful. 
Instead, the specific actions of some herders were found to be detrimental to the environment 
by some environmentalists.
 7 I could not find any information about the company. From Munkhbayar and some other people 
who work in the Mongolian gold mining companies in Uyanga, where Aum Gold operates, I 
discovered that the company has investors from the Czech Republic.
 8 In 2008, Upton observed the ORM to be more grassroots orientated than all other river 
movements in Mongolia. She writes that representatives, membership and awareness of the 
river movements were generally low among local herders, except in the immediate vicinity of 
the dried-up Ulaan Lake at the southern end of the Ongi River (Upton 2012, 244).
 9 For the full profile, see www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/tsetsegee-munkhbayar/.
 10 For the full profile, see www.nationalgeographic.com/explorers/bios/tsetsegee-munkhbayar/
 11 S. Chuluun and G. Byambaragchaa (2014) talk about a different form of coexistence of 
herders in OT ‘mine impact zones’ in Khanbogd, Ömnögovi. Instead of resisting mines or 
attempting to stop them, they try to gain employment from the mining companies; they try to 
get a permanent salary to increase their financial resources. 
 12 For the full video, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=aVpBq1aM5K0
 13 Indeed, many write how Europeans intended to master the earth. Consider, for instance, the 
Judaeo-Christian and Biblical traditions that can be found in Genesis, the first book of the 
Bible. Carl Hand and Kent Van Liere (1984), Ronald Shaiko (1987), Jeremy Cohen (1989) and 
many others show that the West has been developing the concept ‘to master the earth’ from its 
ancient religious teachings. William Leiss (1994) writes of the history of different concepts of 
mastery over nature and argues that another major facet of ‘mastering of the earth’, different 
from those based on biblical knowledge, was the age of the secular science and technology.
 14 Another founding member of the FN coalition said something similar. In 2012, on a television 
talk show, Javkhlan Samand – a well-known singer who named the coalition of nationalist 
movements Gal Ündesten (Fire Nation) and who became a parliament member in 2016 – said 
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the following: ‘When earth takes its saddle under its belly, and man eats each other, then 
livestock, herder and Mongol knowledge will save the world’ (Delkhii emeelee gedsendee avch, 
khün khünee barij idekh tsagt mal, malchin, mongol ukhaan gurav delkhiig avarch üldene). By 
this he means that when the earth loses its ability to carry us like a horse on its saddle, and 
when man destroys each other and existing Western ideologies come to a dead end, then the 
mobile pastoral way of life and the knowledge of pastoralists will save the world. For the full 
version of the video, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=6QIiSMEcMHY
 15 In contemporary Mongolia, many are rapidly abandoning the pastoral way of life and 
transitioning to urbanisation (Bruun and Narangoa 2006; Myadar 2011, 342). Some 
pastoralists evaluate their work as ‘unskilled’ and their subjectivities as ‘uncultured’, despite 
the widespread celebration of nomadic identities in nationalist discourse (Marzluf 2015). 
At the same time, some acknowledge that being a herder is not easy and does not assure a 
living, because harsh winters always risk wealth (see also Ericksen 2014). For these reasons, 
herders usually leave their children free to decide whether to stay and become a herder or do 
something else in urban areas, and most youngsters choose not to become herders (Ahearn 
and Bumochir 2016, 61–2). In addition to the herding communities, government officials 
also frequently devalue pastoral livelihoods and knowledge (89). Mongolian Prime Minister 
Enkhbayar Nambar expressed this view in 2001 when he called for the end of pastoralism 
and the movement of 90 per cent of the population to urban areas within 30 years (Endicott 
2012). Enkhbayar supported his policy by questioning the viability of pastoralism after 
severe drought and winter weather killed the livestock of 12,000 families from 1999 to 2001 
(Sternberg 2010). For many Mongolians, this is alarming because the number of those who 
carry the authentic nomadic and pastoralist national identity for the nation is dramatically 
decreasing and possibly ending. For example, in April 2016, national news claimed that every 
year Mongolia experiences a 2 per cent drop in the number of young herders aged 15 to 34 
(For full video, see www.tv5.mn/index.php/society/1000-2016-04-01-11-01-59). 
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Conclusion
In April 2018, during the last stages of my fieldwork in Mongolia for this 
book, I met Dashdemberel Ganbold, the lawyer of the river movements 
and popular mobilisations who drafted the ‘Law to prohibit mineral 
exploration and mining operations at headwaters of rivers, protected 
zones of the water reservoir and forest area’, the ‘law with the long 
name’. In the street, we briefly talked about his latest trials, the outcome 
of which had become less successful. He was surprised that he could no 
longer win court cases with the same legal conditions and arguments 
that he had used in the past. His success was affected by more than 
merely amendments made in different laws, such as the 2015 regulations 
act of the ‘Law to prohibit mineral exploration and mining operations 
at headwaters of rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir and 
forest area’ (see Chapter 5). In addition, activism designed to protect 
the environment – in general – no longer attracted as much public and 
political attention and support as it used to. He suggested then that it is 
not the laws and regulations that have decisive importance in the court; 
rather, it is the overall attitude of society at the particular time that 
matters the most.
Around the same time that I saw Dashdembrel, and throughout the 
time I was completing work on this book, I encountered dozens of social 
media posts concerning numerous cases of gold mining operations in the 
river and forest areas, and local protest movements against those mining 
operations from many different parts of Mongolia. One of those incidents 
was at the Zag River near my father’s homeland (nutag), which I visited 
many times. In response to a Facebook post of a video titled ‘Threatener 
of the life of the river Zag’ (Zagiin golyn ami nasand zanalkhiilegch),1 I 
noticed many people I knew from the Zag River and neighbouring regions 
– including my father – had liked and shared the post. There were also 
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strong nationalist statements among the comments. I also noticed that 
the government of Mongolia was unresponsive and provided no reaction 
to protect those rivers. Instead, the central government was busy with 
the IMF bailout and dozens of strikes by government employees in the 
health care and education sectors.
Starting from around the end of 2013, the central government 
abandoned a strategy of concessions to the popular mobilisations against 
mining. Several factors helped to suppress popular mobilisations and 
allowed environmental problems to be ignored. One of these was the 
political labelling of the staged armed protest of September 2013 as 
terrorism and extortion (see Chapter 5). Such presentations created 
the impression that the popular mobilisations were not genuine. This 
also contributed to a prejudice that such movements have morphed 
into radical and dangerous extremist groups that should be avoided. 
Another factor was the economic crisis and neoliberal policies to assist 
the national economy. 
May 19, 2015, was a historic day not only for Mongolia but also 
for the international community involved with developing one of the 
world’s largest copper deposits, Oyu Tolgoi. After almost two years of 
ongoing disputes, the government of Mongolia and Rio Tinto signed a 
US$5.4 billion deal to expand the underground development of Oyu 
Tolgoi. Upon the signing, in the media the Prime Minister Saikhanbileg 
Chimed, who was committed to promoting the agreement, declared that 
‘Mongolia is back to business’ (Guardian 2015, see Chapter 2). It can 
be assumed that the national government plan was to appeal further to 
foreign investors to prepare and secure its economy to pay over half a 
billion-dollar debt, starting from 2017 (Dulam 2015).
In August 2016, Finance Minister Choijilsuren Battogtokh 
announced that Mongolia is ‘in a deep state of economic crisis’ and ‘the 
goal of the government is to avoid default’.2 To help its economy, the 
government of Mongolia requested a rescue loan from the IMF (Hornby 
and Khan 2016). In May 2017 the IMF approved a US$5.5 billion bailout 
package for Mongolia (Edwards 2017). Mongolia’s foreign debt – which 
started to increase dramatically around 2013 (see also Batsuuri 2015) 
– reached US$27.9 billion in March 20183 and the debt-to-GDP ratio 
reached about 90 per cent (Bauer et al. 2017, 1).
Another narrative emerged at this time that served to enforce the 
regime of the resource economy, which concerned China’s ‘debt trap’ 
(öriin urikh or öriin zanga). In this way, failures in Mongolia’s economy 
might make the country dependent not only on the IMF but also on China. 
According to some international media commentators, Mongolia became 
tHe stAte ,  PoPulAr moBIl IsAt Ion AnD golD mIn Ing In mongol IA138
one of the victims of China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ (Fernholz 2018; 
Chellaney 2017). This news immediately alarmed many Mongolians and 
helped to enhance the anxieties surrounding political independence and 
the loss of land and territory. In this manner, the discourse of sovereign 
debt promotes the importance and legitimacy of the resource economy 
and undermines the environment to pay off the national debt.
This book narrates the political economy of resources, mining 
and environmental movements in Mongolia, which emerged after the 
collapse of socialism in 1990, when many politicians, economists and 
rulers of the nation-state established a free market economy with some 
urgency (Rossabi 2005; Munkh-Erdene 2012; Addleton 2013) to help 
combat the critical economic downturn. There was a significant focus 
on ‘mining capitalism’ in the emerging political and economic climate 
(Kirsch 2014). The operation of open-pit gold mines that used old Soviet 
technology (see Dear 2014; Bonilla 2016; High 2017) became one 
of the primary businesses and a vital financial resource for emerging 
Mongolian companies and the government. Mining helped to build the 
national economy. For this purpose, many rulers of Mongolia, including 
Ochirbat Punsalmaa – former miner, technocrat and the first president of 
Mongolia (1990–7) and the Democratic Party – were committed to the 
mining industry, market economy, neoliberalism and resource economy 
(see Chapter 1). Consequently, in 2012, the mining boom made Mongolia 
one of the fastest-growing economies, with a 17.3 per cent GDP growth 
rate (World Bank 2012). That same year, the massive gold and copper 
mine Oyu Tolgoi, which is a joint venture of Rio Tinto and the Mongolian 
government, made Mongolia the economy with the most investment 
(Riley 2012). Unfortunately, the so-called mining boom did not last 
long. Mongolia’s GDP growth rate dramatically dropped and reached 
–1.4 per cent in 2016 (Trading Economics 2018). Thereafter, discourses 
of terrorism, economic crisis and sovereign debt helped to silence many 
actors in the state institutions in regard to mining-induced environmen-
tal damage, and endorsed the regime of the liberal economy of resources. 
However, matters of indigenous culture, history and environment in 
Mongolia remain, forming a compelling political resource of mobilisa-
tion that cannot be quickly suppressed or permanently terminated. 
Under the new government that took power in 2016 the environment, 
indigenous culture and history have gained prominence again.
Although mining successfully contributed to the Mongolian 
economy, its impact was also damaging; many nationalist protestors, 
local environmental movements, politicians, technocrats and scholars 
resisted and fought against political forces that promoted neoliberal 
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policies. Since the 1990s, in parallel to the emergence of neoliberal-
ism, the reconstruction of the ‘traditional’ culture, history, nomadism, 
pastoralism and national identity mainly reinforce ideas related to the 
protection of the environment, nature and lifestyles of local herders. 
As a result, nationalist environmental movements successfully brought 
problems related to the environment and local people in the areas deeply 
affected by mining to the attention of the national and international 
public, and to the consideration of the central government, parliament 
and president. In Mongolia, the simultaneous emergence of nationalism 
and statism and the circulation of neoliberal policies and capitalist 
market explains why popular mobilisations have emerged with so much 
power; these popular mobilisations were able to construct a regime that 
defined itself in opposition to the dominance of the resource economy. 
The contemporary Mongolians presented in this book exist within 
a unique era: they are working to build the nation and to craft the state. 
In this politically prioritised and nationalised process to build a nation 
and to craft a sovereign state, the priorities of many modern Mongolians 
fall into two major spheres: one promotes the resource economy, global 
capitalist market, neoliberal policies and democracy; the other promotes 
history, tradition, environmentalism, naturalism and spiritualism. The 
so-called liberal reformers and nationalists or populists have ideological 
conflicts and disagreements and endlessly debate different issues. All of 
the chapters of this book show how those ideological conflicts, disagree-
ments and debates in the process of crafting the state shape different 
practices and concepts, such as the national economy, mining, neolib-
eralism, mobilisation, nationalism, pastoralism, environmentalism, 
sovereignty and state. The process of building the nation continues, and 
the continuation of the process further generates and shapes policies and 
practices. In the context of the political economy of resource, mining 
and mobilisation in Mongolia, nation-building and state-crafting is the 
legitimate, most potent and resourceful political and discursive agenda. 
The relationship between neoliberalism and the nation-state 
in Mongolia recalls Karl Polanyi’s argument, which claims that it is 
impossible to dis-embed the economy from society and the state (Polanyi 
cited in Block 2001, xxvi–xxvii). Hanna Appel recently developed a 
similar argument. She states that ‘there is no economy without the state’ 
(Appel 2017, 301). Following Polanyi and Appel, as I mentioned earlier, 
throughout the book I consider neoliberalism as an ideology that can 
be employed for national purposes and used in the nation-building and 
state-crafting project as policy. In this case, I argue that there is not just 
an indigenous response and resistance to neoliberalism, as Maria Bargh 
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(2007) shows, but also the indigenous shaping of neoliberal policies 
and processes of neoliberalisation, by embracing it and then altering 
it to make it suitable to the indigenous, ethnic and national principles. 
Politicians, economists and nation-state rulers make the best use of 
neoliberal policies and others attempt to limit, control, transform or 
even break its principles. In other words, the use of neoliberal ideology 
in Mongolia is about embedding neoliberal policies in local or national 
contexts and making them their own. 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, each of the chapters are intended 
to individually present the employment of different ideological positions 
to generate different discursive resources and contribute to discussions 
of different natures. Chapter 1 presented state rulers’ employment of 
neoliberal ideology and contributed to the discussion about the anxiety of 
political independence and the reification of national economy. Chapter 2 
presented nationalist technocrats’ employment of Buddhist ideology 
regarding the economy and nationalist historical perspectives on the 
state protection of natural resources and contributed to the discussion of 
alternative understandings of the economy and ‘resource nationalism’. In 
Chapter 3 I gave the narrations of those who own, manage and operate 
mining companies and who deploy neoliberal ideologies and also 
endorse a nationalistic identity of ‘national wealth producer’ (ündesnii 
bayalag büteegch). The findings of this chapter engage with discussions 
of the varying degrees of power of mining companies and deconstruct 
the homogenous transnational image of mining companies. In Chapter 4 
I described how local government authorities started to endorse the 
local grassroots and civil society positions and established a right and a 
recognisable way to protest. The achievements and influence of popular 
mobilisations in this chapter suggest to us the need to reconsider conven-
tional discussions on the power of local resistance movements, and 
the relationship of the local activist groups and international donors. 
In Chapter  5 I described how nationalist activists employed histori-
cally constructed statist concepts and showed how this provides a new 
perspective on the discussion of the deification and reification of the state 
and its power to control and protect the environment, natural resources 
and territory. Finally, in Chapter 6 I showed how activists employed 
nomadic herder and mobile pastoralist positions to construct an ideology 
of an ancient original environmentalist society which adds to discussions 
of environmentalism, nomadism and pastoralism. Besides the above 
individual interventions and contributions, all of the chapters should be 
seen as forming an overarching argument regarding the indigenisation 
and nationalist shaping of neoliberal policies and the capitalist market 
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economy of resources within in the broad project to build the nation and 
to craft the state. 
Notes
 1 For the full video, see www.facebook.com/shine.suvd/videos/1728337473954305/?fb_
dtsg_ag=AdxIHTc9YXAYJAsScOHtkyA8RsaG4mrF7EdogvrTa3D8g%3AAdx7XacDJBkizsVvG
aLL0rMrXwzxJU5_5kZ_ODep9ccjdg
 2 For the full version of his announcement on Bloomberg TV Mongolia, see www.youtube.com/
watch?v=qo9Qb0LT3kc




Abrams, Philip. 1988. ‘Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State’, Journal of Historical Sociology 
1(1): 58–89.
Acheraïou, Amar. 2011. Questioning Hybridity, Postcolonialism and Globalization. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Addleton, Jonathan S. 2013. Mongolia and the United States: A Diplomatic History. Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press.
Ahearn, Ariell and Bumochir, Dulam. 2016. ‘Contradictions in Schooling Children 
among Mongolian Pastoralists’, Human Organization 75(1): 87–96. 
https://doi.org/10.17730/0018-7259-75.1.87
Amarsanaa. S. and Bayarsaikhan, N. eds. 2007. Töriig tsochooson ongiinkhon (People of Ongi who 
alarmed the state). Ulaanbaatar: Od Press.
Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London and New York: Verso.
Andreucci, Diego. 2017. ‘Resources, Regulation and the State: Struggles over Gas Extraction 
and Passive Revolution in Evo Morales’s Bolivia’, Political Geography 61(6): 170–80. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.09.003
Andreucci, Diego and Radhuber, Isabella. 2017. ‘Limits to “Counter-Neoliberal” Reform: Mining 
Expansion and the Marginalisation of Post-Extractivist Forces in Evo Morales’s Bolivia’, 
Geoforum 84(1): 280–91. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.09.002
Appel, Hannah. 2017. ‘Toward an ethnography of the national economy’, Cultural Anthropology 
32(2): 294–322. https://doi.org/10.14506/ca32.2.09 
Atwood, Christopher. 2004. Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire. New York: 
Facts on File.
Auty, Richard. 1993. Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. 
London: Routledge.
Badamsambuu, G. 2007. ‘Irged khüchtei bol dülii niigem dünkhüü bodlogyg ch öörchilj chadna’ 
[When citizens are powerful even a deaf society and dull policy can change]. In Töriig 
tsochooson ongiinkhon [People of Ongi who alarmed the state] edited by S. Amarsanaa and 
N. Bayarsaikhan, 126–8. Ulaanbaatar: Od Press. 
Ballard, Chris and Banks, Glenn. 2003. ‘Resource Wars: The Anthropology of Mining’, Annual 
Review of Anthropology 32(1): 287–313. https://doi-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/10.1146/
annurev.anthro.32.061002.093116
Bank of Mongolia. 2017. ‘Mongol Bankind tushaasan altny khemjee 10 khuviar össön baina’ 
[Amount of gold sold to the Mongol Bank increased with 10%]. Last accessed 11 August 
2019. www.mongolbank.mn/news.aspx?id=1711&tid=1 
Banzragch, Ch. 2004. ‘Altain kharuulyn tuhaid’ [About the patrol of Altai]. In Manjiin erkhsheeliin 
üyiin Mongol [Mongolia in the times of the Manchu occupation], edited by J. Boldbaatar, 
86–92. Ulaanbaatar: Orbis Publishing. 
Baranovitch, Nimrod. 2016. ‘The 2011 Protests in Inner Mongolia: An Ethno-environmental 
Perspective’, China Quarterly 225: 214–33. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741015001642
references 143
Bargh, Maria. 2007. ‘Introduction’. In Resistance: An Indigenous Response to Neoliberalism, edited by 
Maria Bargh, 1–25. Wellington: Huia Publishers.
Barrington, Lowell. 2006. ‘Nationalism and Independence’. In After Independence: Making and 
Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States, edited by Lowell W. 
Barrington, 3–30. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Batsaikhan, O. 2007. Mongolyn tusgaar togtnol ba Khyatad, Oros, Mongol gurvan ulsyn 1915 ony 
Khyagtyn geree (1911–1916) [Independence of Mongolia and 1915 Kyagta Agreement 
between China, Russia and Mongolia (1911–1916)]. Ulaanbaatar: Admon Press.
Batsaikhan, O. 2009. Bogdo Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, The Last King of Mongolia: Mongolia’s 
National Revolution of 1911. Ulaanbaatar: Admon Press.
Batsukh, J., and Chinzorig, O. 2012. ‘Mongolyn avyaslag bisnesmenüüd—Lhagvyn Chinbat’ 
[Talented Mongolian businessmen–Chinbat Lkhagva]. Last accessed 13 February 2019. 
www.wikimon.mn/content/8318.shtml
Batsuuri, Haltar. 2015. ‘Original Sin: Is Mongolia Facing an External Debt Crisis?’ Northeast Asian 
Economic Review 3(2): 3–15.
Battuvshin, B. 2007. ‘Khödolgöönd zütgesen on jilüüd min’ [My years working for the movement]. 
In Töriig tsochooson ongiinkhon [People of Ongi who alarmed the state] edited by S. 
Amarsanaa and N. Bayarsaikhan, 115–16. Ulaanbaatar: Od Press. 
Bauer, Andrew et al. 2017. Fiscal Sustainability in Mongolia. Ulaanbaatar: Gerege Partners and 
Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/
publications/fiscal-sustainability-mongolia
Bayar, Nasan. 2014. ‘A Discourse of Civilization/Culture and Nation/Ethnicity from the Perspective 
of Inner Mongolia, China’, Asian Ethnicity 15(4): 439–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/14631
369.2014.939329
Bear, Laura. 2015. Navigating Austerity: Currents of Debt Along a South Asian River. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press.
Beaudoin, Gary. 2000. ‘Gold Test on the Toson Terrace Placer, Zaamar Goldfield of Mongolia’, 
World Placer Journal 1(1): 1–9. 
Bebbington, Anthony et al. 2008. ‘Mining and Social Movements: Struggles Over Livelihood and 
Rural Territorial Development in the Andes’, World Development 36(12): 2888–2905. 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1265582
Bebbington, Anthony. 2012a. ‘Extractive Industries, Socio-Environmental Conflicts and Political 
Economic Transformations in Andean America’. In Social Conflict, Economic Development 
and the Extractive Industry: Evidence from South America, edited by Anthony Bebbington, 
3–29. London and New York: Routledge. 
Bebbington, Anthony. 2012b. ‘Conclusions’. In Social Conflict, Economic Development and the 
Extractive Industry: Evidence from South America, edited by Anthony Bebbington, 216–28. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Behrends, Andrea, Reyna, Stephen and Schlee, Günther eds. 2011. Crude Domination: An 
Anthropology of Oil. New York: Berghahn.
Benson, Peter and Kirsch, Stuart. 2010. ‘Capitalism and the Politics of Resignation’, Current 
Anthropology 51(4): 459–86. www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/653091
Bilguun. 2015. ‘“Urt nertei” khuuliin khüreend litsenz ezemshigchdiin khüseltiig avch ekhlev’ 
[Started receiving licence holders’ requests in the range of the ‘law with the long name’]. 
Last accessed 16 March 2019. http://chuham.mn/index.php?newsid=324
Blaser, Mario and de la Cadena, Marisol. 2017. ‘The Uncommons: An Introduction’, Anthropologica 
59(2): 185–93. 
Block, Fred. 2001. ‘Introduction’. In The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
our Time, by Karl Polanyi, xviii–xxxix. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Boas, Taylor C. and Jordan Gans-Morse. 2009. ‘Neoliberalism: From new Liberal Philosophy to 
Anti-Liberal Slogan’, Studies in Comparative International Development 44(2): 137–61. 
Bold, S. 2013. ‘Alt khötölböriin khüreend 66.6 ton alt olborlojee’ [66.6 tonnes of gold has 
been exploited in the range of the gold programme]. Last accessed 25 October 2019. 
www.mongolianminingjournal.com/content/51668.shtml
Bold-Erdene, S. 2013. ‘Urt nertees nökhön tölbör nekhegsdiin daraalal nemegdseer’ [Number 
of those demanding compensation from the long name is adding up]. Last accessed 
5 November 2019. www.mongolianminingjournal.com/content/51934.shtml
Bollier, David, and Helfrich, Silke eds. 2012. The Wealth of the Commons: A World beyond Market 
and State. Amherst, MA: Levellers Press.
tHe stAte ,  PoPulAr moBIl IsAt Ion AnD golD mIn Ing In mongol IA144
Bonilla, Lauren. 2016. ‘Extractive Infrastructures: Social, Environmental, and Institutional Change 
in Resource-Rich Mongolia’. PhD diss., Worcester, MA: Clark University.
Bremmer, Ian and Johnston, Robert. 2009. ‘The rise and fall of resource nationalism’, Survival 
51(2): 149–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330902860884
Brown, Clair. 2015. ‘Buddhist Economics: An Enlightened Approach to the Dismal Science’, 
Challenge 58(1): 23–8. https://doi.org/10.1080/01603477.2015.990826
Brubaker, Rogers. 1999. ‘The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction between “Civic” 
and “Ethnic” Nationalism’. In Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in 
Perspective, edited by Hanspeter Kriesi, Klaus Armingeon, Hannes Slegrist, and Andreas 
Wimmer, 55–73. Zurich: Rüegger. 
Bruun, Ole and Odgaard, Ole. 1996. ‘A Society and Economy in Transition’. In Mongolia in 
Transition: Old Patterns and New Challenges, edited by Ole Bruun and Ole Odgaard, 23–43. 
Richmond, Surrey: Curzon. 
Bruun, Ole. 2006. Precious Steppe: Mongolian Nomadic Pastoralists in Pursuit of the Market. Oxford: 
Lexington Books.
Bruun, Ole and Narangoa, Li. eds. 2006. Mongols from Country to City:  Floating Boundaries, 
Pastoralism and City Life in the Mongol Lands. Copenhagen: NIAS Press. 
Bulag, Uradyn. 1998. Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Bulag, Uradyn. 2004. ‘Inner Mongolia: The Dialectics of Colonization and Ethnicity Building’. 
In Governing China’s Multiethnic Frontiers, edited by Morris Rossabi, 84–117. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press. 
Bulag, Uradyn. 2012. ‘Independence as Restoration: Chinese and Mongolian Declarations of 
Independence and the 1911 Revolutions’, Asia-Pacific Journal 10(52/3): 1–15.
Bulag, Uradyn. 2017. ‘A World Community of Neighbours in the Making: Resource Cosmopolitics 
and Mongolia’s “Third Neighbour” Diplomacy’. In The Art of Neighbouring: Making Relations 
Across China’s Borders, edited by Martin Saxer and Juan Zhang, 121–45. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press. 
Bumochir, Dulam. 2004. ‘Cult of the State: State in the Culture of the Mongols’, Acta Mongolica 
3(215): 103–20. 
Bumochir, Dulam. 2014. ‘Institutionalization of Mongolian Shamanism: From Primitivism to 
Civilization,” Asian Ethnicity 15(4): 473–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2
014.939331
Bumochir, Dulam. 2017. ‘Afterlife of Nomadism: Pastoralism, Environmentalism, Civilization and 
Identity in Mongolia and China.’ In Pastoralist Livelihoods in Asian Dry Lands: Environment, 
Governance and Risk, edited by A. Ahearn, and T. Sternberg, 17–41. Cambridge: White 
Horse Press.
Bumochir, Dulam. 2018a. ‘Mongolia’. In Routledge Handbook of Civil Society in Asia, edited by 
Akihiro Ogawa, 95–109. London and New York: Routledge.
Bumochir, Dulam. 2018b. ‘Generating Capitalism for Independence in Mongolia’, Central Asian 
Survey 37(3): 357–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1493429
Bumochir, Dulam and Chih-yu, Shih. 2014. ‘Introduction’, Asian Ethnicity 15(4): 417–21. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2014.942055
Buyandelgeriyn, Manduhai. 2007. ‘Dealing with Uncertainty: Shamans, Marginal Capitalism, and 
the Remaking of History in Postsocialist Mongolia’. American Ethnologist 34(1): 127–47.
Buyantogtokh, D. 2007. ‘Sain khüniig sanan dursakhyn uchir minu’ [My reason to remember the 
good person]. In Töriig tsochooson ongiinkhon [People of Ongi who alarmed the state] 
edited by S. Amarsanaa and N. Bayarsaikhan, 89–90. Ulaanbaatar: Od Press.
Bügüde nayiramdaqu mongγol arad ulus-un yeke qural [The Great Khural [Parliament] of the 
Mongolian People’s Republic]. 1940. ‘Bügüde nayiramdaqu mongγol arad ulus-un ündüsün 
qauli’ [Constitution of the People’s Republic of Mongolia]. Assent June 30. 
Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn Ardyn Ikh Khural [The Great Khural [Parliament] of the 
Mongolian People’s Republic]. 1960. ‘Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn Ündsen Khuuli’ 
[Constitution of the People’s Republic of Mongolia]. Assent July 6. 
Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn Ardyn Ikh Khural [The Great Khural [Parliament] of the 
Mongolian People’s Republic]. 1992. ‘Mongol Ulsyn Ündsen Khuuli’ [Constitution of 
Mongolia]. Assent January 13. www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/367 
Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn Ardyn Ikh Khural [The Great Khural [Parliament] of the 
Mongolian People’s Republic]. 1988. ‘Mongol ulsyn khuuli: Gazryn khevliin tukhai’ [Law of 
Subsoil]. Assent November 29. www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/218 
references 145
Byambajav, Dalaibuyan. 2015. ‘The River Movements’ Struggle in Mongolia’, Social Movement 
Studies 14(1): 92–7.
Çalışkan, Koray and Callon, Michel. 2009. ‘Economization, Part 1: Shifting Attention from the 
Economy Towards Processes of Economization’, Economy and Society 38(3): 369–98. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140903020580
Callon, Michel. 1998. ‘The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics’. In The Laws of the 
Markets, edited by M. Callon, 1–57. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Campi, Alicia and Baasan, Ragchaa. 2009. The Impact of China and Russia on United States–
Mongolian Political Relations in the Twentieth Century. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
Campi, Alicia. 2013. ‘Mongolian “Eco-Terrorists” Attack Ulaanbaatar to Protest Looser Mining 
Laws’. Last accessed 30 September 2019. https://jamestown.org/mongolian-eco-terror-
ists-attack-ulaanbaatar-to-protest-looser-mining-laws/
Cashell, Lee. 2015. Mongolia hopes for a phase of economic stability. Last accessed 11 August 
2019. www.apip.com/news/apip-in-the-news/mongolia-economic-stability
Chellaney, Brahma. 2017. ‘Sri Lanka the latest victim of China’s debt-trap diplomacy’. Last accessed 
24  December 2017. www.atimes.com/article/sri-lanka-latest-victim-chinas-debt-trap-
diplomacy/
Childs, John R. 2016. ‘Geography and Resource Nationalism: A Critical Review and Reframing’, 
The Extractive Industries and Society 3(2): 539–46. 
Chuluunbat, Narantuya and Empson, Rebecca. 2018. ‘Networks and the Negotiation of Risk: 
Making Business Deals and People among Mongolian Small and Medium Businesses’, 
Central Asian Survey 37(3): 419–37. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1450221
Chuluundorj, Khashculuun and Danzanbaljir, Enkhjargal. 2014. ‘Financing Mongolia’s Mineral 
Growth’, Inner Asia. 16(2): 275–300. 
Chuluun, S. and Byambaragchaa, G. 2014. ‘Satellite Nomads: Pastoralists’ Tactics in the Mining 
Region of Mongolia’, Inner Asia 16(2): 409–26. 
Click, Reid W. and Weiner, Robert J. 2010. ‘Resource Nationalism Meets the Market: Political 
Risk and the Value of Petroleum Reserves’, Journal of International Business Studies 
41(5): 783–803.
Cohen, Jeremy. 1989. ‘Be Fertile and Increase, Fill the Earth and Master It’: The Ancient and Medieval 
Career of a Biblical Text. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Collier, Paul. 2007. Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done 
About It. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Collier, Stephen. 2009. ‘Topologies of Power: Foucault’s Analysis of Political Government beyond 
“Governmentality”’. Theory, Culture and Society 26(6): 78–108.
Cordero, Raúl et al. 2005. ‘Economic Growth or Environmental Protection? The False Dilemma of 
the Latin-American Countries’, Environmental Science and Policy 8(4): 392–8. 
Coronil, Fernando. 1997. The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Crossley, Nick. 2002. Making Sense of Social Movements. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Dagvadorj, D. 2002. Tulkhtai khögjil: Mongolyn ireedüi [Sustainable Development: Mongolian 
Future]. Ulaanbaatar: Council for Sustainable Development of Mongolia.
Daly, Herman. 1996. Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development. Boston: 
Beacon Press.
Dashnyam, Gongor. 2014. ‘Galdan Boshgot Sudlal’ [The Study of Galdan Boshgot]. In Galdan 
Boshgot Sudlal [The Study of Galdan Boshgot], edited by E. Jigmeddorj and Na. Sukhbaatar, 
225–31. Ulaanbaatar: Soyombo Printing.
Dear, Devon. 2014. ‘Marginal Revolutions: Economies and Economic Knowledge between Qing 
China, Russia, and Mongolia, 1860–1911’. PhD diss., Harvard University.
Dierkes, Julian. 2016. ‘Resource Nationalism?’ Last accessed 31 March 2019. http://blogs.ubc.ca/
mongolia/2016/resource-nationalism/
Dierkes, Julian and Jargalsaikhan, Mendee. 2017. ‘Election 2017: Making Mongolian Great Again?’ 
Last accessed 20 June 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/election-2017-making-
mongolia-great-again/
Domjan, Paul  and  Stone, Matt. 2010. ‘A Comparative Study of Resource Nationalism 
in Russia and Kazakhstan 2004–2008’, Europe–Asia Studies 62(1): 35–62. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130903385374
Dulam, Sendenjav. 1989. Mongol domog züin dür [Figures in Mongolian Mythology]. Ulaanbaatar: 
Ulsyn khevleliin gazar. 
tHe stAte ,  PoPulAr moBIl IsAt Ion AnD golD mIn Ing In mongol IA146
Dulam, Sendenjav. 1997. ‘Mönkh tengeriin takhilgyn belgedel’ [Symbolism in the Worship of the 
Eternal Heaven], Erdem shinjilgeeni bichig 116(8): 75–94.
Dulam, Sendenjav. 2013. Mongol Soyol Irgenshliin Utga Tailal [Meaning and Interpretation of 
Mongol Culture]. Ulaanbaatar: Bit Press.
Dulam, Bumochir. 2006. ‘Respect and Power without Resistance: Investigations of Interpersonal 
Relations among the Deed Mongols’. PhD diss., University of Cambridge. 
Dulam, Bumochir. 2009. ‘Respect for the State: Constructing the State on Present Humiliation and 
Past Pride’, Inner Asia 11(2): 259–81. https://doi.org/10.1163/000000009793066550
Dulam, Bumochir. 2015. ‘Mongolia’s “strategic mine” and the conflict between civil society, 
national government, and foreign investors’. Last accessed 30 June 2019. http://blogs.
ucl.ac.uk/mongolian-economy/2015/06/30/mongolias-strategic-mine-and-the-conflict-
between-civil-society-national-government-and-foreign-investors/ 
Economist. 1977. ‘The Dutch Disease’, The Economist. 26 November. 82–3.
Edwards, Gemma. 2008. ‘The “Lifeworld” as a Resource for Social Movement Participation and the 
Consequences of its Colonization’, Sociology 42(2): 299–316.
Edwards, Terrence. 2017. ‘IMF approves $5.5 billion bailout package for Mongolia’, Reuters, 25 
May. https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mongolia-imf-idUKKBN18L0AC
Ekins, Paul. 2002. Economic Growth and Environmental Sustainability:  The Prospects for Green 
Growth. London and New York: Routledge. 
Els, Frik. 2012. ‘Mongolia’s champion of resource nationalism is going to jail for four years’. 
Last accessed 19 August 2019. www.mining.com/mongolias-champion-of-resource-
nationalism-going-to-jail-for-graft-13500/
Empson, Rebecca and Webb, Tristan. 2014. ‘Whose Land is it Anyway? Balancing the Expectations 
and Demands of Different Trusting Partnerships in Mongolia’, Inner Asia 16(2): 231–51. 
doi: 10.1163/22105018-12340017
Endicott, Elizabeth. 2012. A History of Land Use in Mongolia: The Thirteenth Century to the Present. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Enkhdelger, L. 2014. ‘Ts. Munkhbayar nart üzüülsen töriin tömör nüür’ [Iron face of the state 
shown to Ts. Munkhbatar and others]. Last accessed 22 January 2019. http://old.eagle.
mn/content/read/11745.htm
Erdeneburen. O. 2011. ‘Gal Ündesten kholboony udirdakh zövlöliin gishüün Ts. Munkhbayar: 
Mongolyn baigali orchin ezengüi bolson’ [Board member of the ‘Fire Nation’ coalition Ts. 
Munkhbayar: Environment of Mongolia became ownerless]. Last accessed 12 April 2019. 
http://news.gogo.mn/r/86024
Ericksen, Annika. 2014. ‘Depend on Each Other and Don’t Just Sit: The Socialist Legacy, 
Responsibility, and Winter Risk among Mongolian Herders’, Human Organization 
73(1) 38–49. https://doi.org/10.17730/humo.73.1.e218g65507n665u0
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, Laidlaw, James, Mair, Jonathan, Martin, Keir and Venkatesan, Soumhya. 
2015.  ‘The Concept of Neoliberalism has Become an Obstacle to the Anthropological 
Understanding of the Twenty-First Century’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 
21(4): 911–23. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9655.12294 
Escobar, Arturo. 2008. Territories of Difference: Place, Movements, Life, redes. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
Fratkin, Elliot and Mearns, Robin. 2003. ‘Sustainability and Pastoral Livelihoods: Lessons 
from East African Maasai and Mongolia’, Human Organization 62(2): 112–22. 
https://doi.org/10.17730/humo.62.2.am1qpp36eqgxh3h1
Ferguson, James. 2006. Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press.
Fernholz, Tim. 2018. ‘Eight countries in danger of falling into China’s “debt trap”’. Last accessed 
7  March 2019. https://qz.com/1223768/china-debt-trap-these-eight-countries-are-in-
danger-of-debt-overloads-from-chinas-belt-and-road-plans/
Ganbold, Misheelt and Ali, Saleem H. 2017. ‘The Peril and Promise of Resource Nationalism: 
A Case Analysis of Mongolia’s Mining Development’, Resources Policy 53(C): 1–11. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2017.05.006
Gankhuyag, D. 2007. ‘Mongolyn ündesnii üzel mandtugai!’ [Long Life of Mongolian Nationalism!]. 
Last accessed 17 April 2019. www.tsahimurtuu.mn/index.php/stories/2012-05-10-04-48-
56/1393-archive-story-1188
Gardner, Katy. 2012. Discordant Development: Global Capitalism and the Struggle for Connection in 
Bangladesh. London: Pluto Press. 
references 147
Genota, Jeff. 2017. ‘Whatever Mongolia’s Presidential Results, Populism Will be in Check’. Last 
accessed 11 August 2019. www.cogitasia.com/whatever-mongolias-presidential-results-
populism-will-be-in-check/
Gilberthorpe, Emma and Banks, Glenn. 2012. ‘Development on Whose Terms?: CSR Discourse and 
Social Realities in Papua New Guinea’s Extractive Industries Sector’, Resources Policy 37(2): 
185–93. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2011.09.005
Gilberthorpe, Emma and Rajak, Dinah. 2016. ‘The Anthropology of Extraction: Critical 
Perspectives on the Resource Curse’, Journal of Development Studies 53(2): 186–204. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2016.1160064
Godoy, Ricardo. 1985.  ‘Mining:  Anthropological  Perspectives’, American Review 
of Anthropology 14(1): 199–217. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.an.14.100185.001215
Goldin, Ian, and Winters, L. Alan. 1995. ‘Economic Policies for Sustainable Development’. In The 
Economics of Sustainable Development, ed. Ian Goldin and L. Alan Winters, 1–16. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511751905.002
Golub, Alex. 2014. Leviathans at the Gold Mine: Creating Indigenous and Corporate Actors in Papua 
New Guinea. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Graeber, David. 2011. Debt: The First 5,000 Years. New York: Melville House.
Gramsci, Antonio. 2000. The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916–1935. New York: New York 
University Press.
The Guardian. 2015. ‘Rio Tinto and Mongolia sign multibillion dollar deal on mine expansion’. 
19 May. Last accessed 11 August 2019. www.theguardian.com/global/2015/may/19/
rio-tinto-and-mongolia-sign-multibillion-dollar-deal-on-mine-expansion
Gylfason, Thorvaldur, Herbertsson, Thryggvi Thor, and Zoega, Gylfi. 1999. ‘A Mixed Blessing: 
Natural Resources and Economic Growth’, Macroeconomic Dynamics 3(2): 204–25.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1987. The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2: System and Lifeworld. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hand, Carl and Van Liere, Kent. 1984. ‘Religion, Mastery-Over-Nature, and Environmental 
Concern’, Social Forces 63(2) 555–70. https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/63.2.555
Hannam, Ian. 2012. ‘International Perspectives on Legislative and Administrative Reforms as an Aid 
to Better Land Stewardship.’ In Rangeland Stewardship in Central Asia: Balancing Improved 
Livelihoods, Biodiversity Conservation and Land Protection, edited by Victor Squires, 407–29. 
Heidelberg, New York and London: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5367-9
Haraway, Donna J. 2003. Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness. 
Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press. 
Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harvey, David. 2010. The Enigma of Capital and the Crisis of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hatcher, Pascale. 2014. Regimes of Risk: The World Bank and the Transformation of Mining in Asia. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Heissig, Walter. 1980. The Religions of Mongolia. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
High, Mette and Schlesinger, Jonathan. 2010. ‘Rulers and Rascals: The Politics of Gold in 
Mongolian Qing history,’ Central Asian Survey 29(3): 289–304. https://doi.org/10.1080
/02634937.2010.518008
High, Mette. 2012. ‘Cultural Legends in Illegality: Living Outside the Law in the Mongolian Gold 
Mines’. In Change in Democratic Mongolia: Social Relations, Health, Mobile Pastoralism, and 
Mining, edited by Julian Dierkes, 249–71. Leiden: Brill.
High, Mette M. 2017. Fear and Fortune: Spirit Worlds and Emerging Economies in the Mongolian Gold 
Rush. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Hilson, Gavin, and Laing, Tim. 2016. ‘Guyana Gold: A Unique Resource Curse?’ Journal of 
Development Studies 53(2): 229–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2016.1160066
Hornby, Lucy and Khan, Mehreen. 2016. ‘Mongolia asks IMF a rescue loan.’ Last accessed 
30 September 2019. www.ft.com/content/de5ab480-8713-11e6-a75a-0c4dce033ade
Howitt, Richard, Connell, John, and Hirsch, Philip, eds. 1996. Resources, Nations, and Indigenous 
Peoples: Case Studies from Australasia, Melanesia, and Southeast Asia. Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press.
Humphrey, Caroline, Mongush, Marina and Telengid, B. 1993. ‘Attitudes to Nature in Mongolia 
and Tuva: A Preliminary Report’, Nomadic Peoples 33(2) 51–61.
Humphrey, Caroline. 1992. ‘The Moral Authority of the Past in Post-socialist Mongolia’, Religion, 
State and Society 20(3–4): 375–89.
tHe stAte ,  PoPulAr moBIl IsAt Ion AnD golD mIn Ing In mongol IA148
Humphrey, Caroline and Sneath, David. 1999. The End of Nomadism? Society, State and the 
Environment in Inner Asia. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Humphrey, Caroline. 2002. The Unmaking of Soviet Life: Everyday Economies After Socialism. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
Humphrey, Caroline and Hürelbaatar A. 2006. ‘The Term Törü in Mongolian History’. In Imperial 
Statecraft: Political Forms and Techniques of Governance in Inner Asia, Sixth-Twentieth 
Centuries, edited by David Sneath, 265–94. Bellingham: WA Centre for East Asian Studies, 
Western Washington University Press. 
Ichinkhorloo, Byambabaatar. 2018. ‘Collaboration for survival in the age of the market: diverse 
economic practices in postsocialist Mongolia’, Central Asian Survey 37(3): 387–404. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1501347
Idemudia, Uwafiokun. 2010. ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and the Rentier Nigerian 
State: Rethinking the Role of Government and the Possibility of Corporate Social 
Responsibility in the Niger Delta’, Canadian Journal of Development Studies 30(1): 131–51. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2010.9669285
Il Tod. 2012. ‘“Gol, mörnii ursats büreldekh, usny san bükhii gazryn khamgaalaltyn büs, oin san 
bükhii gazart ashigt maltmal khaikh, ashiglakhyg khoriglokh tukhai” khuuliin kheregjiltiin 
tukhai’ [About the implementation of the ‘Law to prohibit mineral exploration and mining 
operations at headwaters of rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir and forest area’]. 
Last accessed 1 March. www.iltod.gov.mn/?p=2513.
Ikon.mn 2015. ‘“Gal Ündesten” kholboony tergüün Ts. Munkhbayar sullagdlaa’. [‘Fire Nation’ 
coalition leader Ts. Munkhbayar is released]. Last accessed 5 November 2019. 
https://ikon.mn/n/lix
Jackson, Sara. 2015. ‘Imagining the Mineral Nation: Contested Nation-Building in 
Mongolia’, Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 43(3): 1–20. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2014.969692
Jackson, Sara, and Dear, Devon. 2016. ‘Resource Extraction and National Anxieties: China’s 
Economic Presence in Mongolia’, Eurasian Geography and Economics 57 (3): 343–73. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2016.1243065
Jargalsaikhan, D. 2015. ‘Bidnii setgelgeenii khotsrogdol ba ediin zasgiin erkh chölöö’ 
[Backwardness of our understanding and the freedom of economy]. Paper presented at the 
For Mining without Populism forum. Ulaanbaatar, 3 September.
Jargalsaikhan, Mendee. 2018. ‘Mongolia’s Dilemma: A Politically Linked, Economically Isolated 
Small Power’. In International Relations in Asia’s Northern Tier: Sino-Russian Relations, 
North Korea, and Mongolia, edited by G. Rozman and S. Radchenko, 157–75. Singapore: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Jigmeddorj, E. 2015. ‘Mongolchuudyn baigali khamgaalakh ulamjlal: Altny kharuulyn jisheegeer’ 
[Mongolians tradition of protecting nature: On the example of gold patrol]. Paper 
presented at the 36th International conference of the Korean Association for Mongolian 
Studies. Seoul, March 2015. 
Joffé, George, Stevens, Paul, George, Tony, Lux, Jonothan and Searle, Carol. 2009. ‘Expropriation 
of Oil and Gas Investments: Historical, Legal and Economic Perspectives in a New 
Age of Resource Nationalism’, Journal of World Energy Law & Business 2(1): 3–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jwelb/jwn022
Kaplonski, Christopher. 2005. ‘The Case of the Disappearing Chinggis Khaan: Dismembering the 
Remembering’, Ab Imperio 4: 147–73.
Khan, Almaz. 1996. ‘Who Are the Mongols? State, Ethnicity and the Politics of Representation 
in the PRC’. In Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan, edited by Melissa J. Brown, 
125–59. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California.
Khazanov, Anatoly M. 1984. Nomads and the Outside World. Trans. Julia Crookenden. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kirkpatrick, Noel. 2018. ‘What is cloud seeding, and does it really work?’ Last accessed 10 March 
2019. www.mnn.com/earth-matters/climate-weather/stories/what-cloud-seeding
Kirsch, Stuart. 2014. Mining Capitalism: The Relationship between Corporations and Their Critics. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Koch, Natalie and Perreault, Tom. 2018. ‘Resource Nationalism’, Progress in Human Geography 
43(4): 611–31. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132518781497 
references 149
Kolås, Åshild. 2014. ‘Degradation Discourse and Green Governmentality in the Xilinguole 
Grasslands of Inner Mongolia’, Development and Change 45(2): 308–28. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12077
Konagaya, Yuki and Lkhagvasuren Ichinkhorloo. 2014. ‘Choijingiin Khurts, Geologi uul uurkhain 
yamny said asan: 2013 ony 3 sard yariltsasan’ [Choijingiin Khurts, Geologist, Formerly 
the Minister of Mining: Interview conducted in March 2013]. Senri Ethnological 
Reports: Mongolia’s Transition from Socialism to Capitalism: Four Views 121(0): 93–180. 
www.minpaku.ac.jp/english/research/activity/publication/other/ser/121
Kradin, Nikolay. 2012. Khünnü Ezent Uls (Xiongnu Empire). N. Ganbat trans. Ulaanbaatar: 
Soyombo Printing. 
Krastev, Ivan. 2004. Shifting Obsessions: Three Essays on the Politics of Anticorruption. Budapest and 
New York: Central European University Press. 
Kretzschmar, Gavin L., Kirchner, Axel. and Sharifzyanova, Liliya. 2010. ‘Resource Nationalism: 
Limits to Foreign Direct Investment’, Energy Journal 31(2): 27–52. https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1317395 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1317395
Larson, Christina. 2014. ‘Prominent Mongolian Environmentalist Given 21-Year Jail Sentence for 
“Terrorism”’. Last accessed 29 January. www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-29/
mongolian-environmentalists-get-21-years-in-prison-for-terrorism
Leiss, William. 1994. The Domination of Nature. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Lhamsuren, Munkh-Erdene. 2006. ‘The Mongolian Nationality Lexicon: From the Chinggisid 
Lineage to Mongolian Nationality (From the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Century)’, 
Inner Asia 8(1): 51–98.
Li, Fabiana. 2015. Unearthing Conflict: Corporate Mining, Activism, and Expertise in Peru. Durham, 
NC and London: Duke University Press. 
Linebaugh, Peter. 2008. The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Magvanjav, Bazaryn and Tsogtbaatar, Choijinjavyn. 2017. Mongol Ulsyn Uul Uurkhai 95: Mongolyn 
uul uurkhain tüükhen khögjliin jim (Mining of Mongolia 95: Routes of the historical 
development of mining in Mongolia). Ulaanbaatar: Inter Press.
Mair, Jonathan. 2012. ‘GDAT 2012: Debating “neoliberalism”’. Last accessed 5 December 2019. 
http://jonathanmair.com/gdat-2012-the-concept-of-neoliberalism-has-become-an-obsta-
cle-to-the-anthropological-understanding-of-the-twenty-first-century/ 
Maniruzzaman, A.F.M. 2009. ‘The Issue of Resource Nationalism: Risk Engineering and Dispute 
Management in the Oil and Gas Industry’, Texas Journal of Oil, Gas, and Energy Law 5(1): 
79–108. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1985171
Marin, Andrei. 2010. ‘Riders Under Storms: Contributions of Nomadic Herders’ Observations to 
Analysing Climate Change in Mongolia’, Global Environmental Change 20(1):162–76. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.10.004
Marsh, Peter K. 2009. The Horse-Head Fiddle and the Cosmopolitan Reimagination of Tradition in 
Mongolia. London: Routledge.
Marzluf, Phillip. 2015. ‘The Pastoral Home School: Rural, Vernacular, and Grassroots Literacies in 
Early Soviet Mongolia’, Central Asian Survey 34(2): 204–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/026
34937.2014.991611
Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority of Mongolia. 2015. ‘Alt 2025’ hötölböriin suuri 
sudalgaany tailan [‘Gold 2025’ programme baseline research report], accessed 27 March 
2018. https://mrpam.gov.mn/public/pages/66/Алт%202025%20хөтөлбөрийн%20
суурь%20судалгааны%20тайлан.pdf 
Mitchell, Timothy. 2002. Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Mongol News. 2011a. ‘Ekh oron nam khaachiv?’ [Where did the Homeland Political Party go?] Last 
accessed 11 April. http://mongolnews.mn/dwq.
Mongol News. 2011b. ‘“Urt nertei” khuuliig shine tösöl avrakh uu alakh uu’ [Will the new 
project save or kill the ‘law with the long name’]. Last accessed 15 February 2019. 
http://mongolnews.mn/cic.
Mongolian Mining Journal. 2008. ‘Mongol ulsyn tösviin zarlaga Genetiin ashgiin tatvaryn 
khuuli batlagdsan üyes ekhlen ogtsom buyu jild dundjaar 56 khuviar nemegdjee’ [Since 
the approval of the windfall tax law GDP of Mongolia dramatically increased average 
56% per year]. Last accessed 11 August 2019. www.mongolianminingjournal.com/
content/15310.shtml. 
tHe stAte ,  PoPulAr moBIl IsAt Ion AnD golD mIn Ing In mongol IA150
Mongγol ulus-un yeke qural (State Great Khural [Parliament] of Mongolia). 1924. Bügüde 
nayiramdaqu monggol arad ulus-un ündüsün qauli [Constitution of the People’s Republic 
of Mongolia]. Assent 29 November. 
Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural (State Great Khural [Parliament] of Mongolia). 1994. ‘Ashigt Maltmalyn 
Tukhai’ [Minerals Law]. Assent 5 June.
Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural (State Great Khural [Parliament] of Mongolia). 1995. ‘Baigali orchnyg 
khamgaalakh tukhai khuuli’ [Environmental Protection Law]. Assent 30 March. 
www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/8935. 
Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural (State Great Khural [Parliament] of Mongolia). 1997. ‘Ashigt Maltmalyn 
Tukhai’ [Minerals Law]. Assent 5 July. http://legalinfo.mn/law/details/7069
Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural (State Great Khural [Parliament] of Mongolia). 2002. ‘Erüügiin Khuuli’ 
[Criminal Law]. Assent 3 January. www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/12172
Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural (State Great Khural [Parliament] of Mongolia). 2006. ‘Ashigt 
Maltmalyn Tukhai (Shinechilsen nairuulga)’ [Minerals Law (Amended)]. Assent 8 July. 
www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/63?lawid=63
Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural (State Great Khural [Parliament] of Mongolia). 2009. ‘Gol, mörnii 
ursats büreldekh, usny san bükhii gazryn khamgaalaltyn büs, oin san bükhii gazart ashigt 
maltmal khaikh, ashiglakhyg khoriglokh tukhai’ [Law to prohibit mineral exploration and 
mining operations at headwaters of rivers, protected zones of the water reservoir and forest 
area]. Assent 16 July. www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/223
Mongol Ulsyn Ikh Khural (State Great Khural [Parliament] of Mongolia). 2010. Ündesnii ayulgüi 
baidlyn üzel barimtlal [National security concept]. Assent 15 July. www.openforum.mn/
res_mat/res_mat-65.pdf
Moreno, Kasia. 2014. ‘Regulatory Environment Has More Impact on Business Than the 
Economy, Say U.S. CEOs’. Last accessed 12 August 2019. www.forbes.com/sites/
forbesinsights/2014/08/12/regulatory-environment-has-more-impact-on-business-than-
the-economy-say-u-s-ceos/-7fa83bb4684d 
Munkherdene, Gantulga. 2018. ‘The Formation and Distribution of Procapitalist Perspectives in 
Mongolia’, Central Asian Survey 37(3): 372–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.20
18.1499609
Munkh-Erdene, Lhamsuren. 2012. ‘Mongolia’s Post-Socialist Transition: A Great Neoliberal 
Transformation’. In Mongolians after Socialism: Politics, Economy, Religion, edited by Bruce 
M. Knauft, Richard Taupier, and Lkham Purevjav, 61–7. Ulaanbaatar: Admon Press. 
Murray-Li, Tanya. 2007. ‘Practices of Assemblage and Community Forest Management’, Economy 
and Society 36(2): 263–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140701254308
Myadar, Orhon. 2011. ‘Imaginary Nomads: Deconstructing the Representation of Mongolia as a Land 
of Nomads’, Inner Asia 13(2): 335–62. https://doi.org/10.1163/000000011799297654
Myadar, Orhon and Jackson, Sara. 2018. ‘Contradictions of Populism and Resource Extraction: 
Examining the Intersection of Resource Nationalism and Accumulation by Dispossession in 
Mongolia’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers. https://doi.org/10.1080/24
694452.2018.1500233
Nasanbaljir, J. 1964. Ar mongoloos manj chin ulsad zalguulj baisan alba 1691–1911 [Tributes of 
Mongolia to the Manchu Qing 1691–1911]. Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevleliin gazar. 
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. 2002. Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey. Princeton, NJ and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
New Zealand Parliament. 1994. ‘Resource Management Amendment Act 1994’. Assent November 
14. www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1994/0105/latest/DLM341408.html
Ninjsemjid. L. 2012. ‘Litsenziin khorig tavigdaj nair bolno gev üü, yerönkhiilögch öö?’ [President, 
hear that there will be a celebration upon release of the licence ban?]. Niigmiin Toil. Last 
accessed 21 December 2019. www.sonin.mn/news/politics-economy/11096.
Odonchimeg, L. 2015. ‘Ch. Saikhanbileg: Mongolyn talyn khuviig 54.9 bolgokh bükh tokhirol-
tsoog khiisen’ [Ch. Saikhanbileg: Have made of the negotiations to make the Mongolian 
percentage of shares 54.9]. Ikon News, 21 May 2015. https://ikon.mn/n/h28
Ödriin Sonin [Daily News]. 2007. ‘Altny uukhainuud baigali orchny nökhön sergeelt khiideggüi’ 
[Gold mining companies fail to engage in environmental rehabilitation]. 30 August. 
Ong, Aihwa. 2006. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press.
Otgonsuren, S. 2011. ‘Margaash “baryn bazalt khiine” gev’ [Said ‘there will be a tiger squeezing’ 
tomorrow]. Last accessed 3 June 2019. http://old.news.mn/r/69457. 
references 151
Papadopoulos, Dimitris. 2010. ‘Insurgent Posthumanism’, Ephemera: Theory and Politics in 
Organization 10(2):134–51.
Peet, Richard. 2003. Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO. New York: Zed Books.
Plueckhahn, Rebekah and Bumochir, Dulam. 2018. ‘Capitalism in Mongolia: Ideology, Practice and 
Ambiguity’, Central Asian Survey 37(3): 341–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.20
18.1510600
Polanyi, Karl. 2001. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. 
Boston: Beacon Press.
Qian, Sima. 1993. Records of the Grand Historian of China. Burton Watson trans. New York: 
Colombia University Press.
Rajak, Dinah. 2011. In Good Company. An Anatomy of Corporate Social Responsibility. Palo Alto, CA: 
Stanford University Press.
Raman, Ravi and Lipschutz, Ronnie eds. 2010. Corporate Social Responsibility: Comparative 
Critiques. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Reeves, Jeffrey. 2011. ‘Resources, Sovereignty, and Governance: Can Mongolia Avoid the “Resource 
Curse”?’ Asian Journal of Political Science 19(2): 170–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/02185
377.2011.600165
Richardson, Tanya and Weszkalnys, Gisa. 2014. ‘Introduction: Resource Materialities’, 
Anthropological Quarterly 87(1): 5–30. doi:10.1353/anq.2014.0007
Riley, Charles. 2012. ‘World’s Best Economies’. Last accessed 13 August. https://money.cnn.com/
gallery/news/economy/2012/08/13/worlds-best-economies/5.html
Ross, Michael. 1999. ‘Political Economy of the Resource Curse’, World Politics 51(2): 297–322. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100008200
Rossabi, Morris. 2005. Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Rosser, Andrew. 2006. ‘IDS Working Paper 268: The political economy of the Resource Curse: A 
Literature Survey’. Last accessed 1 January 2019. www.ids.ac.uk/files/WP268.pdf
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Warner, Andrew M. 2001. ‘Natural Resources and Economic Development: 
The Curse of Natural Resources’, European Economic Review 45(4–6): 827–38. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00125-8 
Sahlins, Marshall. 1972. Stone Age Economics. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
Sanchata, Mariko. 2012. ‘Mongolia aims to woo foreign investors’. Last accessed  31 October 
2019. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702047129045780902827385
17610.html
San Juan, Epifanio. 2002. ‘Nation-State, Postcolonial Theory, and Global Violence’, Social Analysis 
46(2): 11–32. 
Sanchir, Jargalsaikhan. 2016. ‘Bayalgiin ündesnii khyanalt’ [National control on resources], 
Shinjeech 1: 54–79. 
Sanders, Alan. 1996. ‘Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy’. In Mongolia in Transition: Old Patterns 
and New Challenges, edited by Ole Bruun and Ole Odgaard, 217–52. Richmond: Curzon. 
Sansar, B. 2015. ‘“Altan Dornod Mongol” kompani khamgiin ikh ashiglaltyn litsenz ezemshdeg’ 
[‘Altan Dornod Mongol’ company possesses the largest number of extraction licences]. Last 
accessed 10 November. www.olloo.mn/n/22511.html
Sassen, Saskia. 1996. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia 
University Press.
Sawyer, Suzana. 2004. Crude Chronicles: Indigenous Politics, Multinational Oil and Neoliberalism in 
Ecuador. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Semuun, B. 2013. ‘Bayalag ünegüidsen shaltgaan’ [The reason for resources to become valueless]. 
Last accessed 18 September 2019. www.news.mn/?id=143134
Shaiko, Ronald G. 1987. ‘Religion, Politics and Environmental Concern: A Powerful Mix of 
Passions’, Social Science Quarterly 68(2): 244–62. 
Shever, Elana. 2012. Resources for Reform: Oil and Neoliberalism in Argentina. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press.
Shiirev, Ts. 2017. ‘Noyon uulyg yagaad ukhaj bolokhgüi talaarkh olny tanil khümüüsiin setgegdlees’ 
[From the impression of some famous people about why Noyon mountain cannot be 
extracted]. Last accessed 8 February 2019. http://unuudur.mn/article/94583 
Shimamura, Ippei. 2014. ‘Ancestral Spirits Love Mining Sites: Shamanic Activities Around 
a Copper-Gold Mining Site in Mongolia’, Inner Asia 16(2): 393–408. https://doi.
org/10.1163/22105018-12340025 
tHe stAte ,  PoPulAr moBIl IsAt Ion AnD golD mIn Ing In mongol IA152
Shore, Cris and Wright, Susan. 1997. The Anthropology of Politics. Perspectives on Governance and 
Power. London: Routledge. 
Shore, Cris, Wright, Susan and Pero, Davide, eds. 2011. Policy Worlds: Anthropology and the 
Analysis of the Contemporary Power. New York and Oxford: Berghahn. 
Simonov, Eugine. 2013. ‘Short History of the Law with the Long Name’. Last accessed 9 November 
2019. www.transrivers.org/documents/rivers-and-mining/the-short-history-of-the-law-
with-long-name/ 
Smith, Jessica R. 2013. ‘The Politics of Pits and the Materiality of Mine Labor: Making Natural 
Resources in the American West’, American Anthropologist 115(4): 582–94. doi:10.1111/
aman.12050
Sneath, David. 2001. ‘Notions of Rights over Land and the History of Mongolian Pastoralism’, Inner 
Asia 3(1): 41–58. https://doi.org/10.1163/146481701793647750
Sneath, David. 2002. ‘Mongolia in the “Age of the Market”: Pastoral Land-use and the Development 
Discourse’. In Markets and Moralities: Ethnographies of Postsocialism, edited by C. Humphrey 
and R. Mandel, 101–210. Oxford: Berg.
Sneath, David. 2003. ‘Land Use, the Environment and Development in Post-
Socialist Mongolia’, Oxford Development Studies 31(4): 441–59. https://doi.
org/10.1080/1360081032000146627
Sneath, David. 2004.  ‘Property Regimes and Sociotechnical Systems: Rights Over Land in 
Mongolia’s “Age of the Market”’. In Property in Question: Value Transformation in the Global 
Economy, edited by Katherine Verdery and Caroline Humphrey, 161–84. Oxford and New 
York: Berg. 
Sneath, David. ed. 2006. Imperial Statecraft: Political Forms and Techniques of Governance in Inner 
Asia, Sixth-Twentieth Centuries. Bellingham: WA Centre for East Asian Studies, Western 
Washington University Press.
Sneath, David. 2007. The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society and Misinterpretations 
of Nomadic Inner Asia. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Sneath, David. 2010. ‘Political Mobilization and the Construction of Collective Identity in 
Mongolia’,  Central Asia Survey 29(3): 251–67. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2
010.518009
Sneath, David. 2012. ‘The “Age of the Market” and the Regime of Debt: The Role of Credit in the 
Transformation of Pastoral Mongolia’, Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale 20(4): 
458–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8676.2012.00223.x
Snow, Keith Harmon. 2010. ‘The naked face of capitalism: Goldman Prizewinner Shoots up 
Foreign Mining Firms in Mongolia: Western deception and the extinction of the nomads’. 
Last accessed February 2011. https://survivingcapitalism.blogspot.com/2010/12/naked-
face-of-capitalism-goldman.html 
Snow, Keith Harmon. 2014. ‘The naked face of capitalism: Goldman Prizewinner Gets 21 
Years for Resistance to Genocide: Foreign Mining, State Corruption and Genocide in 
Mongolia’. Last accessed 9 February 2019. www.consciousbeingalliance.com/2014/02/
goldman-prizewinner-gets-21-years-for-resistance-to-genocide/
Sodbaatar, Ya. 2013. Mongolyn uul uurkhain tüükh [History of mining in Mongolia]. Ulaanbaatar: 
Admon Press.
Song, Ligang and Woo, Wing Thye eds. 2008. China’s Dilemma: Economic Growth, The Environment 
and Climate Change. Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, Brookings Institution Press and Social 
Science Academic Press (China). 
Standartchillyn ündesnii zövlol (National Council of Standardisation). 2012. Mongol kiril üsgiin 
latin galig [Latin transliteration of the Mongolian Cyrillic]. Approved 16 February. 
www.estandard.gov.mn/index.php?module=standart&cmd=standart_desc&sid=2579
Stanway, David and Edwards, Terrence. 2012. ‘Resource-rich Mongolia plays populist card in 
run-up to polls’. Last accessed 11 August 2019. www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/
wire-news/-1824877.html 
Steger, Manfred B. and Roy, Ravi K. 2010. Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Stépanoff, Charles, Marchina, Charlotte, Fossier, Camille and Bureau, Nicolas. 2017. 
‘Animal Autonomy and Intermittent Coexistences: North Asian Modes of 
Herding’, Current Anthropology 58(1): 57–81. www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/
full/10.1086/690120?mobileUi=0 
references 153
Sternberg, Troy. 2010. ‘Unraveling Mongolia’s Extreme Winter Disaster of 2010’, Nomadic Peoples 
14(1): 72–86. https://doi.org/10.3167/np.2010.140105
Stiglitz, Joseph E., Sen, Amartya, and Fitoussi, Jean-Paul. 2010. Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP 
Doesn’t Add Up. New York: New Press.
Swire, Mary. 2009. ‘Mongolia to rescind mining windfall tax’. Last accessed 28 August 2019. 
www.tax-news.com/news/Mongolia_To_Rescind_Mining_Windfall_Tax____38740.html
Tanaka, Katsuhiko. 2002. ‘Kokka naku shite minzoku ha ikinokoreru ka: Buriyaato Mongoru no 
chishikijintachi’ [Can a Nation Survive without a State? Intellectuals of Buryat Mongols], 
in E. Kuroda (ed.), Minzoku no undou to shidousha tachi [National Movements and Their 
Leaders]: 74–95. Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppan.
Taussig, Michael. 1992. The Nervous System. New York and London: Routledge.
Terenguto, A. 2004. ‘Relationship Between Man and Nature: A Hermeneutical Approach to 
Interpreting the Affective Thinking of the Mongolian People’, Inner Asia 6(1): 81–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1163/146481704793647243
Tolson, Michael. 2014. ‘Eco-warrior or eco-terrorist? Mongolia jails environmentalist for 
21 years’. Last accessed 28 January. https://asiancorrespondent.com/2014/01/
mongolia-tsetsegee-munkhbayar-jail/-Ew7EPjeEvk6t44Av.97
Tömör Temür Tamerlan. 2018. ‘1990 ony khuvisgal khuvisgal bish baisan’ [The 1990 
revolution was not a revolution]. Facebook, 28 May 2018. www.facebook.com/
groups/1377355269164330/permalink/2163713927195123/
Torbati, Yeganeh. 2016. ‘Kerry Hails Mongolia as “Oasis of Democracy” in Tough Neighbourhood’. 
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-mongolia-idUSKCN0YR02T.
Trading Economics. 2018. ‘Mongolia GDP Growth Rate YoY’. Last accessed 12 September 2018. 
https://tradingeconomics.com/mongolia/gdp-growth.
Tse, Pui-Kwan. 2007. 2006 Minerals Year Book: Mongolia. Last accessed 18 September 2018. 
https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/prd-wret/assets/palladium/production/mineral-
pubs/country/2006/myb3-2006-mg.pdf 
Tsenddoo, B. 2015. Irgenshliin zamd: Mongolyn soyolyn almanakh (On the way towards civilization: 
Almanac of Mongolian culture). Ulaanbaatar: Nepko Publishing.
Tseren, P. 1996. ‘Traditional Pastoral Practice of the Oirat Mongols and Their Relationship with 
the Environment’. In Culture and Environment in Inner Asia. Volume 2: Society and Culture, 
edited by C. Humphrey and D. Sneath, 147–59. Cambridge: White Horse Press.
Tsetsentsolmon, B. 2014. ‘The “Gong Beat” against the “Uncultured”: Contested Notions of Culture 
and Civilization in Mongolia’, Asian Ethnicity 15(4): 422–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/14
631369.2014.947060
Tsing, Anna. 2005. Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Tsing, Anna. 2012. ‘Unruly Edges: Mushrooms as Companion Species’, Environmental Humanities 
1: 141–54. www.environmentandsociety.org/node/5415
Tsogzolmaa, J. 2010. ‘Geologi uul uurkhain üildveriin said asan, doctor Ch. Khurts: Khuulia khui-
valdaand tokhiruulsanaas bid Luugiin golyn tolgoin ordoo aldsan shüü dee’ [Ch. Khurts, 
doctor and former minister of geology and mining productions: We lost our deposit in 
Luugiin Tolgoi for fitting our law to conspiracy]. Last accessed 11 August 2019. http://
news.gogo.mn/r/67550. 
Tuya, S. and Battomor, B. 2012. Uul uurkhai mongol orond (Mining in Mongolia). Ulaanbaatar: 
Jicom Press. 
Ul-Oldokh, Ch. 2014. ‘S. Narangerel: Ts. Munkhbayar nar ingej shiitgüülekh uchirgüi’ (S. 
Narangerel: Ts. Munkhbayar and others are not supposed to be sentenced like this). Last 
accessed 24 January 2020. www.sonin.mn/news/politics-economy/23516
Upton, Caroline. 2010. ‘Nomadism, Identity and the Politics of Conservation’, Central Asian Survey 
29(3): 305–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2010.518010
Upton, Caroline. 2012. ‘Mining, Resistance and Pastoral Livelihoods in Contemporary Mongolia’. 
In Change in Democratic Mongolia: Social Relations, Health, Mobile Pastoralism, and Mining, 
edited by Julian Dierkes, 223–49. Leiden: Brill.
Vanoli, André. 2005. A History of National Income Accounting. Amsterdam: IOS Press.
Venzon, Cliff. 2018. ‘Flare-up of resource nationalism burns miners across Asia’. Last 
accessed 11 August 2019. https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Commodities/
Flare-up-of-resource-nationalism-burns-miners-across-Asia 
tHe stAte ,  PoPulAr moBIl IsAt Ion AnD golD mIn Ing In mongol IA154
Verdery, Katherine and Humphrey, Caroline. 2004. ‘Introduction: Raising Questions about 
Property’. In Property in Question: Value Transformation in the Global Economy, edited by 
Katherine Verdery and Caroline Humphrey, 1–29. Oxford and New York: Berg. 
Vitebsky, Piers. 1995. ‘From Cosmology to Environmentalism: Shamanism as Local Knowledge in a 
Global Setting’. In Counterworks: Managing the Diversity of Knowledge, edited by R. Fardon, 
182–203. London: Routledge.
Vivoda, Vlado. 2009. ‘Resource Nationalism, Bargaining and International Oil Companies: 
Challenges and Change in the New Millennium’, New Political Economy 14(4): 517–34. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13563460903287322
Vladimirtsov, B. I. 1971. Comparative Grammar of the Mongolian Written Language and the Khalkha 
Dialect. Cuckfield: Gregg Publishing
Walker, Danny. 2001. ‘Placer Gold Mining in Mongolia – the New Zealand Way’, World Placer 
Journal 2(1): 36–49. 
Watson, Nicholas. 2012. ‘Mongolia: Mine ownership gets political’. Last accessed 11 August 2019. 
www.ft.com/content/91195805-14ed-3839-8b8c-a72ea6609cd4
Watts, Michael. 2003. ‘Development and Governmentality’, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 
24(1): 6–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9493.00140
Watts, Michael. 2004. ‘Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, 
Nigeria’, Geopolitics 9(1): 50–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040412331307832
Welker, Marina. 2014. Enacting the Corporation:  An American Mining Firm in Post-Authoritarian 
Indonesia. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Weszkalnys, Gisa. 2011. ‘Cursed Resources, or Articulations of Economic Theory in the Gulf of 
Guinea’, Economy and Society 40(3): 345–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2
011.580177
Williams, Dee Mack. 2000. ‘Representation of Nature on the Mongolian Steppe: An Investigation 
of Scientific Knowledge Construction’, American Anthropologist 102(3): 503–19. 
https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.2000.102.3.503
Wilson, Jeffrey. 2015. ‘Understanding Resource Nationalism: Economic Dynamics and Political 
Institutions’, Contemporary Politics 21(4): 399–416. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.
2015.1013293
World Bank. 2004. ‘Mongolia: Mining Sector Sources of Growth Study’. Last accessed 15 September 
2018. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/14397
World Bank. 2012. ‘What is behind Mongolia’s Economic Boom?’ Last accessed 
11 August 2019. www.worldbank.org/en/news/video/2012/02/28/what-behind-
mongolia-economic-boom
Yeh, Emily. 2005. ‘Green Governmentality and Pastoralism in Western China: 
“Converting Pastures to Grasslands”’, Nomadic Peoples 9(1): 9–30. https://doi.
org/10.3167/082279405781826164
Zulbayar, B. 2015. ‘Today’s dilemma: Short term tactics or long term strategy?’ Last accessed 
11 August 2019. http://ubpost.mongolnews.mn/?p=16531 
155
accessing the state  112
activism  82, 88, 140
advocacy organisations  81–3, 90, 
95, 99
AGR Limited  72
Albright, Madeleine  28–9
Algaa Namgar  32–7, 43–4, 54, 56, 67
Ali, Saleem  2, 40–2, 49
Altangerel, P.  110
Amarjargal Rinchinnyam  xviii
Amarsanaa, S.  88, 91
Anderson, Desaix  28
anthropogenic forces  131–2
Appel, Hannah  23–4, 37, 48, 139
The Asia Foundation (TAF)  30, 89, 
94–9, 121
Asian Development Bank (ADB)  
26–7, 30
AUM (gold mining company)  125
Avirmed, S.  43
Badamsambuu, G.  103
Baker, James  28
balancing action taken by the state  
53–9
Baljinnyam, B.  116
Ballard, Chris  62–3
Banks, Glenn  62–3
Bargh, Maria  139
Barrington, Lowell  9–10, 12, 22, 
102, 117
Batbaatar (company)  77–9
Batbayar Nyamjav  56
Batbayar Jargalan  56
Batbold Sukhbaatar  108–9
Bat-Erdene Badmaanyambuu  105
Battulga Khaltmaa  43
Battuvshin, B.  88
bayalag büteegchid  17
bayalgiin ündesnii khyanalt  41;  see 
also national resource control
Bayarsaikhan Namsrai  64, 85, 88–91, 
95–9, 103
Bear, Laura  61
Bebbington, Anthony  3–4, 11, 62, 90, 
94, 102
berry trees, planting of  98–9
Blaser, Mario  3
Boas, Taylor  5–6
Bogd Khan  51
Bolor, D.  25
Boroo Gold  34–6
Bremmer, Ian  40
Buddhism  47
Byambaa, J.  43
Byambabaabar Ichinkhorloo  125–6
Byambajav, Dalaibuyan  33, 81, 99
Byambasuren Dash  xvi, 16, 26–31, 36
de la Cadena, Marisol  3
‘camels’ protest (2002)  121
Canadian Centerra Gold Inc.  xii–xiii
Canadian Mining and Energy 
Corporation (Cameco)  72
Centerra Gold (company)  72, 108–9
Chandmani Dambabazar  87–8
Childs, John  2, 41–2
China  8–9, 21, 24–7, 31–2, 137–8
China Shenhua Energy  62
Chinbat Lhagva  ix, 63, 67–72, 130
Chinggis Khan  101, 107, 116, 
118–19, 129
Choijilsuren Battogtokh  137
civic principles  9–10
Index
InDex156
civil society  88, 96–9, 140
climate change  123
Clinton, Hillary  28–9
Cold Gold Mongolia (CGM)  64, 
71–9, 82
Collier, Paul  xv
‘commoning’ process  3
community-based organisations  81–2
compensation payments  76, 106, 110
constitutions of Mongolia  12, 52, 54, 
109, 116–17
Cordero, Raúl R.  xiv
Coronil, Fernando  101
Croft, Layton  89–90, 94–7
crystal extraction  46
Dagvadori, D.  132
Daly, Herman E.  xiv
Dashdemberel Ganbold  30, 104–5, 
109, 115, 125, 136
Da Silva, Luis  xiv
Davaa, N.  107
Davaanyam, P.  107
‘debt trap’  137–8
deification and de-deification of the 
state  101–2, 110
desertification  123
Dierkes, Julian  2, 41–2
discursive resources  58–9, 90
donor organisations  17–18, 89, 95–9
Dulam, S.  132
Ekins, Paul  xiv
election rigging  108
elite groups  22, 87
Elizabeth II, Queen  31
Empson, Rebecca  xv, xviii, 2, 32, 
41–3, 53
Enkhbold, Z.  91
Enkhjargal Dandinbazar  34
Enkhsaikhan Mendsaikhan  33, 65
Enkhsaikhan Oomoo  55
environmental protection  xi, xiv–xv, 
9–12, 18–19, 53, 68–9, 74, 84–5, 
91, 98, 103, 117–19, 124, 130–3, 
136, 139
Environmental Protection Law  52, 
105–10
Equatorial Guinea  23, 48
Erdenebaatar, I.  65
Erdenebat, B.  65
Erdenet (company)  56, 106
Erel (company)  63–7, 70–1, 76, 86–7, 
91, 93, 103
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland  5
Erkhis Mining  73–4
ethnicity  9–12
ethnography  1, 101–2
Fire Nation (FN) coalition  107–15, 128
food production  70
Fortuna’s daughter, law of  56
Fratkin, Elliot  123
free market economy  46, 58
Friedman, Milton  45
Galdan Khan  49
Ganbold, Misheelt  2, 40–2, 49
Gans-Morse, Jordan  5–6
Gantulga, N.  125–6
Gatsuurt (company)  xii, 63–4, 67–71, 
73, 76
Gilberthorpe, Emma  13, 63
Gluchowski, Peter  88
gold mining  38, 56–7, 60–4, 68–72, 
75–9, 85, 93
gold patrol  50
Gold Programmes  32, 58
Goldin, Ian  xiv
Goldman Prize  84, 93–5, 111, 114, 
126–9
Gorbachev, Mikhail  28
Graeber, David  29
greed  47
Group for Debates in Anthropological 
Theory (GDAT)  6
Habermas, Jürgen  102
Hannam, Ian  123
Haraway, Donna J.  133
Harvey, David  29–30
Hatcher, Pascale  xvi
Henke, Michael  88–9
High, Mette  xv, 52, 65, 95
homeland claims  22
‘horse’ operation (2011)  110–11
Humphrey, Caroline  xv, 26, 102, 124
hunter-gatherer societies  122
Hürelbaatar, A.  102
imagined communities  4, 36, 101
imprisonment  114, 117–19, 125, 127
independence of Mongolia  21–6
indigenisation  4–5, 7–8
‘indigenous’, two meanings of  5
International Monetary Fund (IMF)  
26–30, 57, 137
internationalisation  93–4
Ivanhoe Mines  57, 95, 97, 108
Jackson, Sara  22, 41
Jacques, Jean-Sebastien  40
Jargalsaikhan Dugar  11–12, 33, 35, 54
Javkhlan Samand  107
Johnston, Robert  40
Kerry, John  29
Khan Shijir (company)  73–4
InDex 157
Khashchuluun Chuluundorj  34
Khüitnii Am mine  74–7
Khurts Choijin  16, 43–7, 50–5
Kirsch, Stuart  xv, 24, 36, 61, 63
Koch, Natalie  2, 41–2




law of nature  132
Law of Petition  118
‘law with the long name’  67, 69–70, 
82, 104, 119, 125, 136;  see also 
prohibition by law of ‘mineral 
exploration and mining operations at 
headwaters of rivers, protected zones 
of the water reservoir and forest area’
‘legitimate state’ concept  118–19
Lhamsuren, Munkh-Erdene  7, 9, 25, 
30, 118
Libya  23
licences for mining  34–5, 54–5, 66–7, 
70–1, 79 106;  international  40
‘lifeworld’ concept  102
Linebaugh, Peter  3
Li Peng  27
Lkhagvadorj, O.  107
lobbying  91, 119
local communities  13–14
Lundeejantsan, D.  91
Mair, Jonathan  5–6
malchin identity  125, 128, 130, 133
marketisation  7–8
Mearns, Robin  123
Mineral Resources and Petroleum 
Authority of Mongolia 
(MRPAM)  34
Minerals Laws  33–6, 44, 47, 54–6
mining industry  13–15, 51–2, 60–2, 
77–9, 108–9, 138;  see also gold 
mining
mining technology  68
minority groups  22
Mitchell, Timothy  30
mobile phones, use of  105
mobilisations  82–4
Modu Chanyu  49
Mongol Empire  118
Mongolian Democratic Party 
(MDP)  84
Mongolian Mining Journal  57
Mongolian National Mining Association 
(MNMA)  11
Mongolian Nature Protection Coalition 
(MNPC)  96, 103, 109, 121
Mongolian People’s Party (MPP)  84
mongolisation  5, 7–8
Mongolor project  50–1
Mönkh Tenger  118–19, 130–2
Motherland Party  65–7, 91–2
multinational corporations  61–2;  
image of  62
multipartite relationships  1, 13
Munkhbayar Tsetsegee  xi, 12, 18, 
65–6, 76, 84–7, 90–9, 102–19, 
121–33
Munkherdene, Gantulga  26
My Mongol Homeland coalition  92
Myadar, Orhon  41
nation-building  7–9, 17, 23–4, 37, 60, 
139–41
nation-states  6, 12
national identity  122–3, 133
national resource control  41–3, 48–56
nationalisation  91–4
nationalism  xviii, 2–3, 8–10, 15–18, 
22–3, 37, 49, 58, 60–5, 70, 102, 117, 
136–9;  civic  10;  ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
10, 46–7, 60;  see also ‘resource 
nationalism’
‘navigation’ (Bear)  61, 64–5, 71, 74–8
neoliberalisation  4–6, 8, 140
neoliberalism  xviii, 3–10, 22, 24, 41, 
45, 137–40
New Zealand  72
nomads  122, 132
Noyon Mountain  xii–xiii, 109
Ochirbat Punsalmaa  xvi, 16, 31–6, 46, 
54, 85, 138
Odod Gold (company)  74–7, 82
oil supplies  28
Ongi River  85, 90–1, 98
Ongi River Movement (ORM)  81–2, 
86–92, 99, 103, 121, 125–9
Orgilmaa Zundui-Yondon  73–9, 82
original environmentalist society  18
Otgonbayar, S.  65
overgrazing  123, 133
Oyu Tolgoi (OT) mine  40, 57–8, 106, 
137–8
Oyun Sanjaasuren  36
pastoralism  19, 49, 116, 122–33;  
‘return’ to  124–30;  sustainability 
of  123–4, 129–33
Perreault, Tom  2, 41–2
Philippines, the  xvi
Polanyi, Karl  139
political leaders in Mongolia  21–2, 
26, 37
political parties in Mongolia  84, 91, 
112;  see also Motherland Party
populism  139
power relations  83–4
InDex158
precarity, forms of  21–5, 31, 36–7
privatisation  30
‘privileged objects’  48
prohibition by law of ‘mineral 
exploration and mining operations at 
headwaters of rivers, protected zones 
of the water reservoir and forest area’ 
69, 75–6, 82, 96, 104–5, 108–10, 
115, 119, 136
‘protective culture’  42–3
protestors  17–18;  power of  14–15
Puraam (company)  108
Qian, Sima  49
Raash, R.  91
Rajak, Dinah  13, 63
Reeves, Jeffrey  2
rehabilitation of land  68–74, 77, 93
reification of the national economy  
11–13, 21–5, 51, 58
resistance against mining  73–5, 78
‘resource curse’ concept  2–3, 13, 15
‘resource nationalism’  xvi–xvii, 2–4, 7, 
10, 16, 37–8, 40–3, 47–9, 53–4, 58
respect for the state  114
‘responsible mining’  96–9
return to the countryside  127–8
Rio Tinto (company)  62, 40, 57–8, 97, 
106, 137–8
river movements  18, 65–6, 92–3, 96–9
rivers, protection of  103–5
Rossabi, Morris  7, 30, 36
Roth, Pedro  xiv
Roy, Ravi  6
rule of law  103
Russia  21, 24–8, 31–2;  see also Soviet 
Union
Sahlin, Marshall  122
Saikhanbileg Chimed  xii–xiv, 58, 137
San Juan, Epifanio  12
Sanchir, Jargalsaikhan  2, 41–2
‘scissors’ metaphor  xiii–xiv
self-funding  99
shamanism  131–2
small- and medium-scale enterprises  
57, 62, 78
Smith, Jane  95
Sneath, David  26, 48, 52–3, 116, 
121, 123
Snow, Keith Harmon  96–7, 113, 115
social movements  102
Sodbaatar, Ya  51
South Sudan  23
sovereignty  6, 23–4, 37
Soviet Union  8–10, 46;  see also 
Russia
state-crafting  7–9, 17, 60, 139–41
statism  13, 60–4, 70, 102, 139–40
Steger, Manfred  6
suing the government  110
sustainability  123–4, 129–33
Tavan Tolgoi mine  108
technocrats  43–4, 55
television documentaries  105
Terenguto, A.  124
terrorism  113–14, 137
‘third neighbour’ policy  21–6, 
29–32, 37
Tolson, Michael  114–15
transnational corporations (TNCs)  
13–15, 83 
‘trusting relationships’  xv–xvi, 53–4
Tseren, P.  124
Tsetsentsolmon, B.  122
Tsing, Anna  83, 94–7, 133
Tsog, L.  107
Turquoise Hill Resources  40
Ulaan Lake  85
Ulaanbaatar  87, 89, 126–9
ündesnii üzel  23, 37, 46
United Movement of Mongolian 
Rivers and Lakes (UMMRL)  96, 
106–7, 109
United Nations  5
United States  24–31;  Agency for 
International Development  86
Upton, Caroline  124, 127–8
Uradyn Bulag  27
uranium mining  46
Uuls Zaamar mine  77–9, 82
Uyanga  66, 86
Uyanga Gantomor  xii–xiv, 127
Venezuela  101
Verdery, Katherine  xv
violence, political  113–14
Walker, Danny  68, 71–9
water supplies  17, 85–6
Watts, Michael  3
Webb, Tristan  xv, xviii, 2, 32, 41–3, 53
Welker, Marina  61
Western concepts and practices  99
Weszkalnys, Gisa  2
windfall tax  56–8, 69–70, 74, 82
Winters, Alan  xiv
World Bank  26–7, 30–3, 44–5
Xiongnu Empire  48
Zag River  136
zakh zeeliin üye  6
Zandaahüügiin Enhbold  66
Zorig Sanjaasuren  36

